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PART ONE
BACKGROUND

CHAFTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the dissertation is to bring together
and examine the criteria of verification to which SK*^ appeal-
ed in his effort to make secure the postulate that truth is
subjectivity.
Doubtless our right even to expect of SK that he face
the question of a test for truth may be contested on the
ground that ex hypothesi the only possible way to understand
an existent ial truth is for the existing individual to go
right into the richness of that truth itself through a pas-
sionate inward decision. Can one appreciate the taste of a
pear, e.g., before he enters into the experience of eating
the pear? And must he not be willing first to learn of the
doctrine? Or, can one fully know what love means until he
gives himself over to the experience of love?
Our confusion grows out of the fact that only a half-
truth is here stated. Surely, one must decisively exist to
knov; what is the existential meaning of an inward truth's
1. Here ana through the dissertation "SK" will be general
ly substituted for the full name, Soren Kierkegaard.

5fullness. But is this the whole ol' the problem? Suppose one
suggests, for example, that by the act of standing erect on
one's head for six weeks certain existential truths are gain-
ed which could never be learned outside of the experience:
yet, has not the speaker the onus upon him to show us that
these truths are worth knowing? The acts of stanaing on the
head and not standing on the head compete as alternatives.
V.Tiich alternate ought to be elected by a rational man must be
settled apart from the existential situation itself.
And so with Christianity; becoming a Christian or re-
maining a pagan vie as existential possibilities. The Chris-
tian says that one can be a Christian only by entering exis-
tentially • into Christianity, while the pa^^ n says that one
can be a pagan only by entering existentially into paganism.
Which shall one decide for? That question can be answered
only outside of the existential pattern itself. Hence, cri-
teria are called for.
To make the point as clear as possible, let us suppose
that by entering inwardly into the experience of taking poi-
son , one learns certain subjective truths he would never
learn outside the experience. Surely, the decision to be ex-
istential is separate from the existential situation itself,
since in this illustration being existential is quite equiva-
lent to being non- existential (dead).
The problem of the aissertation is timely and intrigu-
ing. The timeliness grows out of the wide influence that SK
is exerting both on the Continent, in Barthianism, and in
rioirivv
4America, in the Reinhold Niebuhr school of theological real-
ism,
SK's complexity makes the vrark challenging. From
every angle that one views 6K, problems mount rather than di-
minish. The following points suggest how involved is the
question of Kierkegaardian existentialism.
First, the motive which SK had in mind v.'hen he sepa-
rated the passionate truth of inwardness from the self-
assurance of science and logic was the highest. He earnest-
ly sought to make men Christians and individuals, inward as
well as outward. In our age of socialization, communism, and
mass industrialization, whatever of SK's vision retains rele-
vance is still quite in oraer. Individual creativity must be
saved.
Second , SK rebelled against the standard criteria of
verification in philosophy of religion, such as coherence,
the Bible, the church, rationalism, etc. The following ex-
citing question, therefore, is left open: On what grounds
shall the understanding be used to judge what it is to be-
lieve against the understanding?
Third, from the one fountain, bitter and sweet waters
have flowed. On the one hand, SK has fathered a conservative,
right-wing school of discontinuity theists, as Barth and
Brunner in Frotestantism and Marcel and Haecker in Catholi-
cism. On the other hand, an equally s pirited left-wing fel-
lowship of this-worldly individualists have taken root.
Heidegger and Jaspers, for example, by inverting the psychol-

5ologlcal theism of SK, replaced the latter *s God ccncept
with the structure of an aggressive atheism. Das Null re-
places SK*s God in an effort to make room for more inaividual
passion. Jean-i:'aul Sartre heralds this gospel of atheistic
existentialism in moaern i^^rance, preaching (with great exis-
tential conviction) that the appeal to G-od is but another
objective crutch for a lazy person to rest on.^ ?i/hatever be
our choice between SK and Sartre, surely, the judgment of
Searles is well grounded;
The fact that the contemporary movement is elastic
enough to entertain extremes so diverse as orthodox
Catholicism and secular theism, extreme pessimism and
nihilism on the one hand, and optimism on the other,
is indicative of the ambiguity of the concept . of exis-
tence and of the catholicity of the movement,'-^
To the author's knowledge, SK devotes no systematic
attention in his entire voluminous authorship to the problem
of verification. The basic reason for this, obviously, is
that he never elected it as his emphasis to move into the
area of criteria. His concern was to make men individuals
and Christians. (These two tasks seem to be the same thing
stated in different wordage. ) "For freedom, therefore, I am
fighting... I am fighting for future, for either/or. That is
2. "What an atheistic existentialist like Sartre asserts
...is that we have here only another endeavor .. .to found
values not in free human actions but in objective facts.
True, the facts this time are not sense-data but supernatural
mysteries or eternal truths of reason. Yet they stilH are
facts, which v/e discover existing objectively outside our-
selves and on v;hich we can rely, in blissful dependence, to
guide our actions toward the good and the right." Grene , DF,
13.
3. Searles, Art., 174-175.

6the treasure I desire to bequeath to those whom I love in
the world.
The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I
truly am as an author, that I am and was a religious
author, that the whole of my work as an author is re-
lated to Christianity, to the problem 'of becoming a
Christian. '
^
SK believed that the desire for objective criteria is
itself sinful, for it encourages that feeling of self-
assurance which keeps a man uncommitted in his heart. If a
person believes , he needs no proof; and if a person does not
believe , then formal proof will not help him anyway, nee
the only proof of Christianity is the believing. The com-
mitted man is far too busy being a Christian to dissipate
his time and energy in anxious concern over objectivity and
proofs.
This was the limitation under which Kierkegaard pen-
ned his vi/orks. It surely is the privilege of any author to
announce how he plans to delimit the scope of his writing,
although he is quite responsible for what he finally does
with that privilege.
It would be ouite inaccurate, however, to say that SK
completely avoided dipping into the problem of verification.
Kierkegaard, "speaking as a fool among fools," actually
yielded to sinful huinanity by outlining a clear-cut program
for the one to follow who desires to learn how the understand-
4. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 149.
5. Kierkegaard, PV, 5-6.

7Ing is to be used when faith believes against the understand-
ing. The following three volumes contain SK*s basic answer
to the problem of verification: The Journals, Concludiing Un-
scientific r'ostscript , and Philosophical i^'ragments * A close
examination of these works reveals that SK. had one basic cri-
terion in mente v;hen he defended the hypothesis that truth is
subjectivity. It may be stated in various ways, but in each
case the principle, that "the religious man has his satis-
faction within himself,"^ is reiterated.
The dissertation is divided into five unequal sections.
First , there is the introductory material, which is here be-
ing detailed. Second , in order that the problem of the dis-
sertation may appear in perspective, the personal dilemmas
which drove SK into his vocation v ill be examined. Third
,
SK»s negative criteria of verification will be detailed.
Doubtless this negative contribution to the history of phil-
osophy of religion, together with the magnificently warm and
stimulating literary discourses on religion, sum up two of
the reasons why SK is assured a permanent place in those
circles where great minds gather to discuss the spirit of man.
Fourth , the difficult formulation of the positive criteria
will be attempted. The scattered threads of personal offense,
existential contradiction, passion, suffering, a coordinated
life, and the changelessness of duty will be seamed into a
pattern. Fifth, and finally, the dissertation will draw to
6. Kierkegaard, GUP, 515-516.

a close by a siiramation and evaluation of Klerkegaardian ex
istentialism from the perspective of the problem of verifi
cation.

PART TWO
KIERKEGAARD'S PROBLEMS

GHAj:'TER TV/0
THE I'AAN Ab A ir^ROBLEM TO HIMbELP
A. Introduction,
In some sense every man is the result, directly or
indirectly, of biological, psychological, ana environmental
conditions. Doubtless, only an Aristotle coula have penned
the immense potency-act system, and only an Aquinas could
have synthesized the Aristotelian structure with Christian
presuppositions. Only a Kant could have written the pedantic
critiques, and only a bpinoza could have succeeded in living
sub specie aeterni . A man can think and live only within the
definition of his own whole personality.
In the instance of genius, personal conditionings are
compounded with aDility in such a peculiar way that out of
the resourceful depths of interior feeling there flow forth
richly fecund creative responses. The genius can make the
most simple, everyday experience appear to be a profound in-
sight. Especially where genius is complexly related to per-
sonal idiosyncrasies, is this principle true. At the behest
of the |B n of the extraordinarily talented, the ;^ ightest
pneumatic persuasions or the m_eanest interior analyses of the
spirit are captioned as significations quite worthy of re-
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celvlng reverence in a We It ans chauung «
SK (1813-1855 J is characteristically a genius vvith
idiosyncrasies. The fact that all of his major literary pro-
ductions have been translated into the major world languages
is a tribute to his abilities and to the magnificent dimen-
sions in which he wrote. Ana it is no less unquestionable a
truth that SK was a peculiar personality hauntea by not a few
deviations from normalcy.
Kierkegaard was a neurotic: of that the story of his
life leaves little doubt. His heritage, physique, tem-
perament, upbringing and way of life were all abnormal,
and produced a perpetual maladjustment between him and
his environment. His Journals are a happy hunting-
ground for the psychoanalyst
But to conclude from the fact that since SK was abnor-
mal, therefore what SK writes is a priori irrelevant to nor-
mal men, is to reason non sequitur . The biological, psycho-
logical, and environmental history of no man fully explains
the man, since it is always the prerogative of the man to
rise above his limitations and, v.ithin certain outer termini,
to create for himself new outreaches of personality previous-
ly believed to lie outside the pale of his abilities. Thus,
though it is doubtlessly indubitable that what a man i£ and
how he expresses himself are closely connected relations,
one cannot conclude from the fact of SK's neuroticism, that
the man himself was necessarily in error: since there is
nothing in the term "neurotic" which, v/hen analyzed, yields
1. Patrick, i'K, II, 311
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by necessary inference the conclusion "absence of truth."
Lowrie, by clipping from behind those who persist in
the superficial conclusion of supposing that they have ridded
themselves of the task of making peace with SK by indicting
him as abnormal, safeguards the healthy judgment that the
questions of whether a man speaks the truth, and who the man
is doing the speaking, are two quite separate questions.
It will not do to dispose of S.K. 's psychology by re-
marking that his own soul, uhe soul he chiefly studied,
was a sick soul. For not only coula he reply that all
souls are sick, and that the notion that one has a
'healthy-minded' soul is the most perilous of all sick-
nesses; but all pathologists will agree with him that
the study of abnormal states is essential for the under-
standing of normal health. If it is true that few men
have had so sick a soul to deal with as had S.K. , and
also that no one of them has ever probed so deeply into
his sick soul, with such intellectual competence, we
may reasonably expect to learn something from his psy-
chology . 2
No effort will be expended in the dissertation to de-
tail a biography of SK. Not only would the project be some-
what beside the point for our problem, but also, and more
important, it would be redundant labor. There is probably no
aspect of Kierkegaardian research which has received more
careful and scholarly attention than the preparation of the
man's biography. Lowrie, Kierkegaard and A Short Life of
Kierkegaard ; Allen, Kierkegaard; His Life and Thought ;
Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard , \ol, II; Viahl, Etudes
Kierkegaardiennes ; and Geismxar, Soren Kierkegaard , are repre-
sentative volumes of the general sweep of the biographical
2. Introduction to Kierkegaard, CD, xii.
T t>. j> :>
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literature. True as this fact may be, however, the criteria
of verification in SK will not be appreciated in their con-
text without a cursory understanding of the man's personal
life.
B. Home Influences.
The first great conditioning which SK received was in
the home. In later years he wrote in tones, sometimes rich
and at other tim.es tragic and regretful, of his pathetic ex-
periences as a frail boy In th« home: T-he large family, a
father who was possessed with extreme melancholy, and a
mother whom none of the family seemed to be able to come to
in perfect love.
SK's pr ecociousness robbed him of those hours of child'
ish forgetfulness and carefree abanaon which are the dear
possession of all those imaginative young boys v;ho have
placed the raft on the river for fishing or who have search-
ed for treasure over the far side of yonder hill. SK came
into an av/areness of his potentialities very young. He felt
that he leaped from infancy to manhood without passing
through the happiness of childhood. "I never knew the joy
of being a child. "'^ This fact v;orried the young genius^ not
a little, setting off trains of thought in his mina which
continued to haunt him during those days when he ought to
have been climbing apple trees or romping with his dog. SK
was "a child who never grew young, a child who was already
3, Kierkegaard, JSK, §860,
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£in ola man and never grew younger,"^
SK haa not a few personality problems. He ccmplaineci
for example, of "a certain bashfulness"^ with which he had to
struggle. He was self-conscious of his physical sight. Be-
ing "light, delicate, and weak, denied in almost every re-
spect the physical requirements,"^ he early nursed that feel-
ing of self-conscious inferiority which spooked him to the
very end of his life. After his literary pioduction began,
SK became the laughin,«;^tock of Copenhagen, Not a little,
therefore, did the man lament, when he reviewed his youth,
that he was "melsincholy
,
soul-sick, profoundly and absolute-
ly a failure in many ways,"'''
These distresses of soul were not ail entered on the
debit side of the leager, however. SK m-Ltht have felt that
his childhood was lost by his being a genius, but as a m.at-
ter of fact Kierkegaard was quite elated over his gift of
intelligence. He was proud of his mental abilities. He re-
joices that he was given "a pre-eminent intelligence," "pre-
sumably so that I should not be quite defenseless."® The
pain of melancholy, too, was never merely a hindrance to the
Danish student. Melancholy goaded SK here and there, "the
most faithful mistress"^ that he ever knew, teaching him the
reach of those inward tensions with v;hich he was to struggle,
4. Kierkegaard, JSK, §921,
5. Ibid
. , §875,
6. Ibid
. , §1335,
7. Ibid,
8. Ibid,
9. Ibid.
, §359.
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and acting as a catalyst to produce some of SK's most pro-
found interior analyses.
While I am submerged in the deepest of melancholy,
some thought or other becomes so knotted up that 1
cannot disentangle it, and since it is connected with
my ovv'n life I suffer increaibly. And then after a cer-
tain time has gone by, the abcess bursts--and unaer-
neath lies the richest ana most beautiful material for
work and of the very kind that I need at that moment, -^^
The home itself was probably ill managed, for SK often
spoke out about the "crazy way" he was brought up,
0, piteous satire upon mankind; that providence should
have endowed almost every child so richly because it
knew in advance what was to befall it: to be brought
up by 'parents' i.e. to be made a mess of in every way
possible
,
Not the least of "the thoughtlessness, carelessness, and
cocksureness "-^2 according to v;hich Soren was reared was the
enthusiastic, but mxisguided, zeal expended by the parents to
insure the former's perseverence in the orthodox religion.
Like Kant, SK chafed under a severe religious narrowness in
the home J although unlike Kant he never actually broke with
orthodox Christianity. "Humanly speaking m^y misfortune has
clearly been thtt I was given a strict Christian upbring-
But once again, happily, the misfortune of the home
turned into a tool v^ith which the genius could mine other
nuggets of great treasure. Even as Kant turned his pietis
tic heritage into a reverence for the moral ought, so SK's
10. Kierkegaard, JSK, §807.
11. Ibid
. , §927.
12. Ibid .
13. Ibid., §892.
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orthodoxy taught hirn the meaning of purity ol' heart being to
will one thing.
The sternness of the parental discipline, indeed, gave
the boy a lofty impression of outy, for he was trained
to a strict obedience .This left a permanent mark upon
his thought .-^^
^K»s father, Michael i'ederson Kierkegaard (1756-1838),
exerted an incredible, lifelong power over the brilliant and
eccentric son. SK's literary productions seem to have the
shadow of Michael hovering over them at all times, "I owe
everything, from the beginning, to my father, "^^ was the sonfe
repetitious testimony. The terrible religious severity of
the father easily pierced the soft skin v^hich coated the
heart of the nervous boy. The father, therefore, from whom
"melancholy descended in inheritance,"-'-^ provoked within the
son a dialectical strain of sympathy/antipathy , not unlike
those tensions which were soon to be developed to precision
by SK in the cryptic concept of "dread," Like the unchained
man who simultaneously dreads the responsibilities of freedom
while yet loving his freedom, SK's fear of his f ather strange
ly created within him a contemporary fear of and devotion to
the head of the home
,
The dread with which my father filled my soul, his own
frightful melancholy, and all the things in this con-
nection which I do not even note down, I felt a dread
of Christianity ana yet felt myself so strongly drawn
tov/ards it,-^'''
14. Swenson, SAK, 7 3.
15. Kierkegaard, JSK, §773.
16. Ibid
. , §600.
17. Ibid.
, §841,
Cll
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One of the greatest single incidents, called by SK
himself "the great earthquake," a point 1:0 which we shall
make reference again infra , was the confession by the father
to the son one day, that he, v.hile tending sheep in the
heaths of Jutland, colo- ana lonely, cursed God aloud for
making life so miserable for him. The memory of this terrible
confession never left the father,^® As a result, the father
taught the son that the latter would die young because of the
father's curse. This aroused new fear in Kierkegaard. "A
son is a mirror in vvhich the father sees himself reflected,
and the father is also a mirror in which the son sees him-
self reflected as he v^ill be in the future. "-^^
If the father of the house could not be forgotten by
the son, the mother, strangely, seemed never to have pene-
trated SK's inwardness at all. Enigmatically enough, al-
though SK crammed his Journals with all aiverse references
to his father, one looks in vain for any serious intimations
that SK praised his mother for anything she ever did to help
him. There seemed to be no moral influence that the mother
finally exerted over him. Biographers of SK suggest that
the woman was not a mother in the highest sense of the term,
and, therefore, did not earn Soren's affections. In any case,
this loss in the home is suggestive that SK's lifelong mis-
understanding of the place of woman resulted from an early
18. Cf. Kierkegaard, JSK, §556.
19. Kierkegaard, SWL, 192.

frustration.
The fact that there was something vi/hich impeded S.K«
from honoring his mother and from loving her as a son
ought, was certainly a principal cause of his tragedy,
and perhaps it accounts in part for the particular mis-
fortune that he was not able to 'realize the universal'
by marrying the woman he loved. He who v.-rote so much
about woman. . .was able to think of her only as the
counterpart of man, and... rarely dwelt upon the noblest
and tenderest aspect of woman as a mother.
On the other hand, the mother is supposed by some to
be the best explanation for the savoring bits of humor and
whimsicality which are interlarded cleverly in most of SK's
works. If this is the part she played, then let disparage-
ment cease, for one of the greatest treasures in the litera-
ture of SK is the spicy irony and humor which is masterfully
v/oven in between profound philosophical arguments.
It woula be a rare historian indeed who could sift
the complex data in the life of SK and determine exactly to
what extent the boy was controlled by his conditionings and
to what extent he overcame them . But in any case, one true
answer doubtless is to acknowledge that SK was both victim-
ized by his home background and that he yet overcame it.
Let us examine these facets.
That the boy was victimized is incontestable. SK
himself admits that he carried all through life forms of
weakness, nervousness, and melancholy, crosses which, com-
pounded with an ineradicable fear/love of the father and
attraction/revulsion for Christianity, sparked and accele-
20. Lowrie, SLK, 25
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rated all of his works.
And that the boy overcame his limitations to an un-
believable degree is a fact equally undeniable. Peuerbach
notwithstanding, SK was no simple product of what he ate.*^-^
Like Nietzsche, SK believed that man possesses the power of
a creative will, through the exercise of v/hich one can move
the mountains of historical convention and limitation and
soar into the infinite world of the spirit where the only
limit to possibilities is the inward determination of the
individual himself.
Lowrie sums up very succinctly the sort of a balanced
judgment that one ought to hold to on the question of the
relation between SK's home life and the latter world view
which he defended.
At this point I ought perhaps to say that no one is
less inclined than I to believe that the character of
Kierkegaard was fixed, his fate determined and his life
explained by inheritance and environment. These fact-
ors, of oDurse, exerted a prodigious influence, vh ich
to a certain extent we can trace; S.K. attained an un-
derstanding of himself by reviewing his life from early
childhood, but on the other hand, the freedom and re-
sponsibility of the individual was his most ardent con-
viction, and therefore he accounted 'the inaividual
higher than the race. ' I know that I should encounter
his scathing disapproval if in the manner of material-
istic historians I were to endeavor to account for him
by this background of inheritance ana environment.^^
21. There is a peculisir fate to the arguiiient that what
a man is, is the result of what he eats, for then even that
very statement is the result of what the speaker has eaten,
and itself is a meaningless claim to truth.
22. Lowrie, SLK, 29-30.
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G. Later Life.
SK carried with him through life a physical malady
which, as biographers claim, came when he fell out of a tree
in diildhood. In later life, therefore, boren spoke sarcas-
tically of the crazy disproportion which subsisted between
his bony and soul. The disproportion itself, however, con-
tributed its bit to sustaining: that fea? of aeath which kept
SK from being too confident about the morrow. Since bK felt
that he might die any minute, his decisions in time had to
count for eternity. It is very probable that in not being
beset by the weighty ballast of earthly possessions, and be-
ing forced, like bocrates of old, to turn inward for solace,
SK found that his calling to detail the topography of spirit
was an easier assignment than it might otherwise have been.
During the twenty-first year of his life, SK, who had
up to that time been bound to his father by religious fear,
felt that he, through "the great earthquake , "^"^ was at last J
delivered from the domination of the parent and released to
move into the sphere of his own creativity.
How terrible about the man who once as a little boy,
while herding the flocks on the heaths of Jutland, suf-
fering greatly, in hunger and in v/ant , stood upon a
25. In the year of 1834 the father predicted that i^eter
and boren, the last of the original seven children, v/ould
never live beyond the age of thirty-four and that he, the
father, would doubtless outlive them both. The mother was
dead at this time, too. Hence, with the family reduced to
three, a sharp melancholy and morbidness pervaded the home
life. It was this fear and dread in the home from which SK
had to break before he could train himself to be an author,
24. Kierkegaard, JSK, ^24 3.
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hill and cursed God— and the man was unable to forget
it even v;hen he was eighty-two years old,^^
When the father finished his story, the son felt himself
"freed" from the father's domination. The great earthquake
crushed ana shattered SK, but it was a purifying experience.
After this, in 1835, SK, now as "Antigone," shuffled
on to the manly stage of his life, aetemined to seize life's
treasures by force, i'rovided v/ith funds from his father,
the boy broke from home and went away for a vacation. This
new release from bondage encouraged a supercillious aloofness
to the Christianity in which he had been brought up, an at-
titude which was later recalled to mind with great sorrow.
Although SK did not actually break with Christianity, ap that
he never passed through apostasy, the young man at that time
nevertheless far preferred the pagan suaveness of humanism
to the stuffy orthodoxy in which he had been reared. But
the attending guilt of this "practical apostasy" never left
him, "He recognized a fev years later that his state of mind
meant not only revolt against his father but a^ inst God. "'"^^
When new intellectual stuaies and pursuits absorbed
his attention, SK was ushered once again into a fear/attrac-
tion dialectic of spirit. While not really abandoning
Christianity, the boy discovered to his surprise that Chris-
tianity and philosophy could not intellectually be reconcil-
ed. The freedom to leave Christianity for philosophy, and
25. Kierkegaard, JSK, §556,
26. Lowrie, SLK, 90.
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the fear to do so, exist entiaily taught SK the meaning of
f.he "dread of the spirit." Dread is defined by Kierkegaard
as follows:
The dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit
would posit the synthesis, and freedom then gazes down
into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sus-
tain itself. 27
SK existent ially passed through the fringes of the now
famous stages of the spirit: the aesthetic, ethical, and re-
ligious. The indirect communications in Either/Or and Stages
on Life's Way
,
therefcjpe, can in a measure be traced back to
specific biographical situations. bK's excursions at this
time were not unlike those of Solomon, who, as detailed in
the book of Ecclesiastes
,
passed in the dizziness of freedom
through the stages of pleasure and wisdom, while ending up a
religious enthusiast who testified that the sum of life's de-
m.ands is to fear God and to keep his commandments. But SK,
unlike Solomon, did not seek after fortune ana wealth, for
he was provided with a handsome sum of money by his father,
an inheritance -which was sufficient to keep him in cash al-
most to the end of his life. One wonders, v/hen he considers
this fact, whether SK*s avoidance of class problems as of in-
consequential concern to him might have been changed if he
had been forced to stand in the bread lines ana beg for food.
27. Kierkegaard, CD, 55. "For dread is an attraction to
what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy. Dreaa is an alien
power which lays hola of an inaividual, and yet he cannot
tear himself loose from it, and also does not will to; for
one is afraid, but what one fears also attracts one."
Kierkegaard, JSK, §402.
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SK never appreciated exist entially what poverty meant imtil
almost the ciay he died. In this he is very un-Marxian.
Women, Mozart, and Hegel put in their claim upon bK's
time before the latter came to that place of bankruptcy where
he felt he knew what it meant to love the Lord with all his
heart and mind and soul. This is not to suggest that SK ever
claimed to have fulfilled this absolute demand, for he woula
be the first to deny such pretentiousness. We mean only to
point to the fact that out of the despair of selfishness SK
came to himself to learn what it meant to be selfless ana to
let God work in him. In Kierkegaard's mind despair of self
is always the conditio sine qua non for a surrender to God.
In these years of wandering, the proaigal ate freely
from the husks of philosophy. An early self-desparation,
however, a passionate concern conspicuous for its absence in
the prodigal of Biblical fame, attended this wandering son.
He studied it (philosophy), therefore, in the only way
that it can be profitably studied, that is, for his ov/n
consumption, with a view to discovering a meaning in
his life, when meaning had vanished with the rejection
of Christ ianity.^°
While studying philosophy it was only natural that Kierke-
gaard responded to the beck and call of Kegel, since the lat-
ter was all the rage in academic circles. Hegelianian was
the Zeitgeist . Not to follow the Master was but to endanger
one's intellectual progress. The spell of Hegel did not
make an unqualified Hegelian out of SK, to be sure, but it
28, i.owrie, SLK, 115.
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did capture the student *s imagination so consistently that
in breaking from the sin of immanence^^ SK felt that he had
to break from the sin of Hegelianism.
Just before his father died, SK experienced an inci-
dent vhich cancelled out the releasing experience of "the
great earthquake." The ailing man took boren aside and con-
fessed to the latter his orm sins and shortcomings as a
father. This was the thunderstorm which cleared the air be-
tween the father and the son and effected that reconciliation
which carried along until the death of both.
He must have made him understand that the religious in-
struction he imparted to his children, however mistaken
it was, was prompted by love and had the intent of sav-
ing them from the sensuality to which he had succumbed.
Subsequently, this was S.K. 's interpretation of his
father's 'crazy' way of bringing him up. And how could
he have learned it but from his father's lips?*^
This confession was doubtless one of the great turn-
ing points in the life of the son. SK at times aavances the
veiled suggestion that death in the father was perhaps a vi-
carious payment for sin. The lost devotion to Christianity
(which SK seemed at times to identify with the home ) was
found, 'i'he boy was the full prodigal now, inasmuch as he had
come to himself in the final sense of the word. Wov. SK was
the one who was full of guilt. The earthquake, v^/hich had
29. The concept of imirianence will be discussed in extenso
belovi?. It is that view which supposes that man is metaphysi-
cally and epistemologically continuous vi/ith G-od and that
through his ov.-n unshattered ego he can come to Gog.. Imma-
nence presupposes that without any unilateral intrusion by
G-od, man is quite equipped immanently to find his own way to
God.
30. Lowrie, SLK, 119.
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caused him to depart rrori the father, became but a rnention-
±ess trifle compared to the three full years of supercilious-
ness ana wandering in vjhich he himself ha a indulged. A feel-
ing of spiritual ecstacy, so vividly described in the Journals
,
overtook the boy now. Restoration of damage done was the
task to which he assi^^ied himself.
Of equally profound influence upon SK was mgina Olsen.
One can only speculate \¥hat mif.ht have happened to the history
of existentialism if bK coulo have brought himself to marry
Regina, and if their marriage had been consummated in happi-
ness ana fecundity. But in the realm of the contrary to fact
such speculation must remain, since it happens to be an his-
torical fact that Sii failed to marry Regina and that in so
dealing he inflicted new damage to his own equilibrium.
Guri-ously enough, the difficulty vi'aich wedged itself
between the two lovers did not grow out of any romiantic
faults in SK, for in a short time of courtship SK succeeded
in v/inning both the heart of the maiden and permission from.
her father for marriage. The trouble brewed deeper than any-
thing as superficial as this. It wss way down in the soul
of SK that the breakwith Regina took its inception, Kierke-
gaard v'orried about his at^ility to make Regina happy. So,
deeming it the wise thing to do, he aggravated her until
their engagem.ent finally had to be broken. This gesture cast
the die: SK's life can be dated before and after this break
with Regina. Before the break he worried about his union
with the girl, ana after the severance he fretted himself
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over the problem why he had broken the engagement in the
first place.
itegina was the secret reigning queen of iiK's life.
That burning love, which invited romantic trysts with the
girl, never departed from him. In the Journals he addressed
his young beloved, "ITiou sovereign of my heart. "^^ From the
first, however, the melancholy of his own spirit sullied an
unalloyed commitment to the girl. "I was frightened by the
ideal; and so I gave birth to deformities, and therefore
reality does not answer to my burning desires ." ^'^ This con-
fession echoes the tragedy of Kierkegaard, a tragedy which
the Journals often repeat and which is caught up over and
over in various moods in the ci>taKes on Life's Way
,
Repetition
,
and Fear and Trembling . Love seemed to be present, but lack
of understanding and faith shattered a concretion of the ro-
mance. As for Regina, "she did not understand" '^'^ oK. As for
SK, "Had I had faith I should have remained with hegina."^
A new morbidness of spirit overtook the youth from that mo-
ment on.
Alas, she could not break the silence of my melancholy.
That I loved her--nothing could be more certain— ana
thus my melancholy received enough to feed upon, oh,
it received a terrible addition. It is essentially due
to her, to my melancholy ana to my money that I became
an author.
51. Aierkegaard, JSK, §259.
52. Ibid
. , §235.
33. Ibia.
, §371.
34. Ibid
. , §444.
35. Ibid., §748.
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Some of the authorship, therefore, seems to have served
as an escape-valve for iSK, acting as long love letters, in-
directly addressed, written to the girl of his heart. negina
drew out of SK what mxght have been submerged if the wedding
had been successful. "Oh, I can also say, I owe what is best
in me to a girl; but I did not exactly learn it from her, I
learnt througn her."^
Misunderstood and disgraced in Copenhagen, the frus-
trated lover fled from home to Berlin. Here his literary
work began in earnest. But Hegina never left him. Either/Or
was written for her. The poetic in him was elicited by
Regina. In anonjnns he rhapsodized on the tune of his spirit,
tacking between the duty of absolute devotion to God and the
fleshly hope that hegina woula be his again and that a recon-
ciliation might be affected. With almost sadistic aelight
SK contrived artistic skills to shield his authorship from an
unappreciative public, although hoping all the while that his
indirect communication would be understood by hegina.
It was only when he learned that hegina had become
engaged to Fritz iichlegel that SK, through "repetition," was
released from hegina to become engaged to God. But even
after this supposed final break, SK tried to establish a
friendly relationship with the Schlegels. When this offer
was declined, SK was left without further recourse than to
seek out the establishment of his ov;n individuality.
36. Kierkegaard, JSK, §761
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With unremitting production SK penned volume after
volume, until the appearance of the Postscript in 1846 when
he announced that his ''concluding" work had appeared. V;ith
this effort the young master hoped to retire. But the mo-
mentum of writing was too great to be stopped here. The
spirit has a habit of restlessly wandering in aistant places
when once it has been aroused. Right up until the moment of
his death on October 2, 1855, therefore, nine years after
the Postscript appeared, SK furiously wrote. It was while
penning parts of the Instant , still trying to release some
of the inward pressure v/hich was on his omi spirit, that SK
fell to the floor unconscious. God's faithful hound dog,
heated from the long chase, finally lay down to claim his
reward.
37. Because SK subsidized the first thirteen of his own
books, it is supposed that he became poor at the end of his
life. "Only recently ... Professor Brandt and Else Rommel car-
ried out an investigation which exploded this myth and proves
that he not only made a considerable profit on the books he
published at his own expense, but that, beginning with August
1847, all his subsequent works, nine of them, beside the nine
nximbers of the Instant , were undertaken by the publishers,
who paid him the usual royalties." Lowrie, SLK, 153.

GIIArTEK TEHEE
KIERKEGAARD ' S VOCATION
Soren Kierkegaard had one purpose in life, a purpose
which may be stated in two different ways. First, he wanted
to make men Christian , and second, he wanted to restore in-
dividuality . These are but two ways of referring to the one
and same calling which SK hsd in life, that of making men
Christians and individuals.
A. Kakinp; it Difficult to be a Christian.
One looks in vain for a detailed systematic theology
in SK»-^ The reason for this omission is rather self-eviaent
.
SK believed that an opjective statement of Christianity is
insufficient to bring men to inward decision. Everything
objective can be learned by rote; SK is concerned with inward
transformation. The cad thing about an objective systemati-
zation of Christianity is that it makes the decision for
1. A remark of qualification must be added. SK's works,
although very unorderly, are actually a precise scheme to
elicit from the reader those sympathies which will result in
the individual's giving birth to Christian living. Kierke-
gaard's works do not form a standard systematic theology in
the ordinary sense of the term, because the method he used
was miaieutic.
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Christianity psiinless, and SK would have no part of this.
No glossary of terms used, therefore, graces the clos-
ing pages of Kierkegaard's volumes. Not even the terms
"Christian" or "Christianity" are formally defined for a
reader. Nor was this omission just a careless oversight.
On the contrary, there was a precise existential motive in
SK's miind. A formal definition of Christianity, objectively
stated, would edify no one. Furthermore, it might even stand
as a stumblingblock in the way of a person's becoming a
Christian, by tempting him to believe that through mere mem-
orization of a definition one is miade a Christian. Christian-
ity is too serious a matter to be prostituted by frivolous
definitions. One must be existential , not objective.
When it is a question of existential concepts it always
is a sign of surer tact to abstain from definitions,
because one does not like to construe in the form of a
definition v/hich so easily makes something else and
something different out of a thought v;nich essentially
must be understood in a different fashion and which one
has understood differently and has lovea in an entirely
different way.
If it is derogatory to the bride for the bridegroom on the
morning of the wedaing to search seriously for an objective
definition of love, a fortiori does not one blaspheme Goa's
name to seek for an objective aefinition of love for God?
Love can be known only by love. This is subjective truth.
2. Kierkegaard, CD, 131. SK and Socrates, as we shall
trace out fully below, resemble each other in many features.
In this instance, however, their dissimilarity stands out.
Whereas Socrates believed that connotative definitions were
absolutely necessary if we are to have accuracy in the moral
life, Kierkegaard ruled them. out.
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transforming truth, existential truth. To capture it in a
formal definition is to destroy it. To demand a speculative
definition of Christianity is, for SK, a sure proof that one
continues in sin. "I do not ask whether Christianity is
right .. .Christ ianity is not a doctrine but an existential
communication expressing an existential c ontraaiction. "
^
Vtfhen SK surveyed the spiritual side of the Copenhagen
of his day, he was repelled by its paganism, a paganism which,
enigmatically, flourished even when every one claimed to be
a Christian. Triviality ana complacency displaced serious-
ness and passion. In every university a Frivataocent polite-
ly and systematically reduced Christianity to an abstract
framework of philosophic speculation, a doctrinal pattern
which one can memorize by rote."^ Wowed with indignation in
his spirit over the triviality of Denmark, bK announced his
vocation.
My purpose is to make it difficult to become a Chris-
tian, yet not more difficult than it is, nor to make
it difficult for stupid people, and easy for clever
pates, but qualitatively difficult, ana essentially
difficult for every man equally, for essentially it is
equally difficult for every man to relin^quish his
unaerstanding and his thinking, ana to keep his soul
fixed upon the absurd.*-*
Indeea, SK was v/illing to be as long-suffering in
3. Kierkegaard, CUP, 338, 339.
4. "It is not my fault that the age in which we live has
reversed the relationship, and transformed Christianity into
a philosophical doctrine that asks to be understood, and
turned being a Christian into a triviality." Kierkegaard,
ibid., 339.
57 Ibid. , 495.
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Copenhagen as G-od was of old when Abraham pleaded that Sodom
ana Gomorrah be saved, hoping that a few just souls remained
in it. For ^K, even "one single true Christian is enough to
justify the assertion that Christianity exists." But a tab-
ulation of Denmark's spiritual condition convinced him that
further parleying on the subject was futile. "Christianity
simply does not exist"''' was his solemn conclusion. In the
apostolic days, turning to Christianity was the most passion-
ate decision a man could make, since it involved an absolute
either/or, an inwara decision for good against bad which en-
tailed even the possibility of final martyrdom. But today it
is fashionable to be a Christian.
The visible church has suffered so broad an expansion
that all the original relationships have been reversed.
Just as it once required energy ana determination to
become a Christian, so now, though the renunciation be
not praiseworthy, it requires courage and energy to re-
nounce the Christian religion, v;hile it needs gnly
thoughtlessness to remain a nominal Chris tian.°
This shift over from a teaching ministry of what
Christianity is, to the evangelistic ministry of bringing
men to inward decision for Christianity, brought about in
the movement of i:'rotestant theology what bwenson calls a
"veritable Gopernican revolution."^ Rather than letting ex-
istence be cross-examined by a r'rivataocent , aecided to
reverse the field ana let the latter be cross-examined by
6. Kierkegaard, KAG , 127.
7. Ibid
. , 277.
8. Kierkegaard, CUi^ , 326.
9. bwenson, SAK, 126.
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existence. And the way that SK proposed to accomplish this
revolution was, like bocrates of old, to persuade men to turn
inward and to re-evaluate themselves in the light of eter-
nity's demands upon their conscience. By demanding of men
that they think more upon what they personally are d oing to
be a Christian than upon what Christianity objectively is
,
SK hoped to encourage them to pass from complacency to con-
cern, from tepidity to fervor, from boldness before God to
abject fear.
The ideals of science and of SK stand at polar oppo-
sites. The £:oal of science is to reduce the human contribu-
tion in knowledge to absolute zero, v«hile the aim of Kierke-
gaard is to reduce the ixnpersonal contribution to absolute
zero. To illustrate the objectivity of science, take the
case of measuring heat ana cold. Thermometers were devised
to take the human element (as much as pcssible) out of the
assignment of learning what the objective temperature of a
given mass is. The less the contribution of an inward de-
cision, the better the science. For SK, however, the method
of science is abhorrent in the communication of Christianity,
since science takes in everything but the existing individual.
It measures, bottles, slices, and preserves, but it does not
transformi the inward man himself.
This is not to suggest that SK had any a priori ob-
jections to science qua science. Kather, the formal methods
of science are simply not the methods to follow in learning
whether one is a Christian or not. To discover Christianity,
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one must look invirard, "This treasure is deposited in thine
own inner self: there is an either/or which makes a man
greater than the angels .""^^ bacon's "idols" may have v/or-
ried the empirical scientist, but they never concerned SK«
The only idol SK abhors is complacency.
B, Restoration of Individuality.
When a compositor suggested to SK that he ought to
address his little serm.ons to "the individual," SK was per-
fectly "delighted at the thought since, as he often ex-
claimed, the individual is "my hope, my joy, and my pride. "^^^
Being an individual is equivalent to being a Christian,
since the principle of Christianity is to maximize inward-
ness .
Central in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard is his mas-
ter category of the individual . All of his thought ul-
tim.ately haa to pass through the needle 's eye of
whether or not it compelled men to face their sovereign
responsibility as inaividuals.
It was only natural that SK, when searching history
as a student, literally leaped for joy when he read of Socrates.
Here was a man v^ho, retreating from the rocks and trees,
turned to the only ultimate value on earth, man. Though he
was outwardly somewhat ugly to behold, Socrates had a beauti-
10. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 149.
11. Kierkegaard, JSK, §4 30.
12. Ibid
. , §614.
13. Steere, in his Introduction to Kierkegaard, PH, xiv.
"*The individual' is the category through vh ich from a re-
ligious point of view, our race ana its history must pass."
Kierkegaard, JSK, §923.
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ful soul within. By learning to be "contemporary" with
Socrates as the man went into the market place to interro-
gate others about their soul, SK felt himself "metaphysically
related"-'-^ to this sage of Athens. Kierkegaard testified
that Socrates was "the most interesting man that ever lived,
his life the most interesting ever recorded."
The Delphic epigram, "Know thyself.'" can assist us in
an understanding of the life of this wandering Athenian who
searched for virtue. What a man does inwardly with his own
life is not less important than v/hat he speculatively pursues.
Socrates "was concerned with this alone, and is therefore
the first existential thinker, teaching only what can be
actually reduplicated in his personal life, avoiding all ex-
ternal speculation."
It v/as thus Socrates understood himself, and thus he
thought that everyone must understand -himself , in the
light of this understanding interpreting his relation
to each individual, with equal humility and v/ith equal
pride. He had the courage and self-possession to be
sufficiently unto himself, but also in his relations
to his fellowiiien to be merely an occasion, even Vvhen
dealing v/ith the meanest capacity. How rare is such
magnanimity I -^"^
If misery likes company, SK, who was not a little mal-
adjusted in Copenhagen, found it in Socrates. He took conso-
lation from the latter' s courage. Being forewarned of the
results of seeking inwardness, Socrates pursued his unpopular
14. Haecker, SK, 15.
15. Kierkegaard, FT, 126. The fact that Socrates contin-
ually sought for connotative definitions, thus intellectual-
izing the science of virtue, did not seem to cause difficulty
to SK.
16. Wild, Art., 538.
17. Kierkegaard, i^F, 7.
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task even to final martyrdom. What higher banner coula SK
fly?
The only analogy I have before me is Socrates, My task
is a Socratic task, to revise .what it is to be a
Christian. For my part I do not call myself a 'Chris-
tian' (thus keeping the ideal free), but I am able to
make it evident that the others are still less than I,-'-^
If Socrates v/as wiser than all men, because he was not ignoi*-
ant of his ignorance, SK was a better Christian than others
because, vi/hile perhaps not being an ideal Christian, he at
least was passionately aware of it.
SK could likewise find in the history of philosophy no
better statement of the method which he proposed to follow
than that followed by Socrates. Socrates, a wise old teacher,
knew the tricks of the Sophists, how that after memorizing
answers to geometrical problems they pretended to know geom-
etry, when all the while they had only come to geometry, not
inwardly, but by rote. So, when pursuing questions of vir-
tue, Socrates did not come right out with the answers direct-
ly; rather, by maieutics he drew out of his hearer the con-
clus ions s ought
•
The maieutic art is the method of indirect communica-
tion. Just as the midwife, being without child herself,
draws the child out of another, so the practicer of m^eutics
does not give birth: he only leads the other into giving
birth. In order that the learner might learn, the labor
pains of transforming birth must be borne by the learner him-
18, Kierkegaard, AUG, 283.
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self and not by the teacher. Only in this agonizing way is
the transformation of the individual achieved thx'ough the
learning. Only he vjho works through the steps can claim a
right to the conclusions.
The purpose in interrogating others, i.e. the goal
toward which Socrates strove, was always to lead individuals
into a stinging awareness of their own ignorance. Vvhen ig-
norance is posited, then the possibility of learning is pre-
served. So long as a man is under the blinaing delusion
that he is quite informed, that long will he resist intrusion
of the truth.
Illustrative of the maieutic method is the dialogue,
Euthyphro , a pleasant account Vv'hich relates the meeting of
Socrates and Euthyphro, the latter being a young lad v/ho is
on the way to prosecute his own father for murder. Now, in-
asmuch as the boy was making every outward impression of
knowing what piety is, Socrates hoped that he could surely
learn from him what is the inward meaning of the concept.
But by the time the teacher made the learner pass through
the travail and labor of giving inward birth to the concept
of piety, the latter, frustrated and disgruntled, rushed
away, only to leave the disappointed teacher by himself.
"Alasi my companion," cried Socrates, "ana will you leave me
in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the
nature of piety and impiety." (15Bj
Socrates did not succeed in making many men exis-
tentially virtuous, to be sure, but that accidental failure
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did not deter his enthusiasm for essential truth; for in the
very act of being a humble gadfly of the state, i.e. , one
who would not let others rest in error, a service was accom-
plished. Virtue is its own reward.
In the same spirit SK shouldered his assignment of
making men inaividuals and Christians. If Denmark "needs
another Socrates, someone who could existentially express
•I 19ignorance with the same cunning dialectical simplicity,"
then SK was the self-elected one to fill the assignment.
As the first aim of Socrates was to deflate people 's
ignorance by pricking their pretensions to knowledge, so SK
set himself to the same assignment. "It is easier to become
a Christian when I am not a Christian than to become a Chris-
20tian v/hen I am one." So long as the Copenhagen citizens
believed that they were Christians, that long would they con-
tinue in complacency. There is blindness in aelusion. If a
man does not know that he has a disease, for example, the
chances of his doing anything about correcting the malignant
condition in his body are slight. Being under a mistaken
notion about his condition, he imputes health to himself in
the whole and in the part; while de facto he is still a sick
man, "So if in this situation Christianity is to be intro-
duced, first of all the illusion must be disposed of... this
is the first thing to do, the illusion must go."^-^
19. Kierkegaard, JSK, §7 33.
20. Kierkegaard, CUf , 327.
21. Kierkegaard, KAC , 97.
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SK determined to bring men to decision. The Laoaicean
quality of lukewarmness was that state of existence (if exis-
tence charity could call it) which he loathed the most. The
reason for this is that where there is no decision, inward-
ness is missing, ana where inwardness is absent, individual-
ity is absent. "Better frank sincerity than lukewarmness."^^
Any tertium quia between deciding for Christ or against him
is but an emetic. The decision is the thing.
His one concern was to present Christ to men in such
a way as to search their hearts and lead them to decide
for or against him. He was an evangelist rather than a
theologian. There can be no Question about his own ad-
herence to the orthodox Christian faith of the oecu-
menical creeds. But he sought to speak to the needs of
his times rather than to give a timeless exposition of
the faith. '^'^
SK*s method was Socratic. Refusing to teL 1 people in
a straightforward way what Christianity is, he turned to in-
direct communication, struggling to prod the learner on to
give birth to his ov;n knowledge of Christianity. He believed
that if the teacher "offers himself and his instruction on
any other basis, he does not give but takes avmy, ana is not
even the other's friend, much less his teacher. "^'^ The
teacher is more concerned with the person being taught (the
student) than the subject matter being taught (the branch of
knowledge), for proper inward response is_ the state of learn-
ing.
Since the total inward movement of the student is the
22. Kierkegaard, CUP, 521.
23. i^atrick, i^K, II, 306.
24. Kierkegaard, rP, 6-7.
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learning, one has not begun to learn until he personally
exists in and through the learning. The process of coinmuni-
cation (indirect discourse) is therefore of utmost importance
to SK. A toto caelo difference separates rote learning from
existential learning: the former seems to presuppose but a
neuro-chemical response, plus a sleepy psychic reflex, while
the latter presupposes alert, passionate individuality.
Doubtless, he v/ho comes right out with an answer, as
the geometry teacher who tells the students a solution with-
out dem.anding that they go through the steps of finding it,
will be more popular than the practicer of maieutics. The
objective method, being indifferent to subjective response,
carries with it its own self-recommendation. He who sets
forth objective data, as the taker of the census, unconcern-
ed whether anybody appropriates the truth or not, can laugh
at the ciombersome indirect method of Socrates.
The objective presentation of facts is not an art,
since response is not part of the teaching. But when the
subjective response i^ the knowledge, so that only when one
responds has he learned, then communication indeed becomes a
fine art. One has learned Christianity only when he, per-
sonally and inwardly, comes to himself and repents. Indirect
communication is suggestive but not specific, implicit but
not explicit. To tell the answer too soon is but to rob the
learner of the real travail of childbirth. An illustration
of this robbery i:^ the stuaent who uses a translation in his
language studies , rather than working out the forms for him-
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self. By reducing the agony of learning, he concomitantly
reduces the learning.
The secret of Christianity, which no objective com-
munication can contain, must be learned exist entially by the
individual learner.
Kierkegaard believed that Lessing approached very
closely an appreciation of the truth of Socrates that appro-
priation without striving is meaningless, i^es sing was too
much of a pagan for SK to call him a witness, indeed, but he
was not as far from the kingdom as others.
Ul'enn Gott in seiner Rechten alle Wahrheit, und in seiner
Linken den einzigen immer regen Trieb nach Wahrheit,
obschon mit dem Zusatze mich immer und ev/ig zu irren,
verschlossen hielte, und sprache zur mir: wahleJ Ich
fiele ihm mit Demuth in seine Linke und sagte: Vater,
giebj die reine Wahrheit ist ja doch nur fiir dich al-
leini''^^
Lessing nicely anticipated SK's Gopernican revolution by
sensing the difference between the quantitative truths of
objective evidence and the qualitative truths of the spirit,
"Lessing opposes v/hat I wouIq call an attempt to create a
quantitative transition to a qualitative decision."*^" Inward
transformation cannot be painlessly piped into the soul
through direct communication. Historical documents may tell
us v.hat Christianity ob^ ctively is, but only when one de -
cides , i.e. , by a qualitative leap, does he learn inwardly
what Christianity is.
It is always the transition, the simple and direct
25. Quoted in Kierkegaard, GUP, 97.
26. Ibid. , 88.

transition, from the reliability of an eternal accoiont
to an eternal decision, against which Lessing opposes
himself .^'7
Because of this effort to turn the individual inward
and to elicit from the personality its maximum potentiali-
ties, SK may profitably be compared to other philosophers,
SK is Kantian in his skepticism about the ability of pure
reason to pass from a concept to outside nature. By aividing
between reality as perceived (phenomenon) and reality in it-
self ( Ding an sich ), Kant took what SK calls "the honest
path," Against the rationalists, therefore, SK cast his lot
v/ith Kant on the primacy of the pure practical reason. bK
and Kant further agree that absolute devotion, without re-
gard for reward or punishment , is the mark of a genuinely
inward moral life. "When he, then Vv'ills the Good for the
sake of the reward, he does not v/ill one thing but two."^®
7/hile purity of heart for SK and for Kant is to will
the good alone, however, they part company Y<ihen they come to
define the good. SK contends that more inwardness is aroused
when the moral law is unuerstood as God's law rather than as
simply a part of an abstract rule which God and man must both
respect. Kant discarded the notion that the will of Goo is
higher than the moral law.
It was a very just thought to whJc h the older dogmatic
frequently recurred, whereas a later acgmatic so often
censored it for lack of understanding ana a proper
sense of its meaning— it was a very just thought, al-
though sometimes a wrong application was made of it:
27. Kierkegaard, GUP, 88.
28. Kierkegaard, PE.V, 4 3.
-v3
43
the thought that what makes sin so frightful is that it
is before God, . .Subsequently they became shrewder and
said, 'Sin is sin; sin is not greater because it is
against God or before God,»^^
SK believed that less inward passion is encouraged in the
existing individual when the latter discovers that a wrong
v;as clone against abstract law rather than against a living
person. When a driver runs his automobile through a red
light, for example, the grief that he suffers (normally) is
not so great as it is his if he has broken faith with a per-
son close to his affections. The spirit of fellowship is
inwardly sharper than the prongs of abstract law. Vvhen
fellowship is severed, inwardness of grief is greater than
if abstract lav; is transgressed. Turning Kant's doctrine of
"guilt" into the Christian concept of "sin," therefore, was
one of SK's assignments.
SK and Pascal were m^utually concerned with challeng-
ing the established order, the former in his Attack Upon
"Qhristendom" and the latter in t^rovinciales . It vv-ould be
difficult to establish the hypothesis that the two men stood
in any causal relationship, for SK mentions little about
Pascal in his basic works.
The reason for his (SK's) conflict with the establish-
ed order was precisely the sairie as the reason for
Pascal's conflict with the Jesuits; both men took ab-
solutely seriously the unconditional demands of the
Gospel, and could not bear to see them minimized or ex-
29. Kierkegaard, SD, 128. The "older dogmaticians , " how-
ever, do not pass v.dthout feeling SK's scathing censur4«
"Their fault lay in regarding God as something external, and
in assuming that it was only now and then men sinned against
God." Ibid.
II
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plained away for reasons of conscience or expediency
.
The Wager ol" i^ascai is Kierkegaardian in spirit , inasmuch as
the whole point to it is that, while objective reason can set
uo the dilemma of life, the inward man must leap to the ae-
cision. The understanding is used for man to believe against
the understanding. The V-ager employs a rigorous logical
dialectic to set the barbs of the problem, but the leap, not
the dialectic, saves the individual. Doubtless rascal in
his Fensees gave a higher place to reason than SK is willing
to concede, but nonetheless the single common purpose, "to
affirm the absolute contradictions in htmian life in such a
way as to lead men to seek a refuge from despair in Jesus
Christ "'^-^ threads throu-^h the corpus of both writers.
Nietzsche's doctrine of Ubermensch ana bK's ideal of
the perfect Christian individual are not incom.parable
,
either, although the two thinkers pursued diametrically op-
posea means by which to realize their separate ideals. In
each case, however, the hope v.-as entertained that man would
reach his highest inward potentialities through exerting
volitional self-determination. Hut whereas bK grounded his
individual to God, Nietzsche turned to the autonomous man to
evolve Superman. Man becomes a master of his own morals who
strives for perfectibility through forceful self-assertion.
Nietzsche conl'used caste and class privilege v ith restoration
of indiviauality, thus vitiating much of his positive con-
30, Patrick, fiv, II, 320-321
31. IbiQ
. , 332.

tributlon. ^ His morbidness robbed his writings of that
hximor which SK's enjoys, furthermore, thus pointing to the
possibility that he was a sicker soul than was the Copen-
hagen thinker. "^"^
William James, especially in The Yvill to Believe
,
speaks in the rascal-Kierkegaard mood. James affirms that
our passional nature, when it faces an option which cannot
be decided by reason, may not only, but must
,
decide, when
not to decide involves the risk of losing truth. Each pas-
sionate decision involves a change in inaiviaual character,
since "after the decision he is not the same man as he was
before the decision." The risk taken in passional d e-
cision, of which James makes frequent reference, is parallel
to that "leap" of the will which follows when the existing
individual faces the future and is required to make a quali-
tative decision on the s trength of but quantitative evidence.
There is risk, but the risk makes for passion, faith, and
invtfard transformation.
G. The Hole of the Witness.
The maieutic stage in ^^K is not the final one. The
pseudonyms were satisfactory for that time while SK, under
32. There are evidences in SK of strong social conserva-
tiveness which is quite unservicable to social progress,
too,
33. "Nietzsche is lacking in an adequately proportioned
sense of humor." Swenson, in Introduction to (ieismar, LRTK,
xviii.
34. Ibid. , 46.
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35the scourge of melancholy, haa not the courage to turn
from the shelter of indirect communication to the work of
open witnessing. Yet, the more SK came to sense the differ-
ence between being a Christian and being a follower of
Socrates, the more he realized that the last step in the
life of teaching is witnessing .
The communication of Chris tianity mus t ultimately end
in 'bearing witness,' the maieutic form cannot be final.
For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not
lie in the subject (as bocrates understood it) but in
a revelation v/hich must be proclaimed.*^
The indirect method is negatively successful in e xposing the
pretense of those who erroneously believe they are Chris-
tians, for it calls to their attention the fact that Chris-
tianity does not exist. But since Christianity depends upon
revelation, and not upon the individual's reminiscence of
eternity (as in Socrates), SK woula not have discharged his
full duty to others until he passed from the maieutic to the
positive task of witnessing . "^"^
This break with the indirect method is linked closely
with SK's relations to Regina. While he seriously believed
there v/as a point of contact for reconciliation between them.
35. "For many years my melancholy has prevented me from be-
ing on terms of real intimacy with myself. In between my
melancholy and myself lay a whole world of the imagination.
That is, in part, what I rid myself of in the pseuaonyms."
Kierkegaard, JSK, §641.
36. Ibid.
, §809.
37. SK's break from the maieutic method and his rejection
of immanence are closely related. This correlation will be
treated with infra. The maieutic is the negative method, the
means by which complacency in men is broken. The role of the
witness follows as the positive delineation of the content of
revelational Christianity to those who confess their own in-
ward bankruptcy before God,
Iit
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SK was willing to refrain from publishing works which might
have personally offended hegina. But when he capitulated to
the fate that there was no hope for reconciliation, fear of
himself broke and he launched out on his program of being a
positive witness to the truth. Fortunately, as a result of
this break the marvelous religious discourses, which bear
SK's own name, were born. In them there "is haraly a trace
left of the super-subtlety of a lonely thinker who t alked
predominately with himself." As a witness SK spoke plain-
ly, edifying or attacking, depending upon his mission.
The Journals localize this change in i:>ti in an i^aster
conversion experience in 1848. "My whole being is changed.
My reserve and self- isolation is broken--! must speak.
When SK himself became eaucated to Christianity exist ential-
ly, then a new self-confiaence strengthened him to be a pos-
itive witness to others. "The whole authorship was his own
education before God, away from romanticism and specu!la tive
philosophy and back to Christianity."'^^
Indirect communication is never completely abandoned
in Christianity, however, since the mystery of the incarnate
God (the incognito) can only be communicated through indirect
means. There is no direct experience of Goa, "And if one
aoes away with the God-Man, one aoes away with Christian-
ity. "^^1
38. Lowrie, Kier
.
, 469.
39. Kierkegaard, JSK, §747.
40. Thomte, KFK, 199.
41. Kierkegaard, TC, 14 3.
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The climactic end to being a Christian is personal
v.ltnessing through the process of reduplication. The Chris-
tian cannot disclaim possession of truth, as aid Socrates,
He must reduplicate the Christian truth in his own exper-
ience. Reduplication is "a transformation of life in ac-
cordance with the truth one objectively knows. "'^^ Spiritual
relief in the task of trying to induce others to be individ-
uals and Christians, was made a reality in SK when he him-
self finally broke with his own self-fear. One cannot have
unction to tell others to accept something when he himself
has not the strength to embrace it. He exis tentially learn-
ed to reduplicate as a witness.
Reduplication consists in the fact that the teacher is
a part of it; but wherever there is reduplication, the
communication is far from being the direct paragraph- or
professor-communication; being reduplicated in the
teacher by the fact that he 'exists' in v/hat
.
he teaches,
it is in manifold ways a aiscriminating art.'^
Goa is absoj-ute reduplication, f or t ruth is actus
44purus in him. The witness can be like G-od only when he re-
duplicates the truth in his own life. He cannot hiae behind
the safety of the maieutic pseudynoms. Only by existing: as
a Christian can the Christian message finally make men
Christians and individuals.
This is due to the fact that Christianity is not a
42. Thomte, Ki'R, 203.
4 3. Kierkegaard, TC, 123.
44. SK is unconcerned ^;vith the speculative difficulties
v/hich attend the actus purus doctrine. At no time in the
literature does he explain how the completed God can continue
to give revelation and have temporal interest in earthly af-
fairs.
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doctrine but a communication of existence. It is not
immaterial who presents Christianity, for it is not just
the question of reciting the right thing. V^hen Chris-
tianity is not reduplicated in the teacher, he does not
teach Christianity for Christianity is existence com-
munication ana can only be communicated by existence,
i.e., by one whose life is transformed by Christianity.
This places a tremendous emphasis upon the character of
the Christian teacher.
Thomte, KPR, 203.

CHAPTER POUR
KIERKEGAARD'S AI^THROFOlOGY
SK*s philosophy of religion is sturdily supportea by
a carefully detailed philosophy of man. Anthropology is one
of the few branches of objectivity to which SK gave system-
atic attention. This devotion of labor is somewhat explicable
on the ground that it is man, not the animals, whom SK was
trying to induce to full creativity. Furthermore, it aoes
not follow that just because he is objective in his defini-
tion of man, SK has necessarily brought himself to the point
where he must also be objective with regard to Christ ianity .
In The Concept of Dread Kierkegaard rests the weight
of his arguments for dread, sin, and freedom in paradox upon
tv;o syn^theses in man. V.e shall call thera "Synthesis A" and
"Synthesis They form the nerve center of SK's doctrine
of man.
A. Synthesis A.
Synthesis A stems from the fact that man is a problem
unto himself by being a union of body ana soul carried away
by spirit. Let us analyze this synthesis in aetail.
That man is body is too self-evident a datum to re-

quire demonstration, for he who uses either his tongue, his
hand, or his head to gainsay that truth, begs the very ques-
tion by calling the body into prominence through using the
boay. And he v/ho does not use one of these faculties is in-
articulate.
On the contrary, the supreme self-eviaence of the
body has encouraged some (materialists) to believe that the
whole man is little more than a highly ccffnplex neuro-
physiological organism, differentiated from the rest of na-
ture only in that the natural laws which control conscious-
ness are somewhat more intricate ana mysterious than those
which oversee plants and rocks.
If the materialistic proposition that man is simply
body, is stock, so is the response that man is more than
body, though the latter triumphs finally over the former by
exhibiting a greater profundity. The fact of man's freedom
gives the coup de grace to consistent materialism. In the
i^haedo the venerable bocrates tells Gebes that when he was
troubled over philosophy, he became suddenly thrilled as he
finished with the crass materialists and perused the works
of Anaxagoras; for this last thinker finally turned to nous
as the disposer and cause of all. The joy of Socrates was
short-lived, however, inasmuch as the "mind" principle of
Anaxagoras was found to be just another "eccentricity" of
matter, and was in no significant sense a nous vhich freely
sat in judgment over matter. To challenge the thesis of ma-
terialism, therefore, Socrates denied that he haa come into
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judgment simply because of the complex arrangement of his
bones end muscles. The true predicament of Socrates was ex-
plicable only upon the hypothesis of nous which really juages
values.
The true cause... is, that the Athenians have thought
fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it
better and more right to rem.ain here and undergo my
sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles
and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara
or Boeotia—by the dog, they v/ould, if they haa been
moved only by their own idea of what was best, ana if
I had not chosen the better ana nobler part, instead of
playing truant and running away, of enduring any punish-
ment which the state inflicts.
From the strength of clinching arguments of this sort one
must conclude that man is at least soul as well as boay. Be-
cause man is aware of his predicament, he cannot be explain-
ed simply within terms of the predicament itself.
The "soulish" side of man, if we may speak thus with-
out giving the impression that SK defends trichotomy, is
that animating principle, principally rationality, vhich
supplies man with that discrete existence which distinguishes
him from the homogeneity of the physical worid. Iron is
iron. It enjoys no discreteness. But in both man and ani-
mal, however, the soul, though more complex in the former
than in the latter, insures discrete existence. Man and an-
imal are sharply set off from the monotony of wood ana al-
cohol, for whereas the wooa must remain within the set deter-
minations of woodness, both man and animal can decide to go
1. r'lato, rhaedo, 98G-99A.
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either to the left or to the right, other things being
equal.
But is this e xplanation of the animal also the full
explanation of man ? Those Vvho answer this question in the
affirmative neglect, thinks SK, the fact of man's conscience,
the moral nature, the imperative "ought" which presses in
upon him, making absolute demands. Personality in man, iwhich
is more than discreteness, emerges only when we postulate
conscience, either/or decision, in short, spirit .
It is really the conscience which constitutes a person-
ality. Personality is an individual decision, substan-
tiated by being known to Qod in the possibility of the
conscience. i:<^or the conscience may slumber, but the
constitutive factor is its pos sibility . . .Mor is the
consciousness of the decision, ^self-consciousness , the
constitutive factor, in so far as that is merely the
relation within which the decision is related to it-
self, whereas the co-knowledge of G-od is the determining
factor, the confirmation,^
The emergence of spirit in man is a key to unlocking
the inner fecundity of SK's doctrine of aialectic and cre-
ativity. Spirit is man's response to obligation, his voli-
tional reaching out to higher potentialities. Spirit is the
heart of the philosophy of religion in SK.
Spirit is "the power of a man's understanding over
his life." Animals can decide to go to the left or to the
right, as can man, but only the latter has the freedom to
withdraw from the decision ana to survey it from the per-
spective of the actor himself. This power of self-understand-
2. Kierkegaard, JSK, §560.
3. Ibid., §1177.
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ing, self-transcendence, self- Indictment is the vitality of
spirit. "Man's essential idea is spirit, and we must not
permit ourselves to be confused by the fact that he is also
able to walk on two legs."^
Although spirit is not independent of nous
,
spirit is
more than nous , Spirit is that power of self-trans formation
which molds personality. The beaver can transform wood, but
only man can transform his character through inward self-
determination and passionate decision,
Reinhold Niebuhr, v/ho borrows heavily at this point
from SK, speaks of the spirit as that power of freedom in
man whereby the latter "stands outside of nature, life, him-
self, his reason and the world, "^ and as the ability in man
to make "himself his own object," While rationalists con-
fuse man with nous , and voluntarists submerge the whole man
in subrational vitalities , SK clings to the conviction that
man is essentially spirit .
Out of the above discussion emerges SK's formal
definition of Synthesis A, "Man is a synthesis of the soul-
ish and the bodily. But a synthesis is unthinkable if the
two are not united in a third factor. This third factor is
the spirit."'''
The predicament which results from synthesis A is the
4. Kierkegaard, EO, I, 52.
5. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 3,
6. Ibid
. , 4.
7. Kierkegaard, CD, 39.
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fact that man is necessarily a problem to himself. He is
determined as a lirriitea creature of necessity, on the one
hand, and yet he is free and infinite through the spirit, on
the other. This predicament suggests the second synthesis.
B. Synthesis B.
It might be wiser in this instance to state the syn^
thesis first and then consider the implications flowing
therefrom.
As for the latter synthesis, it evidently is not fashioned
in the same way as the former. In the former case
the two factors were soul ana body, ana the spirit was
a third term, but was a third term in such a sense that
there could not properly be any question of a synthesis
until the spirit was posited. The other synthesis has
only two factors: the temporal and the eternal. Where
is the third term? And if there be no third term,
there is really no synthesis; for a synthesis of that
which is a contradiction cannot be completed as a syn-
thesis v/ithout a third term...
If the first synthesis is man understood from the perspective
of faculty , the second is man seen from the angle of time and
eternity
.
Synthesis A provides for the possibility of the
channeling of time and eternity through man, and Synthesis B
provides for the actuality . In a sense, therefore, the two
syntheses are really only one, detailed from two different
vantage points.
The synthesis of the eternal and the temporal is not a
second synthesis but is the expression for the first
synthesis in consequence of which man is a synthesis
8. Kierkegaard, CD, 76. "Man is a synthesis of the infi-
nite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of free-
dom and necessity, in short it is a synthesis." Kierkegaard,
SD, 17.

56
of soul and body sustained by spirit.^
Man's freedom demonstrates that he is able to mediate
time and eternity; but the question is, hov/ can he actually
do it? This is the predicament of Synthesis B, and in under-
standing it one will lay the foundation for appreciating i>K*s
concepts of dread, sin, and redemption.
The rationalist sees no problem at all, for to him the
mediation of eternity is simply the ordinary processes of re-
flection and memory. For example, when one does a problem in
higher calculus , he i£ mediating eternity as a creature in
time.
SK refuses to approbate any such easy solution as this.
He is an existentialist, and one has not exis tentially mediat-
ed eternity until he lives out eternity, personally, passion-
ately, univocally, in time . So-called speculative mediation
is really not mediation at all; existential mediation is the
only real mediation, since truth is subjectivity
.
Eternity
is tangential to time through the individual only v/hen the
latter lives absolutely (eternally) in time.
Man's predicament as a result of Synthesis B now begins
to stand out in its true dimensions. Spirit is freedcm, and
freedom is choice. Absolute choice is an unreserved (in-
finite) decision for good in time. The good is what prom.otes
man's happiness, and the eternal good is what perpetually
sustains man. When a man decides for the eternal good in
9. Kierkegaard, CD, 79.
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time, therefore, he is deciding for eternal happiness. But
how is the mediation of eternity through the existing in-
dividual possible ? Man is temporal, not eternal. That is
the problem.
A partial answer to this difficulty is the suggestion
that the spirit, vvhich unites body and soul in Synthesis A,
rides on its counterpart in Synthesis B, the "moment" or the
"instant," defined by 6K as "an atom of eternity . "-^"^
The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and
eternity touch one another, thereby positing the tem -
poral , where time is constantly intersecting eterr\ity
and eternity constantly permeating time. Only how does
that division we talked about acquire significance: the
present, the past, and the future
.
The moment has a future orientation. An existential man looks
to; he waits and hopes for; he strives unto. Man is not re-
lated to eternity in the easy sense. that the man in the arm-
chair is related to his pipe and tobacco next to hirn; on the
contrary, eternity is not man's possession until, facing the
future, man decides for eternity.
Kierkegaard broke v;ith immanence
,
therefore, believing
that man is discontinuously related to eternity. It must be
pointed out by way of preface, however, that SK is defending
primarily a metaphysical , not an epistemological , break v^ith
eternity. \'^ie say "primarily" because ae facto the metaphysi-
cal break requires a modified epistemological break, too.
Metaphysically man is net continuous with God, So much is
10. Kierkegaard, CD, 79
11. Ibid.
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crystal clear in Kierkegaard, As for epistemology , however,
SK elects to divide the question. The metaphysical predica-
ment of man caused SK to be pessimistic about man's ability
to know G-od by coming to God. In this sense there is epis-
temological discontinuity. But SK goes on from here to de-
fend the idea tlmt when God comes to man in revelation, then
that revelation can be recognized by man as coming from God.
The content of revelation, therefore, must be continuous with
our faculties. In this sense SK rejects epistemological dis-
continuity. Vtf'e are qualified to know God's will, Whether
this is the best position SK could have held to produce a
maximized inwardness in man, is a question which will be
saved for the conclusion to the dissertation.
On such detailed questions as to whether or not SK
was an epistemological monist or dualist, there is every rea-
son to suppose that he followed the conventional dualistic
position and that he believed that ideas have a non-ideat ional
reference. Although the topic is not formally discussed by
SK, the point is everywhere assumed in the corpus of the
writing. For instance, SK makes a strong point out of the
difference between having an idea of future action and actual-
ly going through that action in concreto . If the future and
the idea of the future were the same thing, the whole founda-
tion of existentialism would collapse. Man would be in pos-
session of Christianity by thinking Christianity. SK in-
sists that Christianity as an idea is very different from
Christianity as an existential possession. For this reason
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SK never tired of castigating Socrates for teaching that the
guilt of man is simply ignorance. SK believed that man can
have all knowledge and still not know the truth. Truth is
inwardness .
With this in miiti let us turn to immanence itself.
Immanence is the doctrine that the self contains within it-
self those potentialities which, by continuity, can be ex-
ploited by the self to put the latter on speaking terms with
eternity. No radical remedy is requirea in the self for the
self to remain at peace with God. In immanence the individ-
ual may take his ease, for his ego is pleasantly continuous
with eternity.
SK felt that until the ego is interpreted as stanaing
in radical metaphysical discontinuity with God, that shatter'
ing of the self which must be presupposed if a maximum of
passion in the moment is to be drawn out, will not material-
ize. The distance between God ana man must be infinite if
the latter is to be aroused to rise to full potentialities.
So long as eternity is manipulatable by one set of determin-
ations antecedent to another set, the latter being possessed
by man like Chinese boxes one within another, that long will
man hesitate to take the decisive leap of the vi/ill; for to-
morrov; will do just as well as today as a time to decide, or
the day after tomorrow as well as tomorrow. Through imma-
nence man can proceed painlessly from one contiguous poten-
tiality to another without facing either passionate decision
from within or the intrusion of God's revelation from^ with-
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out. Immanence is simply a self-evolution. It is paganism.
Christianity is not content to be an evolution within
the total definition of human nature; such an offer is
too trifling a one to propose to the Deltj , one does
not want to be at one moment for the -believer the para-
dox, and then little by little to supply him with an
understanding; for the niartyrdom of faith (crucifixion
of the understanaing ) is not a martyrdom o^' the instant
but precisely the martyrdom of endurance. -^^
SK retains surprise, aiscontinuity , and paradox within
the hmnan situation in order that a man's passion might be
maximized. Immanence stands diametrically related to ais-
continuity. Thomas describes immanence as follows;
Human reason is accepted as the supreme authority, and
God is reached as the conclusion of logical argument.
Wo cleft or discontinuity is admitted to exist in real-
ity as presented within the experience of man. God is
not seriously sought or found in his eternal transcend-
ence. He is not essentially beyond reason. There is a
stubborn refusal to acknowledge that man cannot dis-
cover him unless he first aiscovers man by revealing
himself to man. iVian's rational aiscovery is claimed
to be Goa's revelation. So it is that humanism has al-
ways tended to evaporate God into 'values* ana 'ideas,*
with "Che result that these break up into conflicts as
rival 'ideologies.'
Even Socrates, that great maieutic teacher, who above
all the ancients took time to weigh the implications of ex-
istential living, though rising as high as one outside of
the Christian revelation could, was himself unable to break
with immanence. By supposing that man is continuously re-
lated to eternity by having once lived in the world of Ideas,
(though now temporarily entombed in a body by an incarnation),
ana that when man fails in virtue it is only that he is not
12. Kierkegaara, CUir', 496.
13. Thomas, Art., 36.
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reasoning carefully, Socrates fell into an immanence from
which SK felt he had to break. Keminiscence is a backward
look, vvhile the moment is oriented toward the future. Vt/olff
excellently describes the bocratic deficiency as follows.
It rested upon a faulty anthropology. Man as a knovt^er
v/as viewed as essentially sound and since in his in-
finity he was related without serious interference save
by an ignorance that could be dispelled. the method of
knowledge proceeded by way of r ecollection out of the
present end the f inite back into the eternal ana the
unconditioned. For such a relationship historical ex-
istence was an irrelevance. But what if man were not
integer? What if he had lost his relationship with the
truth by having come into a state of contradiction to
it? What if truth consisted in the seemingly absurd
fact that the eternal truth had become an historical
event? These qualifications are precisely the presup-
positions of Christianity ... Socrates has been outdis-
tanced and disoualified; he had no consciousness of sin
which for K is decisive for Christianity, i-latonic
reminiscence has been destroyed by Christianity's re-
lationship to time. The infinite gulf of sin separates
man from retiring into the eternal by way of recollec-
tion. The past is blocked ana the future is made ae-
pendent upon a relationship to an historical person.-^*^
Discontinuity is overcome only in the moment. From
the point of view of the living inaiviaual, the moment is
that atom of eternity which unites with time when the pas-
sionate individual decides inwardly, i.e. , when the truth of
devotion to duty becom.es an existential realization. Meta-
physical discontinuity is overcome by a passionate leap.
This is no facile assignment. Let us call this the "moment
of contemporaneity," that point in a decision when Lhe in-
dividual, through inwardness, makes himself contemporary
with those demands of eternity which press in upon him in
14. Wolf, ARSK, II, 233.
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his conscience.
But there is still another moment to which the Chris-
tian appeals in his effort to overcome the discontinuity
which separates him metaphysically from God, This is the
"absolute mom.ent," that point in history when the God of hea
ven and earth entered into an individual person and became
the God-Man, eternity in time. Let us examine these two miO-
m.ents in turn.
The absolute moment guards Christianity from the pit-
fall of immanence in that it so seriously posits the gulf
which separates time and eternity that the earth can never
enter into fellowship with heaven without the latter first
invading the former. In the incarnation God actually comes
into time in the form of a single human inaividual. His
divinity is veiled; Christ is incognito. If man could have
mediated eternity successfully and known what God is (love),
then Christ would never have had to come. But Christ aid
com.e. Therefore, man did not know.
Behold where he stands—GodJ Where? There; ao you
not see him? He is God; and yet he has not a resting-
place for his head, and he dares not lean on any man
lest he cause him to be offended. He is God.-^^
The absolute moment defines Christianity's final
break with the maieutic method of bocrates, since in the lat
ter the teacher does not create the conditions for the learn
ing, being able only to urge the learner to recall that pos-
session v/hat is now hidden by error. The method of maieutic
15. Kierkegaard, FF, 25.
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therefore, is faulty; it never assures that the learning will
be achieved. The teacher cannot convey the answer, and a
brilliant individual can find out the answer for himself
without a teacher. Furthermore, when the teacher has final-
ly elicited knowledge from, the learner, the latter can bade
farewell to the former and go on his own way with his posses-
sion. The teacher, in short, is just accidentally related to
the learner. In opposition to this Christianity says that
man can neither learn nor retain anything without the teacher,
God.
Socrates is still in immanence because he doe s not
properly sense his full distance from God. He understands
the problem of the relation between time ana eternity, but he
still believes that from the siae of man the gap somehow can
in
be bridged. In Christianity God breaks^and shows man his
distance. The aifference between God and man is eternity .
The relation is serious. in the absolute moment, therefore,
there is revealed the fact that the condition for learning as
well as the truth learned must be imparted by the teacher if
the learner is to learn. The teacher of man is God. God
must remove our ignorance. "If it is to be aone, it must be
done by God himself. "-^^ The ordinary teacher can easily show
the learner his ignorance, uut that is the end; he cannot
guarantee the conditions under which the ignorance itself
finally is eradicated. Let us remember, for example, that
16. Kierkegaard, FF, 10.
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that Socrates left Euthyphro almost as ignorant as Kuthyphro
left him. ^^ut in the absolute moment Christ, when he showed
man the love of the Father, imparted Doth this Knowledge and
the condition by vh ich man may come to Cioa . Christ revealed
that man "is the object of CiOud*s love, and <JOd desires to
teach him, and is concerned to bring him to equality with
himself," Love is the existential way to God.
In the moment of contemporaneity the indiviaual maices
an absolute decision for Christ, a decision for eternity.
The direction of the decision is pitched toward the future.
One does not recall Christ ( a la Socrates); Christ meets
him in personal confrontation through revelation (the teach-
ing ministry). Christ is the absolute good, ana by deciding
for Christ in time, one has made the most passionate inward
decision possible. By this act his individuality is maximized,
since man is spirit.
And so I say to myself: I choose; that historical fact
means so much to me that I decide to stake my whole
life upon that if. Then he lives; lives entirely full
of the idea, risking his life for it: and his life is
the proof that he believes. He did not have a few
proofs, and so believed and then began to live... That
is called risking; and without risk faith is an impos-
sibility. To be related to spirit means to undergo a
t est ; to believe, to wish to believe, is to change one's
life into a trial; daily test is the trial of faith.
Hecollection does not accent ana develop man's in-
dividuality, because it is but a passionless armchair de-
cision. Faith lives for the future creatively and adventur -
17. Kierkegaard, irF, 21.
18. Kierkegaard, JSK, §1044.
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ously, carving out eternity in the moment of decision. One
may question its t ruth, but SK believed that wir leben vor -
warts; wir denken ruckwarts .
Although Socrates sagaciously understood that his ex-
istence interrupted perfect communion with the world of Ideas,
thus interjecting a pathos into living which is conspicuous
for its absence in the Sophists, he nevertheless clung to
the unfounded optimism that under ideal conditions the in-
dividual would make his way back to the worla of Ideas.
Socrates never abandoned this ideal, though he consistently
disclaimed ever having fulfilled that ideal. But cutting
off Christianity from r ecollection, more spirituality, pas-
sion, risk, in short, more individuality, is drawn out.
But the more difficult it is made for him to take hirr-
self out of existence by way of recollection, the more
profound is the inwaraness that his existence may have
in existence; and when it is made impossible for him,
when he is held so fast in existence that the back door
of recollection is forever closed to him, then his in-
wardness will be the most profound possible.
The moment of contemporaneity, v;hen the individual decides
for Christ, provides for that zenith of individuality beyond
which it is not possible to pass.
But how aoes one know that it is Goa that is speaking
to him in the moment of r evelation? There is no proof but
19, Kierkegaard, GUP, 186-187. Ore might wonder, likewise,
if inwardness is not maae more profound when one is ep i s t em-
ologically discontinuous with eternity, too, as in skepti-
cism, if^hen man is so cut off from God that he could not
even recognize God in revelation, then, surely, he is arousai
inwardly to even a greater height than if he knows ana re-
ceives the revelatiofl.
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faith itself. "The only possible alternative seems to be
that the divine revelation verifies itself to the subjective
nature of the individual through faith which is regarded as
a divine gift."20
G. Implications.
When these two syntheses, which support S-i^'s anthro-
pology, ax'e undersLood, the message of the Jiierkegaardian
literature falls coherently into place. The purpose of the
literature is to make men individuals and Christians. An-
other way of stating the purpose, now that the nature of man
has been examined cursorily, is to say that bK is concerned
to have men exist. Existence is that condition in vvhich the
spirit of man is aroused to passionate activity.
Existence is the child that is born of the infinite and
the finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is there-
fore a constant striving. This was bocrates ' meaning
...however much the subject has the infinite within
himself, through being an existing individual, he is in
process of becoming.
Eternity defines for man the ideal outer limits of
his spiritual possibilities. The more these possibilities
are existentialiy mediated in tim.e , the more intensely the
individual is an individual, on the one hand, and the more
truth as subjectivity is increased, on the oLher. '^To exist
means to express the eternal in time, to translate the eter-
20. Thomte, KfR, 216. Although this is the explicit an-
swer SK would give, there is really a profounder implic it
answer latent in his writings. The revelation in Christ is
continuous with our moral nature; therefore what He says can-
not be of the devil.
21. Kierkegaard, GUr , 85.
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nal content of the human self into a living reality in
time,"^^ In the instant of passionate decision the inaivid-
ual unites time and eternity. In completing this union, man
transforms the quality of his own existing self. He is a
different man after the choice. "The experience of choosing
imparts to a man's nature a solemnity, a quiet aignity,
which never is aitirely lost."^*^ Decision is no simple
thing that can be made once and for all. Man must continual-
ly repeat that moment-by-moment Inward interest \Ahich v/as
first aroused when his spiii t came to maturity. Otherwise,
man relapses back into a spiritless stagnation.
When we understand SK's anthropology then we are able
to appreciate much of contemporary realistic theology, Nie-
buhr, for example, takes SK*s hypothesis that human history
"is permanently suspended between the flux of nature and
finiteness ana its eternal source and end,"^^ and interprets
Christianity as that framework of dialectical tension which
keeps man permanently suspended between his own possibilities
as a free spirit, on the one hand, ana the contingencies and
necessities of history, on the other. Eternity blithely
beckons m^an every second to decision, while at the same time
sternly condem.ns man for not having risen to his full pos-
sibilities. SK and iMiebuhr tell exactly the same story at
this point.
22. Geismar, LRTK, 45-46.
23. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 149..
24. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 148.
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Rightly understood, the eternal assigns only a little
portion at a time in the possioility. Eternity is
throup;h the possible alv/aj^'s near enough at hand, and
yet far enough away to keep a man moving forward, ^^ro-
gressing, toward the eternal. Thus eternity drav/s and
lures man by the posSu.biiity from the cradle to the
grave, if he '#111 but choose to ho^e.^^
V/ithin the tensions of this dialectic SK received
strength to throw off his crushing frustrations in the case of
hegina, and to wait v.dLh renewed patience to listen to the
voice of Goa to his heart in the moment. SK, j-n his ov/n words
is like a trained horse v^hich, instinct ively leaping to the har
ness in the presence of the coachman, becomes miore and more sen
sitive to God's voice in revelation as the years passed. By
an unflinching devotion to spiritual possibilities, SiK came in
to the "earnest" of his eternal happiness v.hile yet in time,
possibility whips a man on, while necessity holds him back; and
the self that does not know the inspiring and goading forces
of this possibility/necessity dialectic has not yet corre in-
to full selfhood, being "but a chipped fragment . "'^^
For the purpose of becoming (and it is the task of the
self freely to become itself j possibility ana necessity
are equally essential. Just as infinitude ana finitude
...both belong to the self, so also do possibility and
necessity, A self which has no oossibility is in des-
pair, ana so in turn is the self which has no neces-
sity.^'
At no point in the literature aoes SK rise to more
sublime heights of eloquence ana beauty than vhen he speaks
of love. In the Works of Love , an im.mensely rich volume, love.
25, Kierkegaard, WL, 204.
26, Kierkegaard, rH, 2U4.
27, Kierkegaard, SD, 53.
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as the mediating element between time ana. eternity, is lavish-
ly adorned, "What is it which connects the temporal ana the
eternal, what except love, which just for this reason is be-
fore everything, and which abides when e yerything else is
past?"^® In the jr^hilosophical Fragments the incarnation of
Christ is likened to the exalt eo king, who, loving a humble
maiden, was moved, through his own self-humiliation, to woo
the maiden and to elevate her to queenship. So God, desiring
to make himself known to man, descendea to the state of man
and with love won the latter to himself. The more one ven-
tures in love, the more he both existentially unites eternity
and time in the moment, and the more he is God-like on earth.
To stimulate man, God, v;ith whom "all things are possible
every instant,' oversees in his providence that faith "vi/ill
certainly receive strength enough in the act of decision. " '^'^
Since the individual who will not love is not a man at
all, for he is spiritless, it is understandable why SK in-
dicted the uncommitted man as one who is only potentially an
individual. The spiritless man, he who refuses to venture
all and so to come to grips with his full potentialities, is
a Philistine . The i'hilistine is he who persists in using the
relative as the absolute in connection with the essential,
Philistinism is spiritless ,.. Philistinism lacks every
determinant of spirit and terminates in probability,
vtfithin which the possible finds its insignificant place.
Thus it lacks sufficient possibility to take notice of
28. Kierkegaard, WL, 6.
29. Kierkegaard, SD, 61.
30. Kierkegaara, PH, 107.
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God. Devoid of imagination, as the Philistine always
is, he lives in a certain trivial province of experience
as to how things go, what is possible, what usually oc-
curs. Thus the Philistine has lost his self ana God.
The pathetic side of SK's anthropology is that it
seems to be carved out more for men than for women. The wo-
man, who supposedly "is more sensuous than man,"*^^ (because
she lives for beauty), is subject to more aread than man.
She is hence less spiritual. "Where beauty claims the right
to rule it brings about a synthesis from which spirit is ex-
cluded. "'^'^ Whether SK was inspireQ for this hypothesis by
home frustrations or by becoming upset over Regina is not
clear. Probably it came from reaaing Schopenhauer. In any
case, iSK here broke the perfection of his dialectic in favor
of a crude, misguided realism.
I have nothing to say in justification of this trait in
S.K.'s thought. It is a flaw v^hich the biographer can-
not ignore, but I feel no neea of dwelling upon it.
For I regard this whole complex as a foreign boay in-
truded into the organism of S.K.'s thought, having no
integral relation to it, nor any further consequences
either theoretical or practical.'^
31. Kierkegaard, SD, 63.
32. Kierkegaard, CD, 57.
33. Ibid
. , 58. SK»s reference to beauty is somewhat point-
less, for there are many other ways to give vent to sensuous-
ness than by the primping of the body,
34. Lowrie, Kier
.
, 488.

GHAir'TEH FIVE
THE DIALECTIC OF INWARDNESS
If subjectivity is truth, a state of inwardness as
decision, then it follows that the more passionately one de-
cides the more one has, or, perhaps, is_ the truth.
With this hypothesis in mind.SK, disciplined by his
own personal experience,'^ detailed a dialectic of inwardness
to serve as a gauge by which to measure both the degrees of
existence and their ability to create and sustain self-
development through passionate inwardness. SK labels the
gradations in the scale "existence-spheres" or 'Istages ,
"
classifying them broaaly as the following: the aesthetic,
the ethical, and. the religious.
There are three stages: an aesthetic, an ethical, and
a religious. But these are not distinguished abstract-
ly, as the immediate, the mediate ana the synthesis of
the two, but rather concretely, in existential deter-
minations, as enjoyment-perdition; action-victory; suf-
fering. But in spite of this triple division the book
is nevertheless an either-or. The ethical ana the re-
ligious stages have in fact an essential relationship
1. "In an exceptional degree, this man's thought was shaped
by his life. For him, as for Kosea, reality was what he
himself had passed through; ana scholars who are v/orKing
over his ideas find it necessary to start from his person-
ality." Mackintosh, TMT, 220.
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to one another.^
"All interpretations of ex3s tence rank in accordance with the
degree of an individual's dialectical apprehension of inward-
ness."'^
In point of fact, hoY^ever, the last two are the only
real existence-stages , since pre-ethical commitments make no
difference for existence. They do not involve any either/or
choice between good and bad; yet within decision alone is
transformation.
A. i'reface to the i^tages: Existenz .
If the man with a dormant spirit is only a potential
individual, since he entertains no transforming decisions,
then an existential man is the most highly actualized in-
dividual. Such a person lives in the mood of Existenz . This
stratum of existence is pithily described by Werner brock.
Existenz is an attitude of the inaividual to himself,
v/hich is called forth by such concrete situations as
the necessity for choice of profession or a conflict in
love, a catastrophic change in social conditions, or
the imminence of one's ovm aeath. It leads immediately
to sublime moments in which a man gathers his v.hole
strength to make a decision which is taken afterwards
as binding upon his future life. x<\irtherriiore , Existenz
never becomes completed, as aoes life through death.
In its different manifestab ions it is only a beginning
vtiich is faithlUlly followed or faithlessly forgotten.
Moreover, Existenz is not real in being knov/n, it is
real only in being effectuated, in the remembrance of
it, ana in resolutions for the future which are taken to
be absolutely binding.'*
2. RierKegaard, CUP, 261.
3. Ibid
.
, 506.
4. Brock, IGGF, 85-84. (C^uoted also in Mackintosh, TMT,
219).

73
Existenz has no being apart from passionate, creative, indi-
vidual moments of decisi on. It emerges when "ana only when
through personal, subjective concern " about the relation of
the self to the world "we transform this relationship to ac-
cord with moral, religious, or specifically Christian prin-
ciples."^ Objective, impersonal situations are transformed
into subjective relations only when the individual, facing
such situations, is no longer able to abide unmoved, but, on
the contrary, feels constrained to react with great inward
passion.
All reality is Existenz when our emotional interest in
its actuality allows us no longer to view it in the
light of an intellectual approximative process that
could after all not have brought it forth but in the
light of a concrete transition from Non-Being to Be-
ing.^
Existenz may be illustrated perfectly by the story
narrated in the closing chapter of The Concept of Dread , en-
titled "Dread as a having Experience by Means of Faith." In
this section SK describes an ascetic Indian hermit who sober-
ly lived two full years on dew. One day, however, he went to
the city and fell prey to drunkeness.. Now, upon learning of
this incident one might laugh, providing he sought humor; but
if one had himself experienced what it means to be a drunkard,
i.e
.
, if he is a man who has passea through the discipline
of suffering and who has been "educatea by possibility,"
that man "is absolutely identified with the unfortunate man.
5. Safier, Jr'SK, 11.
6. Ibid. , 61.
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(for) he knows no finite evasion by which he might escape.""^
Here is Sxistenz ; an objective situation moves over into
subjective concern through inward passion.
Existenz is in vogue today; it is the Zeitgeist . The
remarkable influence SK is exerting is partially explicable
on the grounds that nations are now actually passing through
a period of suffering and insecurity. "Vi/henever a philosophy
becomes fashionable we may be sure that ii: reflects in some
measure the temper of the age."® Troubled international times
are at hand. Personal decision, therefore, is no longer a
resp onsibility which frivolously can be postponed to another
day, for technological advance has made the decision of the
moment too important. A wrong choice in one moment may mean
death the next. Existentialism has captured this spirit of
the times.
The language of the existentialists affords an opportun-
ity of expressing the prevailing sense of being a survi -
vor , a survivor who has but a short time to debate the
issues of suffering and death before they overtake him
also, a survivor who must find his freedom and self-
realization in some terrible personal decision of the
will, a survivor whose only chance to do a noble act in
defiance of a monstrous world might be to anticipate the
end by suicide,^
Existenz is the fruit of SK's attempt to use Hegel's
category of "becoming" as a moving description of the will
of the acting individual who decides for eternity in time.
In the act of existential living possibility passes over into
7. Kierkegaard, CD, 141.
8. Koss, Art., 196.
9. Ibid. , 197.
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actuality. Real becoming, not a chimera such as "logical"
becoming, is achieved. "In the moment of decision, not by
mediation, but by the leap, possibility passes over into
actuality, and thus it is pers onal d ecision that makes His-
tory and Existence. ""^^ SK suspects a sleight of hana in
Hegel. The rabbit of becoming is withdrawn from the hat of
timeless logic.
SK says that Exist enz finds its perfect expression in
the life ana death of the incarnate Christ. Christ so pas-
sionately understood reality that what Christ did, and not
what he said , is the thing which makes him significant. He
came not to teach a doctrine, but to live a revelation of
love.
The Saviour of the world, our Lord Jesus Christ, did
not come to the world to bring a doctrine; He never
lecturea. Since He did not bring a doctrine, neither
did He seek to prevail upon anyone by reasons to ac-
cept the doctrine, nor seek with proofs to substantiate
it. His teaching in fact was His life. His presence
among men.
It might be mentioned in this connection that this
conclusion of SK is somewhat of an oversimplification. When
one reads the New 'J-estament he is impressed by the fact that
Christ came to teach a doctrine as well as reveal the meaning
of love. SK would have spoken more accurately had he insisted
that the aoctrine is insignif i cant without the life. But to
deny the teaching, as if Christ never lectured, is histori-
cally inaccurate, for Christ's teaching ministry was a care-
10. Daane, KCM, 22.
11. Kierkegaard, FSJY, 200.
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fully detailed, ^roposit ional ccaranunlcation v;hich served as
a theoretic explanation for the living ministry.
The more one moves from the sphere of abstractions and
passionless objectivity into the stratum of real inwardness
and subjective concern, the more he canonizes his ov^n "living
epistle." SK was more interested in making the epistles of
men canonical than the Bible books.
Prom this emphasis it is easy to appreciate why SK
has received such a surprisingly warm reception from many
Roman Catholic scholars. The Catholic doctrine which iden-
tifies sanct ification f-ina justification may not explicitly be
detailed by SK, perhaps, but evidently the spirit of the doc-
trine is there. In nearly one thousand entries in the
Journals on the topic "Christendom," for example, it is sig-
nificant to observe that at least one hundred of them are di-
rected ap;ainst Luther or rrotestantism, or both. These in-
dictments are not unrelated to the mooa of Exis tenz . The
sola fide doctrine of the Reformer's is rejected by SK be-
cause it (ostensibly) leads to that disparagement of good
works which encourages a breakdovm of inwaraness . ^'^ The
"Epistle of Straw," therefore, suddenly becomes a aocument
which takes on the value of an "Epistle of Gold." If faith is
eouivalent to inward obedience, then the v/ill of Goa is
mediated only when one is engaged in doing good works. In
12. There is solicthing pathetic about this.- Vi/hat is to
prevent good works themselves from becoming new forms of se-
curity through which the tension of the dialectic is cor-
rupted?
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vain, therefore, does one ssak in SK any of those warmer
IrTotestant doctrines of mediation and justification through
Christ alone. The verse, "There is therefore now no con-
demnation for those vvho are in Christ Jesus, "'-'^ is a rauline
not a Kierkegaardian judgment.
SK did not approbate the ir'rotestant rejection of the
Catholic machinery of the "saints," either. in rejecting
sainthood the Reformation lov/ered the ideal of human achieve-
ment, thus encouraging spiritual laziness. Unlike Jc'rotestan-
tism, Catholicism "has a conception and idea of the Christian
ideal. .. protestantism is vorldliness from beginning to end."-^^
As for Lutheranism, it was only a negative corrective which
could not possibly last*
V/hen Catholicism degenerates, what form will che cor-
ruption take? The answer is easy: hypocritical sancti-
moniousness. 'liVhen protestantism degenerates, what form
of corruption shall v/e find? .... shallow worldliness .
The frustrated i:>K, whose "weary limbs never knew the
marriage bed," went through life with his best eye focused /
on the ascetic seclusion of the monastery. The banter and
bizzareness of Copenhagen annoyed the sensitive author and
made him long for an official outlet for his urge to live
absolutely. "Protestantism always, needs the monastery."
SK»s flirting with the monastic movement as objective
machinery by which to express inwardness, is possibly what
13. Romans 8:1.
14. Kierkegaard, JSK, §1379.
15. Ibid., §1327.
16. Ibid
. , §711.

78
Sartre has in mind when he challenges Christian existential-
ism on the ground that by not going all out for inward pas-
sion it seeks the palliating objectivities of an institution,
doctrine, or God.
Sartre ... bitterly attacks Christianity precisely be-
cause he sees in this appeal to God an attempt zo escape
from the Angst of our situation, to find a false com-
fort in our despair, to thrcpw upon God tfie final re-
sponsibility which is ours . '
SK never fully approbated the Catholic philosophy of monasti-
cism per se , to be sure, for, as we shall show in greater de-
tail in a later chapter, monasticism confused inward absolute-
ness with the facade of an externalism, Nevertheless, mon-
asticism is infinitely superior to the indifferentism of the
sola fide.
B. Transition to the Stages.
The boundary lines which separate the stages are
qualitative rather than Quantitative, for zhe tension created
in a succeeding stage always presupposes the residual despair
of the preceding. "The aesthetic sphere is that of immediacy,
the ethical is that of requirement ... the religious sphere is
that of fulfillment.
Twilight or boundary zones hover about each stage.
"Irony, constituting the boundary between the aesthetic and
the ethical; humor, as the boundary that separates the ethi-
cal from the religi ous . "-^^
17. Moss, Art. , 197.
18. Kierkegaard, SLW, 43.
19. Kierkegaard, CUP, 448.
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Irony is born when the particulars of the finite are
juxtaposed with an ethical requirement, thus giving frame-
work to a decisive contradiction. Irony, appreciatea by
Socrates perfectly,*^ serves as the incognito of the ethi-
cist. The ethicist "grasps the contradiction there is be-
tween the manner in which he exists inwardly, and the fact
that he does not outwardly express it,"*^-^
Humor, the boundary between the ethical ana the re-
ligious stages, is not essentially different from irony. It
stems from an incongruity, too. Humor, however, is a more
intense appreciation of the total guilt of the personality
in relation to ethical demands. It requires real courage
for a man to laugh at himself. But humor must not be confused
with religion, since it aoes noz terminate in "che humble
posture of repentance. The humorist aoes not repent; he
keeps laughing at his incongruity. The religious man, who
is busy creatively living for eternity, finds his preaica-
ment too serious to laugh at. "Where the decision comes to
be in a moment, and the movement is forward toward a relation-
ship with the eternal truth which came into being in time:
there humor does not follow. "^2 The humorist is an almost
man: he is not far from the kingdom, but as yet he is inward:
ly uncommitted. ''He la cks that qualitative decisiveness
20. "According to Kierkegaard, Socrates was not only a mas-
ter of irony, but his whole point of view, his view of life
was irony, s ensu emlnentiori . " Thomte, Ki-'R, 9y,
21. Kierkegaard, GUi^, 450.
22. Ibid. , 243.
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which Kierkegaard regards as essential to the Christian
position.
Although sK does not classify and arrange the stages
in that unambiguous sense which is characteristic of a final
system, he does propose that time is a criterion by vh ich
to learn whether a given existence falls in one stage or in
another.
For the esthetic life, time has no fundamental signifi-
cance, enjoyment culminates in the moment, and for the
esthetic view the happy moment is everything. The
ethical life accentuates time as the necessary meaium
of a history and a solution for the permanent. Religion
A emphasizes time still more strongly, by intensifying
the significance of the transformation that may occur
in it but not dicisively, while Religion B emphasizes
time paradoxically by making the temporal commensurable
for an eternal aecision.'^^
C. The Aesthetic Stage.
A person resides in the aesthetical stage whenever he
understands the meaning of life to consist in the immediacy
of sense perception. The only things that interest the
aesthete are imumediate satisfaction, the finite, the given.
All personal sacrifice for principles which are valid for
eternity, i.e. all devotions which boraer on the fright of
inward repentance, are comic to the aesthete. He faces no
decision, and his spirit is never taxed. The aesthete takes
his life just as he finds it. He basks in the decisionless
pleasures of the moment.
25. Thomte, KPR, 101.
24. Swenson, SAK, 176-177.
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The aesthete finds no contradiction in existing, and
lives his life in sheer unbroken iirimediacy . . . I'hus for
the aeihetic inaiviaual time has no significance, for
the dimensions of the pleasurable are wholly within
the present moment, so that in contradiction vvith the
speculative, which has only the past moment, aestheti-
cism has only the present moment, and, as a consequence,
the past and the future are without significance.
The aesthetic stage is lowest in the scale of exis-
tence because by eliminating all decision it destroys indi-
viduality. The aesthete is a reductio ad absurdum . He is a
man trying to preserve his individuality through a process
which by definition guarantees a destruction of the individ-
ual. The aesthete just _is_; he is never becoming * But it is
only in the decisive act of becoming that the individual ex-
ists. The aesthete can only come to boredom and forgetful-
ness, since the spirit, which alone can break through to the
limitless freshness of eternity, is neglected. Spirit tlirives
only in decision.
SK claims the poet as particularly illustrative of the
futility and frustration involved in aesthet icism. Somewhere
in the x^oetics Aristotle remarks that, since history itself
is the mixed category while poetry is pure ideality, poetry
deals with that which is above history. The poet, therefore,
does not actually exist ; he is lost in a make-believe stratum
of the ideal. Curiously enough, however, the poet somehow
gives the appearance of remaining in history while creating
his ideal above history. This is hiomor mixed with pathos.
The poet does not touch reality. While he explains
25. Daane, KCM, lUO-101.
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love in great riddles, he does not relate that love to his-
tory, the imperfect world in vh ich he, a profound synthesis
of time and eternity, is supposed to exist. The poet never
details a program for history. It is only "g3 od fortune" if
the individual happens to fall in love. Christianity, how-
ever, takes eternity seriously, for it sees our problem to
be not the speculative issue of what the ide al is, but how
man may be eternal in the temporal here and now . Christian-
ity requires that a man seek out his neighbor in love, A
man does not have purity of he«rt until he wills the one
thing, impossible though the achievement of the ought may be.
Christian love is self-denying love, therefore it
vouches for this 'shalt.' 'x'o exhaust these passions
is bewildering. But the extreme passionate limits of
partiality lie in exclusiveness , in loving only one;
the extreme limits of self-denial lie in self-sacrifice,
in not excluding a single one.^^
Because the poetical was elicitea bv' Hegina Qlsen, bK
exis tentially learned what it means to be a stagnant soul
which is prostrated in immediacy ana which never comes to
decision. The aesthete loses his soul by trying to save it.
He flnitizes himself through immediacy.
The only possible way of escape for the aesthete is a
cleansing despair through the malancholy of boredom. If the
individual can become hysterical through perpetual boredom,
he may come to see that he is destroying his own spirit.
"There comes a moment in a man's Ixfe when his irnmediacy is,
as it were, ripened ana the spirit demanas a higher form in
26. Kierkegaard, WL, 4 3.
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which it will apprehend itself as spirit."
In boredom there emerges the possibility of either a
forward or a backward movement. If the aroused spirit is en-
couraged, transformation for good may result. The hope of
restored individuality as a possibility may emerge. But
there is also the risk of the backward movement. This means
melancholy.
If this does not come to pass, if tne movement is
checked, if it is forced back, melancholy ensues. One
may do much by way of introducing forgetfulness , one
may work, one may employ other expedje nces more inno-
cent than those of Nero, but melancholy rem.ains
.
Apart from this path of the individual's coming to
himself, there is absolutely no compulsion for one to move
from one stage to another. "If they presented themselves as
passible, they also presented themselves as possible of non-
realization." SK went to great length to get underneath
the skin of men to move them to self-decision, but the title
of one of his books , For Self-Examxnation and Judge for Your-
selves 1 , preserves SK's conviction that decision must arise
voluntarily from within the inaividual himself. If the
aesthete cannot oe aroused to indiviauality through appre-
ciating his task, then ail SK can ao is to shake the dust off
his shoes.
D. The Ethical Stage.
Let us remember that man is a synthesis of the finite
27. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 159.
28. Ibid.
29. Thomte, KrR, 208.
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and. the eternal. If the aesthete seizes on to the finite in
man, the ethlcist exploits the eternal . The ethicist iaenti-
fies human happiness with the realization of a universal ob-
lifration. This marks an infinite break with the aesthetic
because the universal is found within personality. The ethi-
cal tries to arouse man's spirit to action. The ethical is
a dynatuic life, standing sharply contrasted to the static
selfhood of the aesthete. "He v/ho lives ethically. lives
dynamically .. .he lives in and by the enthusiasm, but also by
the effort and strain of an essential and profound becoming."
True ethical enthusiasm is willingness "to the utmost limits
of one's powers, but. at the same time being so uplifted in
divine jest as never to think about the accomplishm.ent . ""^-^
One leaps into the ethical stage whenever his choices
are understood as duty. In the tensions of duty the individ-
ual is developed, a. nee one's personality and the total de-
posit of his decisions in life are the same thing. "-t^e does
not become another man than he was before, but he becomes
himself, consciousness is unified, ana he is himself." The
quiet solemnity which the ethical man adds to his personality
is a dignity which is never lost; it ,is a quality wi ich the
unmoved aesthete can never acquire. "The aesthetical in a
man is that by which he is immediately what he is; the ethi-
cal is that whereby he becomes what he becomes. "^'^ Transfor-
30. Srenson, SAK, 167.
31. Kierkegaard, GUP, 121.
32. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 149.
33. Ibid. , 150.
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mation is the salvation of the ethical man. It is well that
he sees life in terms of either/or, for in so una erstanding
he learns that in freedom the spirit is aeveloped ana that in
choosing ethically he actually chooses himself, rure ethics
involves the hard assignment of either/or, and the "only ab-
solute either/or is the choice between good and evil."
The ethical stage is not to be understood as an ab-
straction, SK is interested in ethics only as that science
which fulfills the general condition that truth is subjectiv-
ity. "You never think under the rubric of good ana evil.
You are constantly thinking relative aifferences, never the
absolute difference." The real science of ethics is living .
In existence the individual and the good both become. "The
good is_ for the fact that I will it, ana apart from my willing
it it has no existence. An abstract good may exist for-
mally as an ideal in the mind of a philosopher, or eternally,
perhaps, in the very being of God, but it cannot exist for
man apart from decision in the concrete moment. In concreto
,
the only good, as in Kant, is the good will. SK goes so far
as to say that "in making a choice it is not so much a Ques-
tion of choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness,
the pathos with v^nich one chooses. Even in a v/rong choice
one's spirit is aroused and personality accented, for there
is still a choice.
34. Kierkegaard, bO, II, l4l.
35. Ibid. , 188.
36. Ibid .
37. Ibid. , 141.
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For SK, the religious stage generally presupposes the
virtue of the ethical. The enthusiasm of ethics is neeaecL
if the passion of the religious life is to be secured.
When an individual abanaons himself to lay hold of same-
thing great outside of him, his enthusiasm is aesthetic;
Vv'hen he forsakes everything to save himself, his enthu-
siasm is ethical. ^°
Honesty in the ethical assignment necessarily Je ads to humor
and despair. Kant's formallstic ethics, for example, rests
upon the fundamental premise that action is moral only v/hen
it is done out of respect for the law. Since perfect re-
spect for duty makes for a perfect will, one must always in-
quire what is his duty and never vi,'hat is his aesire. "Now
the comedy begins. Formallstic ethics succeeds only by
forgetting actually what it means to be a man. Kant's ethics
may apply to angels, perhaps, but not to men who happen to be
finite as well as infinite, emotional as well as rational,
temporal as well as eternal. Kant teaches tha-c one must
crush his subrational vitalities, never giving place to the
imjnediate or finite impulses within him. If a man yields to
his emotional nature, that very moment he forfeits his right
to calling himself moral. This is fxmny, thinks bK, because
it happens to be a passionate man v;ho is proposing the theory
which excludes that very man.
The real man is the whole man, intellect, emotions, and
will. If we remove the sensible life from man, we re-
move part of the real man, for there is no activity
38. Kierkegaard, G\Jf , 350.
39. Ibid. , 351.
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without sensibility, and no moral life without feelings
/in
and desires.
By the ethicist's attempt to transform himself by devotion to
duty, therefore, humor is formed. Only by ignoring the in-
dividual in his predicament as byn-chesis B does formalistic
ethics succeed. i'eople who see the ethicist^ stand back and
wonder at his other-worldly pose.
The judgment of men upon such an individual will always
be: for him there is nothing that is important. And
why not? Because for him the ethical is a bsolutely im-
portant, differing in this from men in general, for whom
so many things are important, aye. nearly everything,
but nothing absolutely important .^-^
The ethical man is not within the kingdom, however,
because he has not fully come into Existenz . He does not
succeed in mediating the ideal and the actual. "To exist
means to express the eternal in time, to translate the eter-
nal content of the human self into a living reality in time,
By hiding behind the incognito of irony, the ethicist betrays
his inability to express outwardly in life what he knows in-
wardly is his duty.
Honest sensitivity to the ethical idesl, therefore,
leads necessarily to despair. The more one ideally sees his
duty, while remaining a man who is a synthesis of the temporal
and the eternal, the more impossible does the rule of duty
become. The result of this is a contradiction.
40. Carnell, ICA, 323. Formalism borders on dualism. "The
part which is immersed in natural process is essential evil
and the part vhich is subject to reason is essentially good."
l^iebuhr, hDlA, I, 119.
41. Kierke2:aard, GUf , 451.
42. Geismar, LHTK, 45-46.
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Ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that
man is in possession of the conditions requisite for
performing it. Thereby ethics develops a contradiction,
precisely for the fact that it makes the aifficulty and
the impossibility clear. '^'^
Existenz requires passionate interaction with time and eter-
nity. This condition is missing in ethics. When the ethi-
cist is informed that he is defending an hypothesis which is
an existential impossibility, he just snivels. "Even to lis-
ten to such talk is unethical, is something for which ethics
has neither time nor opportunity . "^"^ Existenz is conspicuous
for its absence in the ethical stage. Unlike ethics Existen^
moves within the seriousness of the moment. Where there is
no decision which passionately mediates time and eternity,
there is no Existenz . Existenz is found only when the con-
crete realization of ideal duty in time is achieved.
E. The Religious Stage,
Vifhen the ethicist, having passea from humor, sees him-
self for what he is and repents, then he leaps into the re-
ligious stage. To appreciate this transition, however, it
is necessary first to understand ^K's doctrine of sin.
The initial stage in the transition from the guilt of
of
ethics to the sin^Ghrist ianity is the seizure of man by dread .
Dread is an attraction to what one fears, a sympathetic
antipathy. Dread is an alien power which lays hold of
an individual, and yet he cannot tear himself Ioob e
from it, and also does not will to; for one is afraid,
but what one fears also attracts one.
43. Kierkegaard, CD, 15.
44. Ibid .
45. Kierkegaard, JSK, §402.
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Dread grows naturally out of SK's doctrine that man is a
S3mthesis of body and soul carried by spirit. Spirit is de-
cision, freedom. The more the spirit becomes alive to its
freedom, however, the more dread, "freedom's appearance be-
fore itself in possibility,'*'^^ is aroused. Dread is that
dizziness of freedom which results when the spirit is drawn
to freedom's possibilities while at the same time fearing to
take hold of its responsibilities.
When dread is aroused, innocence is lost. Innocence
is not, as in orthodoxy, the ontological possession of right-
eousness by an historical man, Adam. Such a doctrine, by
making Adam unlike all other men, would put the first outside
of the race. Innocence is ignorance. It is the condition of
man before he consciously realizes his potentialities in free-
dom. "In his innocence man is not determined as spirit, but
is soulishly determined in immediate unity with his natural
condition. Spirit is areamiing in man."^''' Innocence is an
existential concept, therefore, it comes "into existence by
the fact that it is annulled. .. as that which was before it
was annulled ana is now annulled." Innocence is the stu-
por of the individual before spirit is aroused. The man who
does not know the prohibition (ethics) is innocent; but when
he knows it and his freedom is aroused, he is no longer inno-
cent. He now knows he is not performing what he should per-
46. Kierkegaard, CD, 99
47. Ibid
. , 57.
48. Ibid. , 35.
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form. This involves guilt.
The aesthete never even comes to guilt, let alone sin.
There is no dread in immediacy. The aesthete aces not know
what it means to be a man. Without decision, "reality of
freedom as possibility anterior to possibility""^^ never fol-
lows; and dread, " a s^rmpathetic antipathy ana an antipathetic
sympathy , is unknown. In dread, however, "an alien power"
iays hold on the individual, "a power which he loved and yet
dreaded, sets in. For example, the individual vi?ho passes
a bar, after having given up arinking liquor at a great price
of inwardness, is drawn sympathetically by the desire of tak-
ing a drink while being repelled by the antipathetic fear of
falling once again into the defeating sin. The man is inno-
cent until his possibilities are roused; but imorediately after
this innocency disappears, for the man then knows his own
dread in terms of what he simultaneously loves and fears.
Dread of evil is holy dread, while "the demoniacal is
dread of the good."*^^ In demoniacal relation the one aroused
to freedom's possibilities fears the good, as he v^ho knows
it his duty to help another in aistress and yet regrets the
fact that freedom is his to fulfill that duty. The individ-
ual clings to his freedom, for he does not want to be an an-
imal, but he cringes at the responsibilities which attend
that freedom.
49. Kierkegaard, CD, 38.
50. Ibid .
51. Ibid
. , 59.
52. Ibid. , 1U9.
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In the state of Innocence freedom was not posited as
freedom, its possibility appears in the dread of the
individuality. In the demoniacal the situation is re-
versed. Freedom is posited as unfreedom, for freedom
is lost. The possibility of freedom is in turn dread.
The difference is absolute; for the possibility of
freedom manifests itself here in relation to unfreedom,
which is exactly the opposite of innocence, which is a
determinant oriented towards freedom. ^'^
SK defines sin in such a way that he corners the in-
dividual in an inescapable predicament. Sin is this: " Be-
fore God, or with the conception of CJ-od, to be in despair at
not willing to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be
oneself . " If a man says that he can be existential, he
sins, because he aoes not see how high the law of G-oa (love)
is and how deeply involved is his predicament (Syntheses A
and B); and if the man says that he cannot be existential,
he, too, sins, because he does not appreciate that the holiness
of the law of God consists in part in the fact that man must
mediate time and eternity. As Kant, one ought; hence he can .
The former sin is blindness of priae and the latter is melan-
choly. "Melancholy is sin, really it is a sin ins tar omnium
,
for not to V'ill deeply and sincerely is sin, and this is the
mother of all sins."^^ The reason why SK assigns melancholy
to the top of the list of sins is that it is such a convenient
point for the individual to rest without pressing on to com-
plete self-despair. The self-pitying individual in melancholy
still clings to the unfounded hope that a solution to his
53. Kierkegaard, CD, 109.
54. Kierkegaard, SD, 123.
55. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 159-160.
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problem of being an individual can be solved in the future,
and that out of the future of possibilities will come a proof
tha-^^contradict ion is accidentally rather than necessarily
related to existence.
Guilt must be sharply distinguished from sin. The
latter is always despair or arrogance coram deo , whereas the
former is never. A guilty person does not appreciate himself
as he really is, i.e. , a creature suspended between absolute
obligation (eternity) and temporal necessity (time) vjhlle
being the personal focal point of the union (Synthesis B).
In guilt consciousness the iaentity of the subject with
himself, and his relationship to the internal are pre-
served; in sin consciousness the breach is posited
within the self, in such a manner that the self has
lost its relationship to the Eternal,"^"
Guilt remains within immanence. It always attends the un-
shattered ego seeking for a solution. Repetition, as the
new birth of the individual after shattering, aoes not fol-
low, "The iaentity of the subject is such that guilt does
not make the subject a new man, which is the characteristic
of the breach." Sin always presupposes guilt, but sin is
alwjays more than gxiilt. "He who has no relation to this
never gets to the point of conceiving himself as totally or
essentially guilty."^®
The transition from "guilt" to "essential guilt," or
sin, is made through the medium of despair . The mom. ent the
56. i^aane, KGM, 106.
57. Kierkegaard, CUf , 474.
58. Ibid. , 471.
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individual gives up himself and abandons all hope of the
self, he passes from melancholy to collapse. "Despair con-
sists in laying hold on an individual with infinite passion,"
Despair is not an accidental misfortune, as the anxious man
who having lost his one eye hears from the doctor that he is
about to lose another. Rather, it must always follov/ out of
the essential preaicament of man. The nature of man makes
his predicament inevitable, ana the predicament guarantees
the essentiality of the despair.
That which really makesa man despair is not misfortune,
but it is the fact that he lacks the eternal; despair
is to lack the eternal; despair consists in not having
undergone the change of eternity by duty's 'shalt.'
Consequently despair is not the loss of the beloved,
that is misfortune, pain^ suffering; but despair is
the lack of the eternal."^
'iiin comes when one exi stent ially experiences guilt,
leaving off all trace of formalism. Sin is an existential
phenomenon. Sin is not a dogma or a doctrine for thinkers.
It is an existence-determinant, ana precisely one v;hich can
not be thought. The psychologist may not toy with sin as he
would with reflexes, for sin is an emergent relation which
exists only in the becoming inaividual. "Its idea is that
its concept is constantly annulled. As a state ( de potentia )
it is^ not, whereas de actu or in actu it is ana is again. "^'
requires the doctrine of sin to preserve his hy-
pothesis that truth is subjectivity. Metaphysical immanence
59. Kierkegaard, WL, 54.
60. Ibid
.
61. Kierkegaard, CD, 14.

is restored if despair is not kept essentially related to
man's nature. By assuring men that sinfulness is inevitable ,
the revelation of fiod and grace of God are kept sine qua non »
A radical discovery of sin involves repentance, Iininediacy
must be viewed as invalid. Inwardness w'ill not be rriaximized
if the self is not made absolutely discontinuous with God.^^
SK's break with ;:iOcrates might profitably be recalled
at this point, b ocrates thought that the individual was
truth, i.e
.
, under ideal conditions he coula reminisce his
way back to eternity. SK, however, by making the predicament
of man mietaphys ical
,
necessary, ana perpetual, defines the
individual, as far as his being a way back to eternity is
concerned, as untruth. "Original sin," the inevitable pre-
dicament which emerges as .soon as innocence is left and
dread appears, sums up SK's break with Socrates. By making
sin a necessary concomitant attending Synthesis B, SK makes
sin so original to man's every first act of freedom that F;an
cannot be a man without at the same time being a sinner. In
this paradoxical way, subjectivity as truth (Existenz ) is
accertuated b^r the postulate that subjectivity (as a v/ay to
God; is untruth . Socrates did not take the predicament of
man seriously enough, ana so never understood the Christian
doctrine of sin. '^K settles for a complete metaphysical dis-
62. SK woula have to admit, however, that epis temologically
,
man continues to be continuous; otherwise revelation woula be
completely unrelated to man when Goa gave it. Man cannot comie
LO God, tut he som.ehow can recognize revelation v^hen Goa comes
to him.
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continuity between man and God,
Let us now call -che untruth of the inaividual Sin .
Viewed eternally he cannot be sin, nor can he be eter-
nally presupposed as having been in sin. by coming into
existence (for the beginning was that subjectivity is
untruth), he becomes a sinner. He is not born as a
sinner in the sense that he is presupposed as being a
sinner before he is born, but he is born in sin ana as
a sinner. This we might call Original Sin . But if ex-
istence has in this manner acquired a power over him, he
is prevented from takinp; himself back into the eternal
by way of recollection.^'^
The stamp of existence itself forever vitiates the possibility
of the individual's existentially mediating eternity in time.
Eternity can never univocally be mediated by man in the high
sense of Existenz . Eternity is eternity and time is time.
SK sums up man's metaphysical predicament by the cryp-
tic phrase, "sin postulates itself." This presupposition, so
effectively exploited by Niebuhr, grows out of SK's anthro-
pology. As soon as the first roan comes into selfhood (free-
dom), then he is already a sinner because he is guilty of not
discharging the duty of existentially living out the demands
of eternity in time. One can call the first man "X" or "Adam."
It makes no difference. All men are quite the same, for his-
torical positions in the chronology of the race are dismissed
as an irrelevance. Sin came into the world by the first sin,
but sinfulness , as the antecedent condition brought on by the
dizziness of the spirit in v/hich the individual either refuses
63. Kierkegaard, GUP, 186.
64. "The anxiety of freeaom leads to sin only if the prior
sin of unbelief is assumed. This is the meaning of Kierke-
gaard's assertion that sin posits itself." iviebuhr, l^iDM, I,
252.
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to be an individual or claims that he is alreaay an inaivid-
ual, is postulated as an essential datum in the predicament
of man.
If this were not so, then sin would have come in as
something accidental, which man should do well not to
try to explain. The difficulty for the understanaing
is precisely the triumph of the explanation, its pro-
found consistency in representing that sin presuppose
itself, that it so came into the world that by the fact
that it is, it is presupposed. Sin comes in as the
sudden, i.e. with the leap; but this leap posits at the
same time the quality; but v^hen the quality was posited,
the leap that same instant turned into the quality and
was presupposed by the quality, and the quality by the
leap.^^
The prima facie objection to the aoctrine that sin came
into the v;orld by sinfulness is, believes SK, quite counter-
balanced by the fact that, exi stent ially spe dicing man's in-
evitable sinfulness is his lasting salvation. The individual
is most clearly himself onxy when he is inwardly aroused to
passion. The postulate of original sin accomplishes this by
breaking with all immanence. If I cannot , but mus
t
, while
not being sinless until I do , then I am totally shattered.
Meaningful responsibility for what is an impossibility elicits
a maximum of inward passion.
65. Kierkegaard, CD, 29.
66. The objection is suii'imed up in the question. Hot/ can I
meaningfully be held responsible for a metaphysical situation
in which I find myself by creation? Was there a time V(/hen I
was given the choice to be Syntheses A ana B? If so, why did
I not choose to be an angel ana so rid myself of this problem?
There seems to be a fantastic bit of theology here to call
responsibility into a metaphysical situation. SK responds as
follows. "We have nowhere been chargable Vvith the foolish-
ness of thinking that man must sin." Kierkegaard, GD, 100.
Quite so, man is not sinning if he is not a man; so long as
one dreams all day he does not sin. But as soon as he comes
to himself and spirit is aroused, then he is a sinner . The
objection remains. ~
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The doctrine that sin postulates itself accounts
somewhat for Kierkegaard's unsympathetic attitude toward the
orthodox interpretation of the story of the garden. As for
the SDeaking serpent in the story, SK says, "I prefer to ad-
mit bluntly that I can associate no definite thought with the
serpent. "^"^ The serpent lies outside of Adam, so SK will
have nothing of this. In the temptation, rather, Adam was
just talking to himself—his imagination was working over-
time. "The imperfection in the account. ..is eliminated when
one reflects that the speaker is language, and that hence it
is Adam himself who speaks." The orthodox doctrine that
the historical Adam is the head of the race is, as noted
supra , a false externalism, since it puts Adam "outside the
race." Unless we all go through what Adam, did, we might as
well forget about Adam.
But paganism is worse off than orthodoxy, inasmuch as
it completely lacks the coram deo doctrine. "The pagan and
the natural man have as their mieasure the merely human self."
One looks in vain, therefore, for detailed hamartiology in
the ancients, for to the pagan "virtue is realizable."
The opposite of sin is not virtue--that would be un-
existential, "For the whole of Ghr istaanity it is one of the
67. Kierkegaard, CD, 4 3.
68. Ibid .
69. Ibid
. , 27.
70. Ibid
. , 129. This observation is open to question. The
word "pagan" is too general to mean anything. folate, e.g.
,
who presumably is a pagan, said that God is the measure of all
things
.
71.' Ibid.
, 17.
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most decisive definitions that the opposite of sin is not
virtue but faith. "'^^ If sin is the lack of will, faith is
zhe presence of will. "How can I otherwise explain the say-
ing in the New Testament that whatsoever is not of faith is
sin."'^^ Faith is that inwara desperation-decision (not de-
fiance) which, proceeding from a passionate awareness of the
fact that existence is paradoxical, creates Exist enz « Faith
is the will to believe a leap which inward passion substitutes
for the quantitative approximations of objectivity.
Faith is just this positive taking issue with the con-
tradiction between iaeality ana reality, v;hile doubt is
the negative taking issue with the same contradiction.
P'aith is the willingness, the personal, subjective reaet-
iness to accept Becoming as the concrete motion between
ideality and reality, between Thought and Being, be-
tv/een possibility and actuality, between ideal or logi-
cal being ana Exist enz. Doubt is the refusal... to ao
74so.
In a remarkably concise passage Sk surveys the stages
in relation to the dialectic of inwardness.
If the individual is in himself undialectical and has
his dialectic outside himself, then we have the aesthetic
interpretat ion . If the individual . is dialectical in
himself inwardly in self-assertion, hence in such a way
that the ultimate basis is used to overcome and assert
itself, then we have the ethical interpretation . If the
inaividual is inwardly defined by self-annihilation be-
fore God, then we have religiousness A . If tne individ-
ual is paradoxically dialectic, every vestige of origi-
nal immanence being annihilated and all connection cut
off, the individual being brought to the utmost verge of
existence, then we have the paradoxical religiousness .
This paradoxical inwardness is the greatest possible,
for even the most paradoxical determinant, if after all
it is within immanence, leaves as it were a possibility
of escape, of a leaping away, of a retreat into the eter-
72. Kierkegaard, CD, 152.
75. Kierkegaard, JSK, §10.
74. Safier, i^bK, 50.
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nal behind it; it is as though everything had not been
staked after all. But the breach makes the inwardness
the greatest possible.'''^
One passes from the ethical to the religious stage when he no
longer is just desperate over himself, but rather when he al -
lows himself to be inwardly changed by his desperation . The
ethicist must come to himself and understand his despair in
terms of v/hat it- means to be absolutely devoted to relative
ends. If he stands pat and waits, he remains unsaved. But
if he allows his desperate plight to change him, i.e. , if he
suffers , then he is religious. Suffering is one of the most
basic and decisive categories in the religious life. Suffer-
ing is tlB t personal passion which results when the sinner
comes to existential maturity. Transformation results only
when the person in despair understands how desperate ^is con-
aition end how complete is the vitiating power of sin.
The sense of guilt is not the memory of an individual
wrongful act, although such a memory may play a part in
it; but it is the consciousness of a auality affecting
the whole personality, a total and all pervasive color-
ing, which does not admit of differences of degree when
viewed essentially and from within, although externally,
as between man and man, the quantitative conception of
more or less guilt has its appropriate use. But be-
tween man and God, guilt is guilt, and that is the end
of it , the quality being essential ana the degree irrel-
evant.
Socrates, therefore, though quite ignorant of the
seriousness of sin, was yei, a religious man. Ke suffered
for v/hat he thought was right. Even after this concession,
however, the sage of Athens must be overtaken and passed.
75. Kierkegaard, GUP, 509.
76. Swenson, SAK, 184-185.
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since there is more to man's predicament than ignorance and
less than recollection. The iSocrat ic spirit of gazing off
into space, that profound feeling of being separated from
God which creates suffering, is known to Kierkegaard as "Re-
ligiousness A." Socrates saw his discontinuity with eter-
nity sharply enough to make him the supreme example of Re--
ligiousness A. Religiousness A understands that truth is
subjectivity, alright, but it vitiates its insight by believ-
ing that relief from guilt can be achieved by some sort of
an inner struggle or integration of personality. The empha-
sis continues to remain on the unshattered inaividual, an
individual perhaps thoroughly moved by guilt but one who
nevertheless maintains a metaphysical continuity with eter-
nity.
Religiousness A cannot arouse existence as effective-
ly as can "Religiousness B" , since it cannot break with im-
manence. Man is guilty, i.e. , he has a heartfelt fear of God;
and he is inwardly perplexed to know the solution. Socrates
ended his life an ignorant man. But Religiousness A, since
it does not connect eternal happiness and the individual's
decision in time, cannot induce the individual to rise to
that height of Exis tenz where happiness depends upon a de-
cision in time.
heligiousness A makes the thing of existing as stren-
uous as possible (outside the paradox-religious sphere),
but it does not base the relation to an eternal happi-
ness upon one's existence but lets the relation to an
eternal happiness serve as basis for the transformation
of existence. Prom the individual's relation to the
eternal, there results the how of his existence, not
the converse, and thereby infinitely more comes out of

101
it than was put into it.
In Heligiousness A the Individual is yoked under heavy guilt,
thus straining the God-contact as far as possible; out within
this relationship the individual is still essentially integer,
for at each moment he still is metaphysically in contact with
the eternal. "The relationship as given constitutes the ever
present possibility of the transformation."'''®
The weakness of guilt simply alters the subject within
the subject. The individual remains where he stands--thor-
oughly guilty, indeed, and brought under the dialectic of
despair, but all alteration is accomplished within the guilty
ego. The transformation of the ego is not completed because
the data in the problem remain within immanence. The totally
guilty inaividual is still the same individual, his guilt
can only be absolute vvhen the ego is so completely overwhelmed
by guilt that it is no longer the self that it was before.
In Religiousness a one exists in guilt because he is guilty,
not because he exists as guilty is he guilty
.
Only Religiousness B fully goes along with the propo-
sition that truth is subjectivity. Because it is existence
and not just a relation to something which makes sin to be
sin. Religiousness B breaks completely with immanence. SK,
in another remarkably concise passage, details for us the re-
lation between the sta,&es when they are viewed from the per-
spective of what it means to exist.
77. Kierkegaard, G\Ji^ , 509
78. Daane, KCM, 105.
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Immediacy, the aesthetic , finds no contradiction in the
fact of existing: to exist is one thing, ana the contra-
diction is something else which comes from without. The
ethical finds the contradiction, but within self-
assertion. The Religiousness A comprehends the contra-
aiction as suffering in self-annihilation, although
within immanence, but by ethically accentuating the fact
of existing it prevents the exist er from becoming abstract
in immanence, or from becom^ing abstract by wishing to re-
main in immanence. The paraaoxical religiousness breaks
with immanence ana makes the fact of existing the abso-
lute contradiction, not within immanence, but against
immanence. There is no longer any Imaiianent fundamental
kinship between the temporal ana the eternal because the
eternal itself has entered time and v^ould constitute the
kinship.
With this observation existentialism reaches its zenith.
But paradoxical religiousness can be understood only when we
remember SK's basic doctrine that subjectivity is truth.
Subjective truth, as opposed to speculative, is "the truth
of appropriation and assimilation."®^ Truth is an exact
equivalence for concerned existing. Since the inaividual
does not exist as pleasing unto God, for he has not lived up
to the ethical requirement which he knows to be true, he,
the existing ego, is now essentially untruth. This m.eans that
he has broken with God so infinitely that he is no longer the
same self. All metaphysical continuity is severed, i^essing
saw clearly this factor.
SK defines trutn as ' An objective uncertainty held
fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inward-
ness.**®-^ Religiousness A mistakes in basing its guilt and
despair upon objective knowledge rather than upon truth, 1.
a
.
79. Kierkegaard, GUP, 507-508.
80. Ibid
. , 23.
81. Ibid. , 182.
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upon the existing subject In the passion of appropriation.
In Religiousness B truth is taken in its most existential
sense. The individual himself ana no other exists, here ana
now, as untruth. He is a sinner and has by his own existence
removed himself infinitely from God. He has broken with G-od
so that there is no possible way back to Goa through the
self.
Truth as subjectivity, therefore, is not to be inter-
preted in that frivolous sense of individualism or skepti-
cism which can be refuted by a simple play on dialectic.
Rather, it is that richness of inward appropriation whereby
through decision, act, passion, in short, existence- communi-
cation, the whole individual becomes
,
by a transforming in-
wardness, the truth. SK understood in the Biblical message,
"God is truth," the absolute state of subjectivity, the actus
purus « God is always ana forever existing in the inv/ardness
of his perfection. 'fherefore He is the truth . Man, who is
always existing in other than perfection, is untruth . This
message is Religiousness B.
Decision is no mere consequence of recognizing truth,
it is a living ana essential factor in apprehending it.
To think subjectively—and no other kind of thinking
matters here--is to act upon a risk. Cool aetacnment
is an atmosphere in which we cannot believe, as the i^ew
Testament accounts believing. . .When Kierkegaard saia that
truth is sub jecti\Qty
,
then, he bade men recollect that
personal Christianity v/ithout decision is nothing better
than a phrase. We are set, each of us, in the ines-
capable presence of God; ana to live and think as if^it
were not so, is in fact not to think or live at all.°^
82. Mackintosh, TMT, 224-225.
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It was to the individual that SK aadressed all of his
works, the individual whom he wanted to stir up into existence,
to realize himself, to exist. Since in the absolute ana un-
qualified sense, God, the actus purus , is the truth, man is
truth in himself only when he fulfills his end in existence.
"Man has the truth and what is more becomes the truth to the
extent to which, according to the covenant of God and the
image of God, he becomes pure subjectivity, a spiritual per-
son. "^^
It is not enough to say, therefore, that SK is lead-
ing to skepticism ana solipsism by his oeiief that truth is
subjectivity, for he, as observed earlier, reserves for his
reader the right to use the understanding to judae what he
shall believe against the understanding, ir'hilosophy and
theology may scaffold theoretic truth, but that kind of truth
holds no significance for SK^e until it is processed by ex-
istential, passionate appropriation. "It is that truth and
conviction which are struck from the meeting; of the subject...
with a reality and revelation which, though apprehended sub-
jectively, are, in fact, utterly objective to him."^^
This helps explain the mistake r'iiate made when he
superciliously asked Christ, "What is truth?"^^ rilate had
no existential interest in receiving an answer, because he
was not predisposed to the aoctrine that truth is living.
Filate was too objective. "Had not Pilate asked objectively
83. Haecker, SK, 24.
84. Attwater, MCR, 23. Of. also Mackintosh, TMT, 224.
8b. John 18:38.

105
what truth is, he would have never condemned Christ to be
crucified."®^ The fact that x'ilate coula coolly state his
question to the one who was truth, is indicative of the fact
that Pilate was himself untruth. "For Christ's life was Lhe
truth."®''' While Christ existed as truth, Pilate sought a
speculative truth v/hich would not involve the identification
of his life with truth or error Pilate condemned himself in
his question. He sought for something more than that exis-
tential truth for which Christ came .to live ana aie.
SK, in opposition to Pilate and in imitation of Christ,
sought an existence-communication which could fill up the
troublesome gap in his truncated life. "The thing is to
understand myself, to see what God really wishes me_ to ao;
the thing is to find a truth which is true for me , to find
the idea for which 1 can live ana aie. "^® Ana the soxution
to which he came was heligiousness B, or paradoxical religious-
ness in the absolute sense. It is truth because it sees ex-
istence itself as untruth, i.e. , as paradox. This paradox
stands in contradistinction to Religiousness A, which while
appreciating life defines the paradox as stanaing outsiae of
existence itself. Truth must be a paradox because exist ence
for both God and man is the truth. But while God does exist
86. Kierkegaard, CUP, 206.
87. Kierkegaard, TC, 199. Christ existence "is the truth,
and who therefore by Eis life is at every instant a more
potent demonstration of what truth is than are the prolix
lectures of all the cleverest thinkers." Ibia .
88. Kierkegaard, dSK, §22.
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absolutely in the truth, because God is eternity and not
time, the latter can approach truth only paradoxically, for
he remains in time while trying to mediate eternity.
In the passionate moment of decision, v^here the road
swings away from objective knovv'ledge, it seems as if the
infinite decision were thereby realized. But in the
same moment the existing individual finds himself in
the temporal order, and the subjective 'how' is trans-
formed into a striving, a striving which receives in-
deed its impulse ana a repeated renewal from the de-
cisive passion of the infinite, but is nevertheless a
s trivi ng. ®^
It is an antecedent impossibility for the striving
individual univocally to mediate eternity in time; yet it is
out of the very requirement to do so. that a man becomes a
Christian. Man is required to be perfect -sihile yet neces-
sarily remaining imperfect. He cannot recoil from the de-
mand, because in so aoing he rem.ains in innocence. His spirit
is slumbering. But v.hen he undertakes his task, he immediate-
ly is obsessed by dread, the dizziness ol spirit. This in
turn leads to guilt. Gruilt, when understood before Goa , is
sin.
This is Religiousness c, that pure, passionate inward
ness of paradox which results when the individual correlates
himself, his duty, God, and his decisions within time. The
ethicist sees the problem of life and then smiles broaaly.
Such trivialities are not deemed his concern. The follower
of Religiousness A sees the paradox and feels his guilt, but
he does not interpret existence itself paradoxically. In
89. Kierkegaard, GUP, 182
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Religiousness B the individual passes from guilt to sin be-
cause he sees himself under God and passing from truth to
untruth. Relieriousness B takes the decision of the inaivi d-
ual in time seriously, for the individual is_ the totality of
his temporal decisions. All forms of Religiousness A have
a common denominator. They are timeless ana nonhistorical;
they are not relatea to historical aecision. Religiousness
B makes the historical decisive.
For as the eternal came into the world at a moment of
time, the existing individual does not in the course
of time come into relation with the eternal and think
about it (this is A), but in t ime it comeSj^nto rela-
tion with the eternal in time ; so that the relation is
within time, and this relationship conflicts equally
with all thinking, whether gne reflects upon the in-
dividual or upon the Deity. '"^
But when the eternal l_s the totality of his decisions^
then the continued existence of the self is abandoned, 'i'his
is the absolute paradox of existence, the height of subjectiv-
ity. "Religiousness is indeed inwardness in existing, and
everything which serves to deepen this determinant heightens
the religiousness, ana the paradox-religiousness is the ulti-
mate. "^-^ What a man d ecides in time makes the aifference;
there is an historical locus to his aecision, so that the
eternal happiness, v;hich is absolute, is contingent to a de-
cision in time, which is only an approximation. One can know
ethical reality absolutely, but he cannot understana his re-
lation to history beyond p3"obability . Yet, the security of
90. Kierkegaard, CUP, 506.
91. Ibid.
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his eternal happiness rests upon an historical decision.
Nor is this miracle of coming into being through temporal
decisions a temporary paradox. It continues as long as one
has life, as long as one is an individual. The paradox is
essential, therefore, and not accidental.
Christianity is the only religiousness v/nich accentu-
ates life paradoxically. A Christian must decide in time
for Christ vvho is Goa as an inaividual in t ime . This is a
double dialectical c ontraaic tion.
There are t vro aiaJectical contraaictions
,
first, the
basing of one's eternal happiness upon the relation to
something historical, and then the fact that this his-
torical datum is compounded in a way contradictory to
all thinking. ^2
Historical evidences for Christ can never go beyona proba-
bility. Yet upon a decision in time for the Christ of time
rests our eternal happiness. Eternal happiness is the ab-
solute good. But this happiness can come only through the
passion/paradox inwardness of faith in Christ. Christ's en-
tering time is the absolute paradox--beyond it one cannot go.
"The paradox consists principally in the fact that G-oa, the
Eternal, came into existence in time as a particular man."^*^
In the absolute paradox SK's climax is reached. The
individual is faced with a aouble contradiction. Absolute
happiness is made to rest upon a decision in time for Christ
in time. Out of it comes the maximized passion of' faith.
Both the ego and the intellect are shattered. There can be
92. Kierkegaard, CUi^ , 513.
93. Ibid. , 528.

no higher paradox. Any movement from here is movement away
from truth.

PART THREE
KIERKEGAARD » S NEGATIVE CRITERIA

GKAi^TER SIX
SPECULATION
Having made good our intention to sketch SK's over-
all philosophy of religion, it is nov/ incumbent to move on to
the details of those criteria of verification to which the
Copenhagen theologue appealed in buttressing his conviction
that truth is subjectivity. The negative standards v/ill be
examined first, after which the affirmative will follow in
due order.
In broadest terms there can be only one negative cri-
terion of truth in SK*s thinking, and that is spiritless com-
placency . If Kierkegaard is justified in his conclusion that
subjectivity is truth ana if subjectivity is defined as that
condition of inwara passion in which the individual creative-
ly becomes , then it follows that one fails to communicate
truth in his own person whenever he is indifferent or compla-
cent. The unconcerned man is the unsaved man. He is the de-
luded individual who refuses to exploit those inward emotions
and vitalities vhich assure the creation of Existenz. In
Kierkegaard's kingdom of grace, therefore, the sower of tares
is the man v/ho, blinded to existential standards of value,
encourages souls to believe that they can e xist without ex-
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isting inwardly .
However, inasmuch as "complacency" is a very broad
concept and can stand for a large variety of spiritless
postures and attitudes, pi ecision v;ill be gained in the dis-
sertation only v.hen we go to the effort of breaking down the
general condition of spiritlessness into those specific con-
crete cases of complacency v;hich SK haa in mind vi/hen he pen-
ned the corpus of the literature. The following three, though
not exhaustive of the possibilities, adequately represent
the meaning of the term complacency in the Kierkegaaraian
literature: Speculation, Hegelianism, and objectivity . These
divisions are limited enough to have the merit of concrete-
ness, on the one hand, while yet remaining sufficiently
broad to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, on the other.
A. Transition Data.
Before expatiating^^he first of the negative criteria,
namely, speculation, it v;ill be helpful if a transition
bridge betv/een this section in the dissertation ana that of
the preceding be erected.
When SK, as a result of his free excursions into the
universities, concluded solemnly that "Christianity and phil-
osophy cannot be reconciled,'*" the onus then lay upon him to
construct a view of the v;orld which would be intelligible
both to him and to his reader without falling over into the
error of a philosophic system again. The path which he elect-
ed to take is that v?hich is, superficially, the same as that
followed first by Hugo of St. Victor and then, later, by
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Thomas Aquinas. According to this view reason is used to
learn the limits of reason. The correlation betv/een Kierke-
gaard ana Thomas at this point is not more than superficial,
hov/ever, because SK kept the postulates of faith not only be -
yond reason but also contrary thereto, a conviction Vv'hich
the Catholic master would stringently have denied. Kierke-
gaard believed that more inward passion is createa if Chris-
tianity is offensively related to the intellect than if it
lies merely above the intellect. Reason may tell us the
limits to reason, Dut beyona this the heart, not reason, must
guide.
SK's epistemoiogical presupposition that reason and
existential truth are rel; ted dis continuously was not chosen
without incisive thou>-':ht upon his part. On the contrary,
it flov/ed naturally out of his faith that truth is subjectiv-
ity. SK felt that if passion is of the essence of inward
truth, then that v,hich lessens passion is untruth. but if
reason were able to learn of truth by itself, passion would
be lessened; therefore, the reason is required to confess its
impotency.
If reason for the scholastics was the handmaid of
theology, Kierkegaard defined it as the handmaid of existen-
tialism. Reason may serve in the ancillary capacity of set-
ting up the problems of life as hypotheses (possibilities);
but then the oassionate inaividual must mediate time and
eternity through the force of inward decision. Reason always
comes to a cul-de-sac . After this the leap of faith is ex-
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pressed. The only use that we really have for reason as ex-
isting individuals is that of a tool by which to measure the
limits of our ovm immanent abilities, to the end that Vi;e may
expect G-OG to create within us both the truth ana the conai-
tions for learning it. If this despair of the self is not
pitched on the level of the intellect as well as that of the
ethical life, then the full shattering of the self, the con:i
ditio sine qua non for individuality, ?/ill not maturate.
Viih.ere reason leaves off, faith begins. Faith starts
where the things that rer^ily count lie. God is the Unknown,
i.e. , unknovm to reason but well known to the inwardness of
faith. Reason must nand over its authority to faith when it
has run the full course of its office, for once the Unknown
has been met, then offense sets in. Reason can only colliae
with offense; it is faith that thrives of the offense, for
in its tensions the deciding individual is creatively accented.
V^hat then is the Unknown? It is the limit to which
the Reason repeatedly comes, and in so far, substitut-
ing a static form of conception for the aynam.ic, it is
the different, the absolutely different. But because
it is absolutely different, there is no mark by which
it could be aistinguished. Vv'hen qualified as absolutely
different it seems on the verge of ais closure, but this
is not the case; for the Reason cannot even conceive an
absolute unlikeness. The iteason cannot negate itself
absolutely, but uses Itself for the purpose, ana thus
conceives only such an unlikeness within itself as it
can conceive by means of itself; it cannot absolutely
transcend itself, and hence conceives only such a super-
iority over itself as it can conceive by means of itself.
Unless the Unknown (Goa) remains a mere limiting concep-
tion, the single iaea of difference Y7ill be thrown into
a state of confusion, ana become many ideas of many dif-
ferences .
1. Kierkegaard, Fi^ , 35.
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It will not do, therefore, to suggest, as some com-
mentators have, that, since SK toys with paradox, he has re-
jected the use of reason, and by so doing is v.orthy only of
scorn, not logical refutation. This way is not only too
easy, but also it succeeds only after replacing the real
Vvith that of a strav/ construction.
^ar from doing this, Kierkegaard is himself one of the
subtlest of dialecticians; ana he Vi'ould have us think
out the implications of Christianity to the uttermost.
It is the limits, and not any inherent untrus tworthi-
ness of reason that Kierkegaard wants to make vivid to
2us .
The strength of the Kierkegaardlan system, like that
of the Thomistic, lies in the fact that reason may be rigor-
ously called in to fabricate the reasons for the faith, while
yet preserving room for that to which reason may not law-
fully draw near. SK, while breaking; with reason as a way
to truth, yet reserved the conviction as central to his
thinking that not only is the Christian p emitted to use his
reason, to set up the pr oblem of truth, but also that he
must .
A Christian. ,, uses understanding. to make sure that he
believes a^ja inst the unaerstanding. Konsense therefore
he cannot believe against the understanaing, for pre-
cisely the understanding will discern that it is non-
sense and will prevent him from believing it; but he
m.aKes so much use of the unaerstanaing that he becomes
aware of the incomprehensible, ana then he holas to
this, believing against the tinders tanding. ^
The right use of reason assures SK that he uses reason wrong-
2. Croxall, KS, 122.
3. Kierkegaard, GUP, 504
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ly who supposes that by the use of reason the truth of God
can be appropriated.
The use of reason may be compared to the function of
healing hormones in the boay. If an individual is sick,
while at the same time believing that the healing qualities
lie completely within his ovm body or his own mind, then he
is little likely to seek passionately for the medicinal help
of the traveling physician. In like manner, he who believes
he can know the truth without God's assistance is little
likely to pursue that assistance.
Vvhen reason inquires into its limits, it discovers
that cons istency is that relation which must antecedently sub-
sist before approbation by the mind can be given. Consis-
tency is the absence of contradiction. So, whatever contains
a contradiction, reason cannot embrace. but existential
truth is ali^• ays contraaictory , inasmuch as it involves the
juxtaposing of the incompat ibles , time ana eternity. Time
and eternity are mutually exclusive relationships, therefore,
they cannot be brought together by logic without the result-
ing relation involving a contradiction. Ana yet, by feeling
we intuitively sense that we are able to accomplish the mir-
acle of bringing together these incompatibles . In the moment
an atom of eternity passes over into time. Although it is
logically impossible to achieve it, the existential v.itness
is that it happens every time a man is inwardly passionate.
He feels the change inside of him. The very thing which is
a paradox to reason, therefore, is the heart and soul of
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Existenz . Reason is diecont inuously related to faith by vir-
tue of the fact that what sustains existential living is the
very thing which decays philosophy: the paradox.
It follows from this that bhe enemy of Existonz is
,
from the point of view of the proolem of reason, any lorce
which assumes that reason is continuous with ultimate truth
and that one may believe only what can first pass the intel-
lect's critical test of consistency. SK sims up this force
under the general term "speculation."
B. The Nature of Speculation.
One v;0uld go so-Tiewhat awry in interpreting SK. if he
assigned a technical philosophical meaning to the term "spec-
ulation." The v;ord sim-ply refers to that prevailing opti-
mism in the philosophies wherein the inaividual's reason is
defined as sufficient in and of itself to spy out the mean-
ing of reality. Speculation presupposes that m.an's reason
enjoys primacy and that one may never give assent to what is
recognized by that faculty to contain a contradiction. Spec-
ulation is rational self-confidence. It is the presupposi-
tion that the resident faculties of understanaing ana reason
are the only means by v.hich we can fathom the depth of
reality.
Inasmuch as the v^ihole gamut of philosophy is included
in speculation, the following judgment of Vvila is probably
slightly one-sided:
i'hilosophy to him meant ispinoza and Hegel--the building
of speculative systems sub species aeternitatis in
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which there is no place for change, or ethics, or
finite individuality.^
SK's notion of philosophy or speculation is all of this, to
be sure, but it is much more. It incluaes any attitude of
mind, any science of investigation, which believes that by
immanent faculties one can learn the total nature of v/hat-
ever there is to be knovm.
The weapon of speculation is, therefore, not passion
but reason. But the term "reason" must not be freighted with
secret and technical meanings, either. It is simply, as
Swenson summarizes it, the "self-assurance and self-assertive-
ness of man's nature in its totality."^ The range of the em-
ployment of reason is as broad in its potentialities as is
speculation itself. On the one hand, there are the preten-
sions of formal rationalism mhich, as in Spinoza, hopes
valiently to reason more ge^jetrico from self-evident major
premises to true conclusions with the help of valid middle
premises. The conclusions are expected to exhibit in them-
selves their own meaning, a meaning supposedly equivalent
to reality itself. On the other hand, there are the mazes
of naive hopes which, clung to by the men in the street, are
expected to fructify in an unscathed journey into life's
meaning. The average man, thinks SK, is one v;ho, as illus-
trated by the "Christian" of Copenhagen, optimistically
trusts in his resident faculties to find out the meaning of
4. Wild, Art. , 540.
5. Kierkegaard, i'F, 100.
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reality.
In drawing the sword aeainst reason and speculation,
SK aid not retract his conviction that one rriust use his under-
standing to learn v;hat to believe against the understanding.
Nor aid he exhibit such cavalier naievite as to suggest that
as formal aisciplines per s
e
,
philosophy and logic are un-
worthy. "All honor to philosophy, all praise to everyone
who brings a genuine devotion to its service."^ Philosophers
and spe culators are remarkable men. SK, in his avid study
of the Greeks, for example, discovered that the philosopher
is a man of no mean inward fiber. He is a fearless devotee
of the,-truth, one who is quite willing to sacrifice his own
personal security to advance the cause of truth.
In SK's estimation the speculator is like the money-
changer. So long as he keeps his v^-ares away from the temple
steps, that long he is worthy of honor ana praise. The dif-
ficulty with the arrangement, hov^ever, is that as soon as
the existentialist has his back turned the speculator is
once again on the temple steps carrying on traffic. He must
be driven off if the existential temple is to be kept a house
of prayer.
SK was a speculator himself, Vi/hen he penned his phil-
osopnical works under the pseudonyms, such as the abstract
work, ir^hilosophical Fragments , for instance, he was a pure
speculator. What he set down was simply an intellectual pro-
6. Kierkegaard, CUP, 54.
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ject
.
The projected hypothesis indisputably makes an advance
upon Socrates, which is apparent at every point.
Whether it is therefore more true than the bocratic
aoctrine is an entirely different question, which can-
not be decided in the same breath, since we have as-
sumed a nev/ organ: Faithj a new presupposition: the
consciousness of bin; a nev/ decision: Lhe Moment: and
a new Teacher: God in Time.'^
The only difference between this sort of an approach (a fool
speakin^;, to fools, as bK would have it) ana that of garaen-
run speculation in the university is that the r^rivatuocent
believes that reason and not faith can bridge the gap between
the hypothesis and reelity. '^K vehemently denied this. The
problem which bK sets up in the Philosophical Fragments is
nothing more than a problematic situation, claiming merely
a "let us suppose" value. ¥;hether what SK says is true or
not, he does not presume to say. The reason for this is that
only by the leap of faith can one learn of that v.hich lies
beyond what reason sets up hypothetically as the problem.
Christianity, abstractly formulated, is a project of thought .
The truth can be learned only by the act of v^ill.
Vtfi-ch these transition and introductory clarifications
behinci us, v/e are now ready for the remaining task of clar-
ifying why speculation and existentialism are so antipathet-
ically re]^ed, that one can be sure that vv'henever he is
speculating he aoes not have the truth. He only knows the
problem
.
7. Kierkegaard, PP, 9 3.
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G. bpeculation Cannot Pass Beyond Possibility.
If speculation is confined to what is consistent, and
if what is consistent is but a project of thought, then, in
SK's judgment, it follows that at best spe culf. tion is con-
fined to the mediocre assignment of plotting and detailing
realms of possibility. As opposed to this armed-chair ex-
ercise existentialism goes right into the difficult task of
passionate living, taking the project of thou.-^ht experimental
ly into life ana making the hypothetical march with flesh and
bones.
The difference between speculation's confinement to
possibility and existentialism's movement to reaiity may be
illustrated in the following example: If we may identify ex-
istential truth v;ith the inward gasp ana exhileration which
result when one plunges into a cola pool of water, specula-
tion is that shore-line mood of inauiry which hypothesizes
magnificently what would happen _if Lhere were a pool of cold
water there, and if there were a person somewhere in the
vorld to dive into said pool, ana if that person actually
took the dive. Vtfhen this supposititious dive is taken,
everyboay ^oes home without as much as a foot being put into
Che water. While existentialism mediates through a living
witness to the truth, speculation supposes and fabricates.
The existential man passiora tely lives; the speculator en-
thusiastically projects hypotheses.
The heart and soul of classic speculation is the be-
lief that, since the order and nature of ideas is the same
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as the oraer and nature of things, one is allowed to pass
from a necessary idea to necessary reality. Inasmuch as in
the ontological argument this hope taKes on its most dis-
cusible form, it is no surprise to the reader of to dis-
cover that the critical references to this argument are,
like the demons of Biblical fame, legion. ,Just as Kant set
himself to the task of refuting the ontological argument in
the negative interest of establishing a limit to the under-
standing, that the v;ings of the rat ionalists . might be clip-
ped, so also SK fired his most telling salvoes afl;ainst this
argument to the end that the speculator's hope of passing
from idea to reality might be destroyed. tvithout this de-
feat the existential venture is rendered superfluous.
The most eloquent expose of the ontological argument
by SK is found in the heart of the j'hilosophic al Fragments .
After reciting Spinoza's presupposition that perf ecLio and
realitas esse are coinciaent realities, on the one hana, and
the definition that substance is that v.hich is in itself and
conceived through itself, on the other, SK moved on at once
to show that the Spinozistic hope of demonstrating aeus sive
natura was actually not a success. While Spinoza thought
that he could go from the iaea of the whole to the whole in
rerum natura , SK insisted that from the idea of the v;hole one
can only have the speculative consolation that one has a very
vvonderful idea of v/holeness as a possibility
.
Kierkegaard
leaned very heavily upon classic scholastic ai'gurnents to
drive home his conclusions, and for this reason his original-
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ity at this point is rather minimal.
What is lacking here is a distinction between factual
being and ideal being... A fly, when it exists, has as
much being as G-oa. .. Factual existence is wholly indif-
ferent to any and all variations in essence, and every-
thing that exists participates without petty jealousy
in being, and participates in the same degree, ideally
to be sure, the case is auite different, but the moment
I speak of being in the ideal sense 1 no lonper speak
of. being, but of essence . Highest ideality has this
anc. therefore it is, '^ut this its being is identical
v/ith. its essence; such being aoes not involve it dia-
lectically in the determ.inations of factual existence,
since it is; nor can it ue said to have more or less of
being in relation to other things.®
The onx-ological argument, as an abstraction, is extremely
clever. it is an intricate project of thou;-;ht of no mean
dimensions. nMt as a mediation of eternal verities, it is a
futile hypothesis. The ontological argument cannot suc-
ceed.
God is Unknown: He is a pure offense to the intellect.
If this were not true, the life of a Christian woula not be a
moment- by-moment adventure of passion. One can know God only
when G od chooses to create the conditions of learning. The
reason for this is that through the channels of neither uhe
senses nor the intellect can God be brought into focus. Eter-
nity xs over against time toto caelo . One ca^inot have a s ense
percept ion of God, for Goa is a spirit v/hich exists eternally
without parts and passions. By saying Goa is s^yirit aoes
not commit himself to an understanding of God, for the vvord
"spirit" is but a groping term which one employs to assist •
8. ivierkegaard, rF, 32-33.
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him negatively in setting the Unkno\vn apart from the spa-
cially known. This is the via negationis . God is simply
non- extended. Christ, being God, is the incognito, for a
spirit could not have flesh and bones as He did. Noi' can
one have a proper concept of God, since concepts can only
inform us what rray be, never v/hat must be. I can conceive
of a cow behina the barn, but I am not compelled to affirm
either that there is a cow or that there is a barn behind
which the bovine may take refuge. Philosophic conception
may be rigorous and disciplined imagination, to be sure, one
which persistently refuses the non-consistent, but imagina-
tion of raality, not reality, it surely remains.
Reality cannot be c onceived, furthermore, because
concepts are limited to universals. The concept "white" real-
ly is of '"vjhiteness . " But reality is composed of inaividuals
and particulars. In the historical process there are only
individual men and inaividual objects or collections of ob-
jects. "Thought being," therefore, if we may be granted in-
dulgence for the term, when juxtaposed beside "historical
being,'' is actually "non-being." It is only a possibility
of the way things might be.
Logic at best gives a situation which predisposes to
E:xistenz £sicj . It tells us vhat may be demanded for
a thing if the accidental contribution of Existenz
^s ic~j is to make the thing intelligible.
Speculation suffers by confusing valiaity with material truth.
9. Safier, PSK, 86.
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The syllogism Illustrates perfectly what SK has in mind when
he struggles to identify speculation v;ith possibility. It
may be quite logically necessary that if all men are mortals
and if Socrates is a man, Socrst es is a mortal, too. but
there is nothing in the hypothetical problem Vifhich gives us
the least assurance to believe that there is such a man as
Socrates or that the nature of reality is such that there are
any such beings as mortals of which Socrates is an example.
Possibility may be the reality of the ideal but it
cannot be the real of historical becoming. When, therefore,
the speculator confuses the conception of things with their
presentational richness in rerum natura , he seriously errs.
The reality of which Johannes Climacus is a part, is becoming .
It is not a static row of fleshless universals strung to-
gether by the laws of consistency. T he only possilr.le way
that the conceptual as a project of thou>.ht can pass into
the becoming of history itself is by its being mediated
through the passional em.otions of the aeciaing indiviaual
in time. The m.oirifent is the point of that union. Vdithin the
moment a "higher unaerstanding" than founa in conceptual
speculation is r eleased.
Because an individual gives up his understanding for
faith and believes against the understanding, he should
not think merely of the understanding, nor suadenly
arrogate to himself a glittering distinction within
the total compass of the understanding; for after all
a higher understanding is also an understanding.-^^
10. Kierkegaard, GUF , 501.
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By blocking the individual from enjoying this higher under-
standing of emotional experience, speculation robs and cheats.
Speculative hypotheses, which can be learned by rote, are
simulated as reality itself.
In a rather able, yet stock, argument SK labors his
conviction that there is an absolute difference between the
realm of necessity, which speculation presumes to tap, and
the stratum of becoming, which bK happens to live in. Logic
may define the actual as ideal, but it is unable to aefine
the actual as the real of historical becoming. The reason
for this is that the ideal is the necessary, while the his-
torical is the contingent, 'i'he normative must be; the con-
tingent may be. That is the whole difference. Becoming is
involved in the illusive fact of change, while the necessary
ex hypo the si cannot change.
All coming into being is kind of a suffering , and the
necessary cannot suffer; it cannot suffer the suffering
of the actual, which is that the possible ... reveals
itself as nothing the mom.ent it becomes actual; for
the possible is annhilated in the actual. Everything
that comes into being proves precisely by coming into
being that it is not necessary; for Lhe necessary is
the only thing that cannot come into being, oecause the
necessary is.
The eternal always is. If it could taecom^e, it would not be
eternal, for part and parcel of the essence of the eternal
is that it always be. Only that which is contingent may be-
come.
Possibility can pass over into becoming only by a
11. Kierkegaard, FF, 60-61.
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radical jXevi^^^^^ e/s ^6l/oi> , This is accomplished,
however, never tr^y reason, always by faith. Becoming emerges
only in T:he realm of freedom, for viithout a free cause what
is not would never be.
Necessity stands entirely by itself, Nothing ever
comes into being with necessity; what is necessary
never com.es into being; nothing becomes necessary by
co'-iing into being. Nothing whatever exists because it
is necessary; but the necessary is because it is neces-
sary, or because the necessary is. The actual is no
more necessary than the possible^ for the necessary is
absolutely different from both,-^'^
Hunning through all of SK's arg^uments, like capillaries
in the body, is a spirited intention to preserve the unity
and integrity of the existing individual. If reality is ever
identified with the speculative realm of necessity ana con-
cept, then the inaividual person in history is sacrificed.
Kierkegaard's insistence upon the suspended iaentity of
Thought and Being vvith regard to any individual in the
meaium of existence, was inspirea not by a desire to
create an irrational philosophy, but by the dire neces-
sity of preventing existence from, being reduced to
meaninglessness ana faith to speculative knowledge. This
'duality' is a motif that runs throu;?h all of Kierke-
gaard's thousiht and is the conseauence of his insistence
that j-hounht . . . can only arrive at 'essences' i.e., at
ideal essence but not at factual existence. Thought,
abstracting fron actuality, can only arrive at possibil-
ity.^'^
With characteristic satire inverts the seriousness
of the sub species aeterni crusade into comic ai incongruity.
The speculator is pictured as frantically scouring around for
that wonderful climactic expression, the aiscovery of which
will terminate the system of systems. Here the humor is
12, Kierkegaard, FF, 61
13, Daane, KCM, 18-19,
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generated. Being complete , the system may leave absolutely
nothing out; and being necessary , it must eliminate all con-
tingency and becoming. But then, when the systematizer sneezes
or scratches his ear, the laughter begins, for now one sees
that it is the contingent individual who is actually fabri-
cating the non-contingent.
The incommensurability thus confronting him will wholly
prevent him from beginning, and -ill throw a coinic il-
lumination upon every assurance that he has gained any-
thing in this manner.^
D. Speculation is Spiritless.
An outgrowth of this conclusion that speculation is
confined to the possible, is the proposition that the spirit
of man is unaccented when the reason enjoys primacy. The
existentialist brings his whole person into the game of liv-
ing, v.hile the speculator, remaining integral, risks only
that which is external to him. The speculator plays for large
stakes, to be sure, but they are always other than his own
person. He may risk his reputation, his arguments, his co-
herence, his investments. He may even go so far as to lose
his ir'rivatdocent holding. But he himself remains the sam.e.
In contrast to this the existentialist throws his own life
into the stakes of living. For him, gains and losses are
computed in tenr:s of the continuity of the self, on the one
hand, ana the obtaining or forfeiting of an eternal happiness,
on the other. Only within the tensions of emotional decisions
14. Kierkegaard, GUF, 13.
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that make for inward transformation is the continuity of the
spiriiliial self guaranteed. The existentialist's understanding
of the risk in living, therefore, is Pascal-like: life and
death.
Speculation, because it seeks for a system which can
be objectively communicated, seeing to it that "nothing must
be incorporated. .. that has any relation to existence ," -^^ is
devoid of an emphasis upon spirit. Spiritual livinti is ethi-
cal, either/or. Spirit is decision, in the system, however,
decision is not taken seriously. Right thinking displaces
right living. One finds the truth and deliberates upon it,
rather than creating the truth in the moment of inwardness.
In Exist enz "the crucial thing is not deliberation but the
baptism of the will which lifts up the choice into the ethi-
cal, "^^
Because the philosopher-^''' thinks it is m.ore important
to' think about the systemi than to act ethically, it is a
trifle to him. when one asks him to become a Christian.
Christianity is but anot>ier proposed system,
'i'he speculative philos ophor. .. proposes to contemplate
Christianity from the philosophical stanapoint. It is
a matter of inaifferehce to him whether anyone accepts
it or not; such anxieties are left to the theolot:Ues
15. Kierkegaard, CUP, 100.
16. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 143,
17. SK weakens his case considerably by aealing in gener-
alities. It hardly pays to speak of all philosophers doing
this or that. In this case, for instance, Kant aefended the
primacy of the pure practicaljf reason in opposition to the
luxuries of speculation.
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ana laymen. .. The philosopher contemplates Christianity
for the sake of interpenetrating it with this specula-
tive thought; aye, with his genuinely specuJative
thought
.
Being spiritless, speculation looks back complacently upon
the completed system. In opposition to this the existential
ist creatively cuts a swath through the forest of future un-
certainties.
Philosophy turns towaras the past, towards the whole
enacted history of the Vi'orld, it shows how the discrete
factors are fused in a higher unity, it mediates and
mediates. On the other hand, it seems to me to give
no answer at all to the question I put to it, for I
ask about the future .. .However , I get no reply, for
philosophy mediates the past and has existence in it,
the philosopher hastens back into the past to such a
degree that, as a poet says of an antiquarian, 'only
his coat tails are left behind in the present.'-^®
Time, therefore, which is the medium of existential aecision
is but an accident in the art of speculation. Better if one
had a complete intuition of eternity so that there woula be
no need of time at all.
The philosopher's view of time controls his view of
happiness. Here again spirit is conspicuous for its non-
existence. Aristotle, for instance, when speaking of the es
sence of human happiness "identifies the happiness v;ith the
joys of thought, recalling in this connection the blessed
pastim.e of the eternal gods in speculation."'^^
In contradistinction to this the Christian seeks to
make happiness part of the synthesis which defines man as
18. Kierkegaard, GUP, 51.
1&. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 144-145.
20. Kierkegaard, GUP, 54.
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man. If man is a synthesis of time ana eternity, i»e
.
,
boay
and soul carried away by spirit, it follows for hierkegaara
that he is a caricaturist v ; o postulates a happiness outsiae
of the synthesis. Meditation may possibly be a happiness
form for the angels, taut Johannes Climacus just aoes not hap-
pen to be an angel yet.
Since man is a synthesis of the temporal ana the eter-
nal, the happiness that the speculative philosopher may
enjoy will be an illusion, in that he desires in time
to be merely eternal. Herein lies the error of zYie
speculative philosopher. Higher than this speculative
happiness, therefore, is the infinite passionate inter-
est in a personal eternal happiness. It is higher be-
cause it is truer, because it aefinitely expresses trie
synthesis . ^-^
The speculator accents but one side of man's nature ana then
supposes thaL vvhen that facet is understood ana satisfied.
the whole man is t-iven happiness.
Once again the attack by SK on the speculator is subtle.
Instead of coming right out and narrating the truth of Chris-
tianity in opposition to philosophy, he merely continues to
unfold his problem of thought. He refuses to pretend that he
can shov/ the truth of Christianity. He can only pose it as
a problem. The truth can be learned only in the stress of
decis ion.
But suppose this v,hole proceeding were a chimera, a
sheer impossibility; suppose that Christianity is sub-
jectivity, an inner transformation, an actualization of
inv/araness , ana that only two kinds of people can know
anything about it: those who with an irjfinite passionate
interest in an eternal happiness base this their happi-
21. Kierkegaard, GUi', 54
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ness upon their believing relationship to Christianity,
and those who with an opposite passion, but in passion,
reject it— the happy ana the unhappy lovers ... Nov. if
Christianity is essentially something objective, it is,
necessary for the observer to be objective, but if
Christianity is essentially subjectivity, it is a mis-
take for the observer to be objective . '^^
By refusing to identify the problem of thought with
the truth itself, SK safeguards his break from Lminanence,
The ir'hilosophical Fragments , let us remember, were penned as
a problematic departure from the solution to the "pugnacious
proposition" of the "feleno . This proposition is that one can
seek neither for what he knows nor v/hat he does not Know,
Flato sought an answer in Lhe doctrine of reminiscence.
"One who is ignorant needs only a remj_naer to help him come
to himself in the consciousness of v:hat he knows. "^*-' It was
this immanence from which SK felt he haa to bret-k if man
were to be drawn out inwardly. A new problem of thought is
advanced, therefore, one in which both the truth and the
conaition for learning it are created by God.
The condition for understanding the Truth is like the
capacity to inouire for it: the condition contains the
conditioned, and the question implies the answer. fUin-
Socratic sense. )'^'*
But what advance is this over Socrates? Simply this: If
man is discontinuously related to eternity, then passion is
aroused to know truth. The more the passion, the greater the
inwardness. but concern can be maximized only when one w'aits
less this is understood in the
22. Kierkegaard, GUF, 51.
23. Kierkegaard, rP, b.
24. Ibid. , 10.
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before God to give the learning. On SK*s problem of thought,
therefore, man is more man than he is on the bac ratio.
Another v/ay to justify the superiority of his hy-
pothesis over against that of speculation is by directly ex-
posing the impotency of sub spe cie aeterni . When all is
conceptual ana is assigned a hierarchical place under the
rubric of necessity, then "there is no absolute choice, and
if there is nothing of that sort, then there is no either/
or."^^ IViediation in sub specie aeterni may be a pleasant
speculative pastime, but "life, too, has its demands. "'^^
The inoividual is not sub specie aeterni . He is very much a
living part of che nistorical continuum. In his eagerness to
transform everything into conceptual necessity, therefore,
the philosopher "gains the v^hoie world ana loses himself.
This cp.n never happen to a man who lives for freedom, even
thought he were to lose ever so much.
V^ibh what one might call the inward work philosophy has
nothing wtfitever to do, but the inward work is the gen-
uine life of freedom. i^hilosophy regards the outward
work, ana this it does not see in isolation but as it
is absorbed into and transformed by the world-historical
process.^®
In crying, "My task is: to make room that G-od may come,"^^
and also "For freedom, therefore, 1 am fighting , SK really-
25. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 146-147.
26. Ibid. , 1^5.
27. Ibid., 148.
28. Ibid. , 147.
29. xvierkegaurd, JbK, §1401.
30. Kierkegaara, EO, II, 14^,
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meant to say that he wanted Johannes Gllmacus to enjoy in-
dividuality.
By corrupting the meaningful distinctions between "now"
and "hereafter," the consistent speculator jeopardizes the mean-
ing of guilt. If there is to be guilt, there must be choice.
But in a realm of necessity there can be no choice, since
necessity is, was, and ever shall be. What must be necessar-
ily is.
If all reality is to be analysed in terms of thought,
and the unity of thought is the fundamental axiom^ of
philosophy, an individual human being is either G-od,
or else part of God and identical with God to that de-
gree, Hovv then can i-here be a re&lm of moral activity
and responsibility, a realm of guilt , before Goa or
men? Kierkegaard held passionately^ ohat there is such
a realm, that it is a realm of 'existence' as opposed
to 'thought,' ana that as such it cannoL be aescribed,
analyseu or systematized, "^-^
Continuing his oojections to speculation, SK pleasant-
ly plays the role of the cavalier, he suggests that, if the
order and nature of mina is the same as the oraer ana nature
of things, one ought to think of a pot of gold in his back
y&ra, ana in so aoing become very rich. The speculator re-
plies that SK has missed the point, "This identity must not
be understood as applying to existence of an imiperfect oraer,
as if, for example, I could proauce a rose by thinking it."'^'^
'Aith this limitation SK believes that the superiority of his
hypothesis over that; ol' the speculator begins to appear.
The speculator succeeds in iaentifying thought with being
31. Mob s , Art . , 19 3.
32. Kierkegaard, GUF, 29 3.
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only "because being means in this case the same thing as
thoufiht . " Validity is confused with being. What the
speculative mind is actually repeating v^hen he identifies
thought with being is only the tautology, thou;.;ht is thought.
If being is understood in this manner, the formula be-
comes a tautology. Thought ana being mean one and the
same thing, and the correspondence spoken of is merely
an abstract self-ident ity . ivi either formula says any-
thing more than that the truth is, so unaerstood as to
accentuate the copula: the truth i_s, i.e. the truth is
a reduplication. Truth is the subject of the assertion,
but the assertion that it is is the same as the subject;
for this being that the truth is said to have is never
its ovm abstract form. In this manner we give expres-
sion to the fact that truth is not something simple,
but is in a wholly abstract sense a reduplication, a
reduplica tion which is nevertheless instantly revoKed. ^-''^
The speculator may labor hard to cover up this tautology in
highly technical abstractions, but the redunaancy remains
nonetheless.
More salt is poured into the v,/ound vv'hen SK points out
that despite his efforts to avoid being an indiviaual "the
abstract thinker pays his aebt to. existence oy existing in
spite of all abstraction."'^^ Once a quarter Herr rrofesscr
is found standing in line at tne accounting office patiently
waiting to araw his salary. Kovi, how is this so?
Here the wedge is set. Man must exist, that is cer-
tain. bA's point is that only Christianity can explain that
existence. Unlike speculation, for which "thought must be
pointed away from the subject,"*^^ Christianity is "precisely
33. Kierkegaard, GW, 293.
34. Ibid
. ,
"^170.
35. Ibid
.
36. Ibid
. , 171.
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an explanation of how the eternal truth is to be understood
in determinations of time by one who as existing is himself
in t irae •
"
As a rejoinder, the speculator claims that only by
the primacy of the intellect can the madness of inwardness
be avoided, that insanity in which there is no criterion for
truth outside of the inward feelings of the inaividual him-
self. In a rather dramatic stroke bK turns to the illustra-
tion of the insane i.ian v.ho, escaping from the local asylum,
decides upon a program by which he can prove to the people
in the town that he is sane ana souna. His wonaerful plan
is to repeat a given truth that he has memorized, so that all
who come in contact with him will unaerstand that he is quite
in possession of all his faculties. But to his disappoint-
ment, the more he repeats the truism the more suspicion is
aroused that he is unbalanced. In like manner the x^rivat -
docent , v/hile repeating ad nauseam that all being is concep-
tual, continues to exist as a non- conceptual being himself,
vVhat Sk wonders, therefore, is net , who is mad, but
who is the madder . Is it he who exists ana aomits it , or he
v/ho continues to repeat the words that only necessity exists?
In the type of raaaness which consists in the absence
of inwaroness, the comic is that though the something
Y.'hich the happy inaividual knows reaxly is the truth,
the truth v^hich concerns all men, it aoes not in the
slightest degree concern the much respected prater.
This type of madness is more inhum.an than the other.
37. Kierkegaard, GUP, 172
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One shrinks from lookinf-: into the eyes of a madman...
of the latter type at all, from fear of discovering
that he has eyes of glass and hair maae from carpet
-
rags; that he is, in short, an artificial proauct.*-^
In bK's opinion speculation is a monument to arti-
ficiality. Inasmuch as "a particular existing human being is
surely not an Idea, and his existence is surely something
quite different from the conceptual existence of the Idea,""-*^
it is impossible by thou;?ht to learn of reality. And if the
speculator perp-ists in his notion that the order and nature
of m.ind is the same as the order and nature of things, SK
repeats his contention that tomorrov/*s' launary is already
done by taking thought yesterday.
If the content of thought v/ere reality, the most per-
fect possible anticipation of an action in thought be-
fore I had yet acted, would oe the action. In that
manner no action vvoula ever take place, ana the intel-
lectual v/oula swallow the ethical.
.The only way to avoid the embarrassments of specula-
tion is to relegate "thought to the sphere of the possible,
the disinterested, the objective, ana to assign action to
the sphere of the sub jective.
38. Kierkegaard, GUP, 175.
39. Ibid
. , 302. Statements such as Lhis point to a skepti-
cal strain in SK's epiii temoloay v/hich counterchecks the heal-
thy dualism which characteristically marks his work. It is
well and gooa to separate the idea and the thing, out one aoes
not do the cause of philosophy a service if he separates them
too far. If ideas and reality are totally discontinuous,
what is there left to speak ofV
40. Ibid
. , 177.
41. IbiQ.

GHAir'TER SEVEN
JIEaELIAKISM
The second, yet to some extent coincident
,
negative
criterion is Hegelianism. Being understood by SK as the king
of abstractionists, Hegel is made to play the role of specu-
lation's vvhipping boy in the Kierkegaardian literature. If
Socrates was almost a Christian, Kegel is the antichrist.
While Hegel might have known everything and Socrates nothing,
yet the ignorance of Socrates "if it is to be thoroughly
grasped and retained, is more strenuous to carry out than
all Hegel's philosophy put together.""^ Hegel seemed to be
pledged to almost everything for the dissolution of which ex-
istentialism stood comjnitted: rational mediation, v^'orld-
history, the objective ego, and immanence. believed that
no better testimony to his possessing the truth coula be ae-
vised, therefore, than an unequivocal announcement of his
antipathetical relation to Hegelianism.
The confusion which Hegelian philosophy has brought into
personal life is altogether incredible--it is the sad
consequence of a philosopher being a hero and yet, from
a purely personal point of view, a philistine and a
1. Kierkegaard, JSK, ^511.
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pedant. One thing always escaped Hegel—what it was
to live. Ke coula only give a representation of life,
and though a master in the art he is certainly the
most striking contrast to the maieutic thinKer.^
A. Preliminary Comments.
Before plunging into the task of outlining the exact
reasons why SK professed no allegiance to Hegelianism as a
philosophy, it is well to clear ourselves of the inference
that we approbate the ilierkegaardian emphasis at this point.
The following two reasons are suggestive why we believe SK's
position is somewhat weakly taken.
First , the literature is aated by the fact that Hegel
bears the full weight of the arguments against speculation.
A timelessness might have been preserved if the generic fal-
lacy of abstractiveness itself, rather than one temporal ex-
emplification of it, had been set up as the object of attack.
It is understandable from a human point of view why Sii des-
cended upon Hegel, to be sure, for a fire in one's own yard
always seems of more consequence than the holocaust in the
next city.
Second, and more seriously, v,?hile SK goes to great
pains to leave the impression upon his reader that Hegel is
set for the defense of a pure abstractionist Weltansicht in
which history and process are ignored in favor of a quasi-
Eleaticism, little or nothing is said to vindicate Hegel's
profession that the true idea is known by its v.^ork in this
2. Kierkegaard, JSK, §610.
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concrete v;orld , on the one hand, or that only the concrete
can breed the concrete , on the other. In vain aoes one
search for evidences of an appreciation of the empirical siae
of Hegel, SK recognizes that Hegel himself claimed that the
rational is not independent of the process of history, but
he refuses to allow the possibility that it actually is so.
No effort will be made in the follov/ing section of
the dissertation to document our belief that there is an em-
pirical side to Hegel which SK passed over. To attempt such
an assignment v;ould carry the research far beyond the an-
nounced problem of the dissertation. It would be helpful to
the reader, therefore, if he would remember to substitute
"abstractiveness" for "Hegelianism, " and agree to understand
that ibK believed that he v/as talking about the former even
when he used the term "Hegelianism" to express it.
B. The System.
Kierkegaard has much zo say about system. On the one
hand, a logical system is possible, while on the other, an
existential system is impossible. Two systems emerge in the
literature, therefore: the logical ana the existential. Un-
less this equivocation in the word "system" is borne in mind
by the reader, he will be led astray as he moves through
Kierkegaard's arguments. For instance, it is true to say that
SK had a system, v"hile it is true to say that he did not. And
so with Hegel, he did not have a system, and yet he was the
worst offender by having a system. Let us look at these t wo
facets in greater detail.
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posited the principle, "A logical system is pos-
sible,"*^ in order that the right of the individual to fabri-
cate a hypothetical or possible course of action or thought
might be guaranteed. i:>o far as the logical frgimework of
Christianity as a problem of thought is concerned, therefore,
vvould have been the first to aoiriit that he had a system.
Vvhen speaking to fools, vjho have "co have systems, isK becerae
a fool ana wrote a system. The go oblem of thought which is
set up in the Fragments with the skill of a master, forms
the logical systemi of Kierkegaard. but this sort of a system
is so unworthy of an existentialist that it haa to be penned
under a pseudonym. Yet, a systemi it remained nonetheless.
It seems superfluous to remxnd ourselves of the strenuous
efforts to which SK went to safeguard the right of the in-
dividual to use his understanding to determine the limits of
what faith may believe against the unaerstanding. For this
reason the following judgment of Glowney can be accepted Vkith
reservations
:
Despite the protest of S.K. , in the eyes of any one who
has a system Anti-intellectualism must always itself be
a system. A skeptical answer or a negative answer to
the problem! of the union of thought ana. being is never-
theless an ansver, and consequently Kierkegaard, in deny-
ing that thought and being are one, but in uniting them
in the existing Individual, who thinks and is, has given
the professor a system, under v/hich, in spite of him-
self, he miay be classified.^
The kind of a system which SK denounced is not the
3. Kierkegaard, CUP, 99.
4. Glowney, Art., 42.
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logical but the exist ent ial . "An existential system is im-
possible."^ The reason for taking this stand is that the va-
lidity of his calling might not be dissioated. The v^'hole
point to Kierkegaard's writing is to make it difficult to be
a Christian. One is a Christian only when he mediates the
love whereby he was loved in Christ . And only when this
mediation is completed can he significantly say that he has
an existential system. buz obviously sucti a system can ex-
ist only for G-od, since "system ana finality correspond to
one another."^ Goa is actus purus . he is love. But man
stands under the assignment to mediate perfect love (eter-
nity) vjhile being yet confined to the limitations of flesh
(time ) . It is impossible, therefore, for one in time to
have an existential system.
SK felt that the m.istake of Hegel is that he confused
the rights of the logical and existential systems, believing
that the relations which hold true in logic hold true also
in the m.ovement of becoming in history.
In rebutting Hegel, resorted to tne following type
of argument: The system must be formulated by someone, since
it is chosen as one out of a number of possible systems. But
either this formulator is Goa or he is not. SK dismisses the
former alternative on the ground that God does not eat three
meals a day, wear oatches on his coat while lecturing, and
appear for a quarterly salary. These facts happen to be true
5. Kierkegaard, CUF , 99.
6. Ibid. , 107.
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of the Frivatdocent who has formulated the s^^sterrj. There-
fore, the x-'rlvatdocent cannot be Qod. If the formulator is
not (>od, then either the system is composea to include the
individual in history or to leave the individual out. If
the individual is included, then ve have pathos, since the
system is logically necessary, while the individual is very
much contingent ana emotional. And if the inaivicual is ex-
cluded, then v/e have an aamission that an existential system
is impossible, since a system must be complete if it is to
be a system. The system is one thing and the inaividual is
another; therefore the system is incomplete. Logic is limited
to the static universal, while existence takes in the fluid
inaividual who becom.es.
'Hhe existential system is possible only for G-oa. "he-
ality itself is a system--for God." But no existing in-
dividual in time has a right to claim possession of the sys-
tem. Only God can so possess eternity that the eternal is
absolutely mediated in His person. SK had no personal ob-
jections to the Frivatdocent '
s
thinking that he is deity, but
he did vv'ish that the said r'rofessor v;ould exhibit more of the
incommunicable attributes of deity, j^'or this reason SK pre-
fers to laugh at Hegel rather than argue. He believes it
humorous to listen to a lecture on the perfect system, when
the system de facto excludes the very inventiveness of the
lecturer himself.
7. Kierkegaard, CUP, 107
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One must therefore be very careful in dealing; v/ith a
philosopher of the Hegelian school, ana, above all, to
make certain of the identity of the being with whom one
has the honor to discourse. Is he a human being, an
existing human being? Is he himself sub specie aeterni
,
even when he sleeps, eats, blows his nose, or whatever
else a human being does?... Was he born sub specie
aeterni , and has he lived sub specie aeterni ever since,
so that he cannot even understand what I am asking about,
never having had anything to do with the future, and
never having experienced any decision? In that case I
readily understand that it is not a human being I have
the honor to address. But this aoes not quite ena the
matter; for it seems to me a very strange circumstance
that such mysterious beings begin to maKe thexr appear-
ance. An epidem.ic of cholera is usually signalxzed by
the appearance of a certain kina of fly not otherwise
observable; may it not be in the case that the appearance
of these fabulous pure thinkers is a sign that some mis-
fortune threatens humanity, as for instance tne loss of
Lhe ethical ana the religious?^
Once it is clearly established that the one who writes
the system is not Go a, then he must be an indiviaual like SK-
And "if he is a human being, then he is also an existing in-
dividual."^ But this inaiviaual can only do one of two
things. Either he formulates the system which takes in the
individual, and so is comic, or he forgets the possibility
and admits the incompletion of the system. There is no ter-
tiuir, quid .
Either he can ao his utmost to forget that he is an ex-
isting individual, by which he becomes a comic figure,
since existence has the remarkable trait of compelling
an existing inaiviaual to exist whether he wills it or
not... Or he can concentrate his entire energy upon the
fact that he is an existing inaividual.
Inasmuch as Hegel has set ixs» himself to formulate a
8. Kierkegaard, CUP, 271-272.
9. Ibid
.
, 109.
10. Ibid.

145
logical system, SK refuses to concede the possibility that
this logic is also an actual description or the Absolute's
historical coming to self-consciousness. SK is resolute here.
Logic is logic. It may describe the hypothetical or the pos-
sible, but it cannot embrace the actual. For this reason
the Hegelian claim that one can move from the logL cal cate-
gories to historical contingencies is an illusion.
In the construction of a logical system, it is necessary
first and foremost to take care not to include in it
anything which is subject to an existential aialectic,
anything which is, only because it exists or has existea,
and not simply because it is. Prom this it follows
quite si»7iply that Hegel's unparalleled discovery, the
subject of so unparalleled an admiration, namely, the
introduction of movement into IorIc, is a sheer confu-
sion of logical science; to say nothing of the absence,
on every page, of even so much as an effort on Hegel's
part to persuade the reader that it is there. -^-^
Since the system is so complete, SK thou,».ht that Hegel
ought to have committed suicide. The worK. is aone , so the
need for living is over.
For suicide is the only tolerably existential conse-
Quence of pure thought, when this type of abstraction
is not conceived as sorr'ething merely partial in rela-
tion to being human, willing to strike an agreement
with an ethical and religious form of personal exis-
tence, but to respect the passion. "^^
SK refuses to praise suicide. Yhat he rather hopes to accom-
plish is an exposure of the inconsistency of him who formu-
lates a final system ana then continues to live as if his
decisions continued to have meaning. Contingency has no sig-
nificance sub specie aeterni.
11. Kierkegaard, GUF, 99.
12, Ibid. , 275.
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Because the logical system cannot take in the only
thing really v/orth while, namely, the inaividual, it follows
for SK that Hegelianism is the worst form of skepticism.
"The notion that pure thought is the positive truth for an
existing indiviaual, is sheer skepticism, for this positive-
ness is chimerical. "-^"^ There m-ight be great; wisaom in being
able to understand the history? of China ana Persia, but when
the individual cannot be understood, that is the quintessence
of skepticism.
Before concluding this point, let us remind the reader
that all of SK's arguments turn on the valiaity of his sub
specie aeterni interpretation of Hegel. If this happens to
be a faulty understanding, then most of the objections fall
to the ground.
C. The Destruction of Ethical Life.
Behind SK's arguments against the system lay the more
formidable fear that a final and perfect system would destroy
the meaning of the ethical life. Here is the argument: Hegel
interprets everything sub specie aeterni . The eternal, how-
ever, is changeless by virtue of its necessity. But ethical
decisions require the contingency of change if decisions are
meaningful; therefore, Kegel aid not ailov/ a place for ethics.
Indeed, SK conceded, Hegel conversed frequently about
"history," "becoming," and "change," those ideal conditions
13. Kierkegaard, GUr, 275.
/a 8 J
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under v/hich the ethical life thrives. But he was able so to
speak only by forgetting the exact meaning of a logical sys-
tem, rrocess is an illusion v^hen all is sub spe-cie aeterni .
If the real is the rational a na the rational iis the real, then
becoming, which is other than the rational, cannot be.
Eegel would have vehemently denied all of this. In
the historical process bpirit operates on the data themselves,
so that the spirit's movement in enriched along the way.
ISl^w data constantly add to the fecundity of the process. In
short, Hegel believed that he was the only consistent em-
piricist. Far from being an abstractionist, he was detailing
process itself.
SK, however, understood Hegel as a purely logical ana-
lyst. The thesis of the dialectic, vh ich leads to the anti -
thesis and the synthes is
,
may involve a moving rational re-
lationship, but it happens to take place only xn the mina.
"Being" leads to "nothing" and "becoming" only in the rela-
tionships of thought.
The reason why the Hegelian a ialectic is so aespisea
by Kierkegaard is that it makes life too easy. SK's aia-
lectic of inwardness stands or falls on the strength of para-
dox. £5ut when propositions are mediatec by logic, the decid-
ing inaividual's will suffers atrophy. Hence, the objection
to Hegel's dialectic is that everything from the analysis of
"being" on up to the detailing of the highest whole, "the
Absolute," is servilely done by logic. The individual is re -
tired. The overcoming quality ol the synthesis is that
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higher unity in which the contradictions subsisting between
the thesis and the antithesis are mediated. In the Absolute
all paradoxes are finally resolved, and we have the true as
the whole.
far to suit SK. It not only set up the problem of living,
but it also mediatea -che contraaictlons . 'i'his was the mis-
take.
Personality will protest in all eternity against the
proposition th£.t absolute contraaictlons can be mediated
...it will repeat the inuriortal dileaiima through all eter-
nity: to be or not to be, Lhat is the o uestion. ''^
Whereas, therefore, Hegel attempted to mediate everything in
both/and, SK gave himself to the stringing of a barbed either/
or. For this reason SK said that Christianity ana Hegelian-
ism stand related ant ipathet lea lly . In he ligiousness B ex-
istence itself is interpreted paradoxically; in Hegelianism
the Absolute overcomes all paradox.
If Christianity is the opposite of speculation It is
also the opposite of meciation, the latter bein^ a cate-
gory of speculative thought; wnat then can it mean to
mediate "chem? But v/hat is the opposite of mediation?
It is the ab&olute paradox.
At no point in his argument does SK concede the possibility
that the logical categories in Hegel may also have a counter-
part in the movement of paradox in history. For this reason
he continues uninterrupted in his contention that Hegel over-
comes everything, yes, but only in the realm of thou^,ht.
The dialectical logic of Hegel was simply carried too
14. Kierkegaard, JSK, §286
15. Kierkegaard, CUP, 358.
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Another way to express the destruction of ethics in
this sub specie aeterni framework is to point out the impos-
sibility of Hegel's making room for future. It is certain
that if we concede mediation, then there is no absolute
choice, and "if there is nothing of that sort, then there is
no absolute choice, and if there is nothing of that sort,
then there is no either/or ; so^ is just as certain that
there can be no either/or if there is no future. One pas-
sionately becomes only when what is not yet is determined
by what is presently being decided. Existential living is
that passionate regard for decision which makes the v.hole
future of possibility turn on the decisions of the present
moment. It is this creativity of the will in emotional
stress, while facing the absolute paraaox, that gives Chris-
tianity its distinctiveness over against philosophy.
ir'hiloso phy. .. seems to me to give no answer at all to
the question 1 put to it, for I ask about the future...
Now I assume that philosophy is in the right, that the
principle of contradiction really is annulled, or that
the philosophers transcend it every instant in the
higher unity which exists for thought. This, however,
surely cannot hola with respect to the future, for the
oppositions must first be in existence before I can
mediate them. But if the oppositions are there, then
there must be an either/or.^'
While philosophy pivots tov/ard the past ana meaitates upon
logically necessary, Christianity turns creatively to the
future
.
16. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 146-147.
17. Ibia. , 144
.
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Lurking once again the shaaow of every argument is
the Kierkegaardian pledge to release the individuality of
Johannes Glimacus. The individual man in Copenhagen cannot
be accui^jdateo. by the Hegelian sub specie aeternl . "I,
Johannes Glimacus, am a human being, neither more nor less;
and I asstune that anyone I may have the honor to engat.e in
conversation with, is also a human being. "-^^ If paraaox is
cancelled out in the aialectic, ana if the inaiviaual is
subsumed within a higher ego, such as the state, then the
inaiviaual is no longer significant. To exchange the primacy
of the individual for the primacy of either the social insti-
tution or the Absolute is a poor bargain, since it happens
to be the individual himself v;ho is being lost in the shuffle.
This for Kierkegaard is the ultimate blasphemy. For in-
stead of heightening his core of responsibility and in-
tegrity man is invited to ao what he is already enamoured
with doing, to join the crowd, the mass, to be aissoived
into the organic whole. To become a set of relations
within tae whole is all too congenial to mai ern man,
Kierkegaard believed. -^^
Without decision, spirit is dead; and withott spirit, man is
dead. When, therefore, Hegel mediated all c ontreaictions , on
the one hand, and eliminateo the possibility of a significant
future, on the other, he destroyed Johannes Glimacus,
As mir/ht be expected, SK revolted so far from Hegel's
identification of the true ana the whole that "the position
of Kierkegaard is frequently referred to as existential ethi-
cal individualism . "20 jf -^^le individual means nothing to
18, Kierkegaard, GU? , 99,
19. Steere, in the Introduction to ivierkegaard, i'H, xviii.
2U, Aubrey, jr'TT, 67.
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Hegel, he seems to tie an everything to bK. The results of
revolution generally carry along with them an anarchy which
threatens to introduce new aifficulties not found in the
original tyranny aprainst which the movement was initiated.
Hegel's destruction of ethics is not permitted to
pass v/ithout encountering some cutting satire. The strategy
of irony at this point is the same as found elsewhere. "How
does the System begin with the immediate? That is to say,
Qoes it begin v/ith it immediately?" '^"^ SK obliges to answer
this himself: The inaividual makes the decision. A number
of possible systems were in his mind, and he set himself on
one. Therefore, the decision itself preceded the immediate
starting point in the system. The existing inoiviaual had
to come to a decision whether to begin Vv-ith the immediate or
vith some other starting point. Thus Hegel, in spite of him-
self, had to appeal to ethics to formulate the system vjhich
would destroy ethics. 1/Vhat Hegel could not possibly avoid
was " das |sic^ schlechte llnendlichkeit
.
"^^ One cannot re-
treat back zo infinity in ST:arting his system, lest he aie in
the process. SK is worthy of being quoted in extenso here.
What is the implication involved in speaking of a bad
infinite? The implication is, that I hold some person
responsible for refusing 10 end the reflective process.
And this means, does it not, that I require him. to ao
something? but as a genuinely speculative philosopher
I assume, on the contrary, that reflection ends itself.
If that is the case, vhy ao I make any dem.and upon the
thinker? And what is it that I reauire of him? I ask
21. Kierkegaard, GUP, 101 (original is in italics).
22. Ibid. , 102.
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him for a resolve. Ana in so doing, I ao well, for
in no other way can the process of reflection be halted.
But a philosopher is never justified, on the other hana,
in playing tricks on people, asserting one moisent that
the reflective process halts itself ana cores to an end
in the absolute beginning; end the next moment proceed-
ing to mock a man whose only fault is that he is stupid
enoup-h to believe the first assertion, mocking him, so
as to help him to arrive in this manner at an absolute
beginning, which hence seems to be achieved in two dif-
ferent ways. But if a resolution of the Vifill is recuired
to end the preliminary or-ocess of reflection, the pre-
suppositionless character of the System is renounced.
Only v;hen the beginning, which puts an end to the process
of reflection, is a radical breach of such a nature Lhat
the absolute beginning breaks through the continued in-
finite reflection, then only is the beginning without
presuppositions. But Vvhen the breach is effected by
breaking off the process of reflection arbitrarily, so
as to make a beginning possible, then the beginning so
made cannot be absolute; for^it has come inti^ being
through a jJieTC^ ^Cj (TI ^ /Ji ^ei/o-S^ .^^
bK caricatures Hegel as frantically attempting to complete
his system, while all the while making a concealed effort to
forget his ovn existence. hegel corresponds prolifically
vvith all of those who aisagree with him, to ma^e sure that
he has consiaered every objection to the system; and then he
sends the whole m.anuscript off to the printer with his name
aopended. With this immense work finished, he humbly an-
nounces to the Vi.orld that the system is complete. But why
such .pretense, bK wonaersV "VvTien they publish their epi-
tomes they say nothing about anything being lacking. "'^'^ 'ihe
answer to this quandary, which bK again obligingly provides,
is that the salary of the ^ rivat decent aepends upon the pub-
lication of a systeFi. In any case, regaraless what motives
25. Kiericegaard, CuF, 103
24. Ibid. , 98.

stimulate the formulation of the system, nothing can cover
up the primacy of the ethical life in the formulation of
that system. "A persistent striving to realize a system...
is still a striving. "^^ By means of this maneuver bK be-
lieves that he has outflanked Hegel.
D. Conclusion.
Raving alreaay maae frequent illusion to the fact
that SK probably erred in not sui'f iciently crediting Hegel
with an empirical emphasis in his dialectic, let us utilize
the space at the end of this brief chapter to detail the way
in V'hich v.e believe Kierkegaard was profoundly influenced
by the Hegelian aialectic.
'i'here can be little question that SK learned from
Hegel the very theory of dialectical warfare vvhich he employed
against the man.
He translated the hardest passages into Danish, in
order to make them clearer to himself, and he read and
re-read the Lopric over and over again. Both his philo-
sophical style and his terminology show/ the influence
of Hegel.
Jolivet makes reference to the personal reaction of SK to the
logic of Kegel: " La logioue avait toujours ete pour lui une
'voiupte passioanee
.
'
" '^'^ Lowrie has uncoverea a passage in
which SK actually lauds Hegel, a note which, significantly,
was originally intended to be an insertion in the t^os tscript
25. Kierkegaard, GUF, 98.
26. Swenson, SAK, 11.
27. Jolivet, Art., 128.
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itself.
I here would beg the reader's attention to a remark I
have often desired to make. Let no one misunderstand
me, as thoUf;i;h I imagined I were the devil of a thinKer
vho might transform everything. Such thinkers are as
remote fromi me as possible. I cherish a respect for
Hegel v.'hich is sometim.es an enigma to me; I have learnt
much from him, and I knovc that on returninsi: again to
him I could still learn much miore.*^
So much is clear at the beginning: Hegel aid influence SK.
The question nov/ is, where, ana to what extent was this in-
fluence?
The dissertation suggests that He^-vel taught SK not
only the principles of aialectical tension but also the in-
sight that progress is made only when logical contraries are
synthesized or overcome. Hegel believed he found the m.eaning
of the movement of history when he brought a higher unity out
of the contrary dialectical relations. This key, together
with the Socratic insight into the maieutic method, opened
the door of existentialism for SK.
Socrates opened SK's eyes to the m.eaning of the ethi-
cal individual and to the value and primacy of the virtuous
Socrates' infinite merit is to have been an exist ing
thinker, not a speculative philosopher v;ho forgets v/hat
it means to exist... The infinite merit of the Socratic
position was precisely to accentuate the fact that the
knower is an existing inaiviaual, ana that Lhe task of
existing is his essential task. Making an advance upon
Socrates, by failing to unaerstand this, is quite a
mediocre achievem.ent
.
Between Socrates and Hegel diale ctic left the individual and
28. (quoted in Kierkegaard, CUi:', 558.
29. Kierkegaard, GUF , 184-185.
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history to become a rational weapon for the fabricating of
an a gr iorl metaphysic. After bocrates "the way swings off;
oocrates concentrates essentially upon accenting existence,
v;hile r'lato forgets this and loses himself in speculation."'^^
Kant dismissed dialectic as the futile attempt of the under-
standing to reach out beyond the phenomena. SK accepted this
interpretation as far as it went. It was in Hegel that a
real attempt to get aown to earth with dialectic was once
again made. Here, probably, the influence of Hegel upon SK
reaches its high point.
Jhe break with Hegel came when SK decided that this
Hegelian effort, despite its high and worthy motives, became
quagnired in the slough of sub specie aetei-ni; and so once
again trailed off on zo the futile path of the unaerstanding,
trying to get beyond the phenomena. We must not suppose,
therefore, -chat ^^K objected to either the formulation of a
orlogical dialectic to the claim that the dialectic must have
empirical foundations; for these two emphases bK himself
stressed magnificently. Hat-her, he objected to Hegel's
definition of the extent of logic. SK felt that speculation
can Qo no more than set up a problem of thought. Logic can
point to reality, but it cannot be identified with reality.
V^'ith this Hegel disagreed.
Justly or not, therefore, SK revolted from Hegel, biting
deep into the hand that fed him. As a result of this radical
30. Kierkegaard, CUP, 184
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turn, thinks Swenson, SK ''was aestined to give the most
thoroughgoing and absolutely destructive criticism that the
Hegelian philosophy has... ever received. " SK aetermined
to return to Socrates. Philosophy haa suffered retrogression
rather than enjoying progression.
It was only natural in turning to SocraLes that the
category of existence was summoned to the leading role.
When the Hegelian philosophy was enjoying its highest
fame, Kierkegaard chose to attack it from the rear, by
the application of just this category of reality, ex-
istence, but please note, reality and existence in Lhe
thinker himself, not outside the thinker. '^'^
It is the indiviaual , not logic, that performs the feat of
mediation. Only in this way can one retain the paraaox cre-
ated by the Hegelian thesis ana antithesis v;hile at the same
time returning to the primacy of the inuiviaual in boc rates.
iViedja tion can have no place in logic, since it pre-
supposes transition, which is a transcendence that
logic excludes. The transition-category is historical,
not logL cal,
Dialectic is indeed the basis of the ethical life, for with-
out the sharp edges of paradox the individual would not be
suspended in a state of inv/ard passion. In a rather cLear
passage SK makes it perfectly clear that whoever exists out-
side of the dialectic is a soulless individual.
'what serves to mark the thoroughly cultivated personal-
ity is the degree to v/hich the thinking in vv'hich he has
daily life has a aialectical character, 'i'o have one's
daily life in the aecisive dialectic of the infinite,
and yet continue to live: this is both the art of life
31. Swenson, SAK, 11.
32. Ibid . , 43.
33. Ibid. , 118-119.
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and its difficulty. Most men have complacent categories
for their daily use, and resort to the categories of
the infinite only upon solemn occasions; that is to
say, they uo not really have them. But to make use of
the dialectic of the infinite in one's daily life, and
to exist in this uialectic, is naturally the highest
degree of strenuousness ; ana strenuous exertion is again
needed to prevent the exercise from deceitfully luring
one away from existence, instead of providing a train-
ing in existence.'-*^
Hegel supplied SK vvith the basic framework of the
dialectic, viz., the tensional strain of the thesis-anti-
thesis relation. This paradox is then united with the bo-
cratic concept of the individual exemplified in the maieutic
method. Instead of allowing the thesis-antithesis paradox
to be overcome in a higher logical order, however, SK pleaded
the .i)Ocratic principle that the individual himself agonize
out the synthesis in personal, emotional striving for vir-
tue. The whole point to the existential dialectic is that
it is the ethical inaividual who mediates time ana eternity,
LiOgic can set up the time-eternity relation as a problem,
but only Lhe existing inaiviaual, through his personal de-
cisions for the right, can mediate the relation. Kierke-
gaard wrote his books to make it difficult to become a Chris-
tian; so there is little wonder why, when he interpreted
Hegel as making it easy to be a Christian, he revolted from
the master at that point. synthesis occurs in the striving
individual, not in logical categories.
Gomrne toute existence, qui est tension et pathos,
I'exister Chretien reunira les contraaictoires . L' ex-
istence chretienne s'epanouit en eternite, mais elle
34. Kierkegaard, GUf , 79-80 n.

158
s'accomplit dans I'instant; elle est attente et choix,
extase et ^eriexion, risque et gain, vie et mort , avenir
qui reparait comme passe, passe qui se projette en avenir;
contact et conflit; tension constante entre le fini ex
I'infini. L'existant est done instaile aans un etat ou
les extremes opposes sont toujours donnes ensemble, dans
leur opposition meme.^
This attempted union of the Hegelian dialectic with
the Socratic emphasis upon the ethical individual, is probably
the profoundest side of Kierkegaard, It will do no gooa to
flee either to logic or to the Absolute to solve the dilemmas
which the existing individual in history must face. One can
only gird his loins about him and play the man as an ethical
inaividual. This may be the way of a cross, but it is the
way of virtue. The qualitative transitions which are ere- *
ated within the tensions of the existing individual can neva?
be vicariously overcome by logical synthesis. Character and
the ability to love, come only when the inward man is devel-
oped through continued decision for the right. He must give
birth to both the conditions for truth and the truth itself.
In our return to Socrates we must not return to reminiscence
"The individual through strain and suffering becomes what he
becomes , " '^S
Until his death SK slashed at the Hegelian faith that
logic, not the passionate individual, performs the synthesis.
His arguments up until the vevj end were cast in the form of
a ridicule of him v/ho ontinues to deny his own existence.
Let him (the Hegelian) be asked if he ever confronts
35. Jolivet, Art., 137.
36. Swenson, SAK, 119.
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the future so as to act vvith passion ana decisiveness.
If he answer this last question in "che negative, he must
forgive an etnical indiviaual for asserting with indig-
nation and dramatic truth that such a philosopher is a
nincompoop. . But if he answer in the aff ii'mat ive , he will
be compelled to aomit that there is then for him an
' either- or .
*
Swenson, SAR, 80.

CHAPTER EIGHT
OBJECT IV rrr
In one of the exceptionally clear passages wher® the
problem of a proof for Christianity is faced, SK makes it
quite clear that Christianity is never proved by a series
of objectively cominunicable proposition^.
There is only one proof of the truth of Christianity
ana that, quite rightly, is from -che emotions, vvhen
the dread of sin and a heavy conscience torture a man
into crossing the narrow line between despair border-
ing upon maaness--and Christendom. Ihs re lies Chris-
tianity.-^
If Christianity is an emotional experience, it follows that
impassionate forms of objectivity are non-Christ ian. For
this reason we include objectivity as the third and final
example of the meaning of indecision ana spiritlessness in
SK.
A. The Meaning of Objective.
Since words have a way of fooling us, it is best that
we be certain v/e have grasped the meaning of the tenn ob-
jective in the literature, lest we be led astray. We general-
ly think of objective as the quality of an object existing
1. Kierkegaard, JSK, §926.
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"out there," independent of the evaluating subject. The
objective is reality in itself. If this were the sense in
which is using the v^ord when he says, for instance, that
Christ for the Christian is a subjective, not an objective,
truth, then existentialism vould easily reduce to skepticism.
But this is not the way the word is employed. The term can
be best understood if v/e recall SK's use of the word sub -
jective
,
hiubjective does not mean that reality which exists
only by virtue of one's interests, as when a frightened per-
son sees ghosts in the grave yard which actually are not
there. It means, rather, Exis tenz ; personal interestedness
,
character change, spiritual development, moving concern.
Inwardness
,
perhaps, better expresses the thought than sub-
jectivity.
The term objective is the converse of subjective as
Exis tenz . SK is not debating whether the facts of Christian-
ity are objective in the sense of existing "out there."
What concerns him, on the contrary, is the question of whether
or not the thing to v/hich one gives his attention elicits
from him inward, personal concern. A. datiiiri is objective to
one only when it drav/s from him no interest, inwardness, or
concern. The objective is what is taken for granted. It
does not alter one inwardly. This relation may be illustrated
crudely by a hypothetical pile of rubbish lying on the other
siae of the street. The said datum may exist very rnxuch "out
there" so far as its being independent of what one thinks or
does about it is concerned. But "out-thereness " is not the

162
quality which makes the rubbish pile objective. It is ob-
jective because it happens to be that kina of a fact which
docs not stir up personal concern within the inaividual.
in like manner, the absolute paradox may exist as an
historical fact, and so may be called objective, but for bK,
Christ is objective to the individual only when He does not
succeed in changing the heart; ana He is subjective when He
Qoes
.
SK takes for granted the historicity of Christ. The
argument of the Fragment
s
rests upon the hypothesis that
Christ is an historical indiviaual. But such evidences can
neither strengthen nor weaken the subjective truth of Christ's
contemporaneity. By faith Christ is the equal possession of
all. Historicity is merely an occasion for discipleship. In
existentialism one is not closer to the kingdom just because
he happens to share in the historical accident of being near
to Christ auring the days of His humiliation. Unless Christ
passes from objectivity to subjectivity there is no salvation.
There is no aisciple at secona hand. The first and the
last are essentially on the same plane, only that a
later generation finds its occasion in the testimony of
a contemporary generation, while the contemporary finds
this occasion in its own immediate contemporaneity, and
in so far owed nothing to any other generation. But
this immediate contemporaneity is m.erely an occasion,
which can scarcely be expressed more emphatically than
in the proposition that the disciple, if he understood
himself, must wish that the immediate contemporary should
cease, by God's leaving the earth,
Let us note well this equivocation in the word objective.
2. Kierkegaard, ?F, 88.
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Christ is objective as a fact " out there," without question;
yet He is subjective in that he has meaning for an individual
only by changing the life of that individual for the gooa.
If we know what we mean, then, we can speak simultaneously
about Christ's objectivity ano subjectivity. It is necessary
to labor this distinction because not a few unsympathetic
commentators on refute the man too easily. After declar-
ing simply that existentialism reduces to subjectivism, they
pass on to a new topic, forgetting all the while that sub-
jective and objective for oK. have rich contextual meanings
v»rhich cannot be discounted.
The dialectic of inwardness reaches its high point
when the whole God entered into a whole individual person,
ano so became, in time, the God-Man. "The historical as-
sertion is that the Deity, the Eternal came into being at a
definite moment in time as an individual man."*^ It is this
historicity of the God-Man which serves as the basis for the
absolute paradox, that condition in the presence of which a
man is made passionate. rassion arises out of the contra-
diction invo Ived in basing "an eternal happiness upon the
relation to something historical."^
Christianity is an exist ence-communica-cion which makes
the thing of existing paradoxical ana difficult to a.
degree it never. was before and never can be outside of
Christ ianity .
^
3. Kierkegaard, CUP, bl2.
4. Ibid
. , 515.
5. Ibid. , 501.
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The success of the absolute paradox aoctrine turns on the
historicity of Christ as the God. man. "Here is something
historical, the story of Jesus Christ... it is historical
enough."^ If Christ were not historical, the paradox (and
faith) Vvould vanish. Yet after admitting the full objectiv-
ity of Christ, SK tells us that Christ and Christianity are
purely subjective.
It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with,
and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if
it exists at all; objectively, Christianity has abso-
lutely no existence. If its truth happens to be in only
a single subject, it exists in him alone; anu there is
greater Christ ian joy in heaven over this one inaiviaual
than over universal hista y ana the System, vvhich as ob-
jective entities are incommensurable for that which is
Christian.
'
The equivocation is solvea only by keeping in mina the way
that SK is using the terms objective and subjective. Chris-
tianity is historical, but it is not objective, since a
thing is objective only v^hen it fails to elicit the state of
personal concern.
Let us give the symbols "A" and "B" to these two ways
that objective is conventionally used. "A" means '^existing
out there"--in this sense Christianity is wholly objective.
"B" means "not causing inv/ard concern"--in Lais sense Chris-
tianity is wholly subjective. It is species "B" vhich SK
has in mind when he challenges both speculation ana apolo-
geticsj^ with objectivity, since these aisciplines are uncon-
cerned with establishing inwardness.
6. Kierkegaard, JSK, §1044.
7. Kierkegaard, CUi" , 116.

165
B. Anti-Historical.
SK, by being set for the defense of subjectivity, re-
coiled in dread v/henever Christianity was so congenially state.d
that an individual is deluded into confusing the factual com-
munication of Christianity with Christianity as inwardness.
It is only natural, therefore, that he looked with disfavor
upon the efforts of those who supposed that in establishing
the historical foundations of Christianity they haa thereby
secured Christ ianity. If one may rest in historical facts
rather than in Christ who transformea the soul, then he can
eat, drink, and be merry, for Christianity is quite safe and
secure "out there" regardless what he does about it.
Security in historical evidences destroys man. ^an
is spirit, and the more spiritual he is, i.e. , the more pas-
sionately inwara, the more actually he is a man. ¥vhatever is
a stumblingblock in the development of this inwardness,
therefore, must be combated. Historical evidences are one
example, since they form a block to inwaraness. So long as
one is convinced that Christianity securely rests upon good
historical foundations, believing that the intensity of his
Qualitative response neither adds to nor subtracts from that
security, that long will he continue to annihilate himself
as an existing individual. He vill have no inward concern.
Let us illustrate this. If a m.an believes that a chair must
be sat in, and yet also believes that the chair will either
support him or let him fall to the floor, depending upon how
he sits, he will have more passion drawn out of him than if
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his security in the chair is not conditioned in that manner.
'The more what is "out there" can either promote or destroy
my happiness, depending upon how I relate myself to it, the
more passionate I become when I face reality. Mere histor-
ical objectivity is frivolous, such as the question whether
there are ten blades of p;rass in the pot or nine. Ana pas-
sionate concern with triviality, such as the miser counting
his money, is idolatry. But anything which can make the
difference of one's gaining or losing his eternal happiness,
is of infinite importance and should encourage a maximum of
caution in the soul.
The God-Man in history may be auite objective as an
historical fact, but such a fact is useless to faith unless
the manner in which one relates himself to this historical
Christ determines his gain or loss of eternal happiness. It
is not the combined weight of historical evidences which de-
cides faith, for faith grows out of an inward desperation;
faith is a leap, an inward determination to risk all for
Christ. The historian is like the speculator: he may set
up the problem of thought, but he cannot bring the inaivid-
ual an answer to the problem. Only when the individual is
concerned with himself is faith supported.
There is also an a priori reason why faith cannot be
based on historical evidence. At their best, historical
proofs cannot rise above probability, while faith requires
a foundation in absolute certainty. Biblical scholars may
go to great efforts to establish the trustworthiness of the
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Scriptures from a historical point of view, but faith re-
sponds that their conclusions are insufficient. "An approx-
imation, when viewed as a basis for an eternal happiness, is
wholly inadequate, since the incommensurability makes a re-
sult impossible."® Even if in eternity one worked over his-
torical facts, he could never pass beyond quantitative ap-
proximations .
If all the anp:els in heaven were to put their heads to-
gether, they could still bring to pass only an approxi-
mation, because an approximation is the only certainty
attainable for historical knowledge--but also an in-
adequate basis for' an eternal happiness,^
Kierkegaard does^ot soon forget his tribute to Lessing. One
cannot by quantitative evidences pass over to the qualitative
leap of faith. Faith rests on a determination of the will to
believe that infinite stakes are being risked.
Another reason why historical eviaences are of insig-
nificant value to serve faith is that they threaten to undo
the primacy of the individual.
In historical knowledge, the subject learns a great deal
about the world, but nothing about himself. He moves
constantly in a sphere of approximat ion-knowleage , in
his supposed possibility deluding himself with the sem-
blance of certainty; but certainty can be had only in
the infinite, where he cannot as an existing subject
rem-ain, out only repeatedly arrive.-^'-'
Kierkegaard has defended the hypothesis tnat the only reality
that a man can absolutely Know is himself and his ethical
life. If this conclusion is true, it follcws that when one
8. Kierkegaard, GUr, 25
i?. Ibid . , 51.
10. Ibid. , 75.
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looks to other than himself for courage, he has in the act
forfeited the prirriacy of his own ethical iife. i-'urthermore
,
as earlier noted, history can be learned bv rote. A lecture
course in sacred history is just anotner assignment to the
man without faith. He taK.es aown the notes, yawns frequent-
ly, and then, quite unedified, save for the illusory pride
that he has increased his wisdom, he zips up his notebook
and goes to the stuaent commons. One may receive "A" in
Bible and still possess not a single grain of faith..
Nor is this the end of the story. Because history ap-
pears so secure, so objective, it actually stands in the way
of the individual's coming to himself inwardly. It requires
a man of great fortitude to see all of the evidences and
still be inv/ara. Hit-torical evidences are like the posses-
sion of riches: it is easier for a camel to pass through the
eye of a needle than for the m.an who reposes in history to
enter into the existential kingdom of heaven.
On the contrary, in this objectivity one tends to lose that
infinite personal interes tedne ss in passion which is the
condition of faith, the ubique et nusquam in vi/hich faith
can come into Deing, Has anyone who previously had.
faith gained anything v/ith respect to its strength and
power? No, not in the least. Rather is it the case
that in this voluminous knowledge, this certainty that
lurks at the door of faith and threatens to devour it,
he is in so dangerous a situation that he will need to
put forth much effort in sreat fear ana trembling , lest
he fall a victim to the temptation to confuse knov/ledge
with faith. Vvhile faith has hitherto had a profitable
schoolmaster in the existing uncertainty, it would have
in the nev; certainty its most dangerous enemxy. For if
passion is eliminated, faith no longer exists, and cer-
tainty and passion qo not go together . Whoever believes
that there is a G-od ana an over-ruling providence finas
it easier to preserve his faith, easier to acquire soiie-
thing that definitely is faith, and not an illusion, in
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an imperfect v/orld where passion is kept alive, than in
an absolutely perfect vorld. In such a Vvorld faith is
in fact unthinkable
On the surface SK seems to have emasculated Christian-
ity by seekinr^ to float it independently of an historical
foundation. The problem is simply this: if inwardness, not
objective evidences, is the thing, then will not a chimera
do for faith as well as Christ? The end of inwardness justi-
fies the means. Since there aoes not seem to be anything in
the literature to gainsay this suggestion, no effort will
here be made to relieve SK of his embarrassment. The follow-
ing mitigating consideration mitht be added, however: Even
though SK is unable to stop the momentum toward subjectivism
which he has initiated by his retreat from objectivity, he
can always countercharge that the possession of historical
evidences, though not a basis of faith, nevertheless need
not be rejected by faith; for they, like riches, may be used
faithfully for righteousness. A Christian can be rich with
worldly goods, as Christ teaches, just as long as he holds
these goods so lightly that they are never allowed to become
an end in themselves. In reacting against that aead ortho-
aoxy of his day in which the recitation of a creed or the im-
plicit trust in evidences had displaced the real art of Chris-
tian living, SK perhaps went too far; but the principle he
tried to follov^ contains some truth. As Christ told the man
who trusted in his riches that he could come to salvation
11. Kierkegaard, GUF , 30 (italics ours).
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only after he had given away all he had to the poor, so also
c^K advises that he who rests in objective eviaences can be-
come inward only v.hen he has said farewell to his supports.
Just as the man is not saved who lustfully seeks comfort in
riches, so also the historian cannot know reoemption who
trusts in historical facts rather than Christ.
The call for proof exposes a wickedness in Lhe heart.
If a man believed, he would not need proof; ana if he needs
proof, he does not believe. "When faith thus begins to lose
its passion, then faith begins to cease zo be faith, then a
proof becomes necessary so as to command respect from the
side of unbelief . "'•''^
The humor to which SK appeals, to make the seeker af-
ter historical evidences look pitiful in his ovvn eyes, is
typical of the master from Copenhagen. Ke caricatures the
individual patiently standing for a week in a long line,
supposing that at the end he will receive breaa, only to
learn at the termination of his passionate vigil that the
line is for the payment of taxes. The line is actually formed
at the aoor of the rrivatdocent who has just returnea from an
archaeological trip to ir'alestlne, seeking to settle forever
the question of the historicity of Christianity. The individ-
ual waits passionately to hear Lhe verdict, since he believes
that he can no longer have faith in Christ if the v.ord of the
rrofessor happens to be negative. But all his tension is
12. Kierkegaard, CUi' , 31.
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ill expended, since objective evidences have nothing to do
with the creation of the act of faith. Faith must arise out
of the heart of a man despairing of himself. Ihe stages on
life's way exclude the possibility of a man's coming to Christ
unshattered. Faith arises only when the self is no longer a
way of escape. Faith is like the cry of the man in the burn-
ing hotel when he learns that all of the exits are cut off.
For this reason objective evidences are a block to faith.
They form a fire escape. They contain their own self-recom-
mendation. In relation to them, the individual continued
unshattered, unaffected, unbroken inwaraly.
G. Apologetics.
bince aefensive formulations of Christianity, as il-
lustrated in the sundry forms of philosophical proofs for
G-od , fall into the same state of opprobrium as historical
evidences, SK's opposition continues its same high pitch at
this point. V/hereas Kierkegaard soUfi-ht to have man break
with himself and immanence, apologetics seeks to fill in the
gap between the quantilative evidences ana the qualitative
leap of faith. Apologetics makes the mistake of trying to
formulate Christianity in such a way that an individual can
come to Christ on his own terms. It seeks to remove all of
the risk in becoming a Christian. For these reasons Kierke-
gaard felt that his relation to apologetics could only be neg-
ative.
SJ\ believed that there were few greater hindrances to
the development of Christianity in history than the apologetes
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of the church. When Christianity began its witness to the
world, instead of just ignorine: the wrath of the pagans and
their volumes of words hurled against the Christian faith,
the apologetes rushed to the defense of Glii'istianity as an
objective system of truth. In so doing they lowered Chris-
tianity to those standards which the pagans might respect.
The pagan aoes not want to be inward. He wants to repose in
the truth, assuredly , but only such truth as is congenial to
his own selfishness. Therefore, when the apologetes tried
to accomodate Christianity to forms which the unshattered pa-
gan could appreciate, they unwittingly gave Christianity the
kiss of death.
They sought by reasons to prove the truth of Christianity,
or to adduce reasons in support of it. And these rea-
sons— they begat aoubt , and doubt became the stronger.
For the proof of Christianity really consists in 'fol-
lowing. ' Tha-c they aid away with. So they felt the
need of reasons; but these reasons, or the fact that
there are reasons, is alreaay a sort of doubt— and so
doubt arose ana thrived upon the reason, T hey did not
observe that the more reasons one adduces, the more on©
nourished doubt ana the stronger it becomes, that to
present doubt with reasons with the intent of slaying
it is like giving to a hungry monster one v/ants to be
rid of the delicious food it likes, -^"^
SK recommended that Christians refrain from parleying with
the pagan, telling the latter only to follow Christ. The
Christian may set uo Christianity as a i^roblem of thought,
but he must never encourage the pa^ n to believe that apart
from the subjective leap of faith he can come to the kingaom.
The early apostles were, in bK's view, too busy following
13, Kierkegaard, FSJY, 88.
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Christ to fret themselves about proofs. "Their lives were
too full of effort... to be able to sit in idleness and deal
with reason and doubts, odds, or evens. "''^ The task of be-
ing inward is such a full-time assignment, that anybody who
takes it seriously will have time for nothing else.
The apologetes forgot that the Christian faith is kept
venturesome by being founded on the double paradox. On the
one hand. Christian faith is a paradox because one must base
his eternal happiness upon historical probability; ana on
the other, the very historical fact itself is an absolute
paradox, quite incomprehensible to the mind, since the whole
God became a whole indiviaual in time. Strangely, therefore,
in the name of Christian activity the apologetes were set
for the defense of the faith. "For the defense wishes out
of the goodness of its heart, to take the possibility of of-
fense away.' Remove the offense ana, as in speculation,
you remove the faith. Without offense Christianity is just
another religion. Its distinctiveness is lost ana it may
be abandonea without diminution of values to man. "Take
away from Christianity the possibility of offense ... and then
lock the churches, the sooner the better, or make them into
recreation centers,"-'-^
?ihile the apologete believes that it is easier to oe-
lieve in Christianity if the weight of probable evidences is
more in its favor than against it, SK cannot so agree. In
14. Kierkegaard, FSJY, 88.
15. ?iierkegaard
,
WL, 162.
16. Ibid. ,^162-16 3.
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the Fragments he attempts a proof that the first disciples
stood in no more advantageous a relation to Christ than ao
the last. The first aisciples had Christ and so do we, and
that is that. "There is not and never can be a disciple at
second hand."-^''' If there were an advantage to living at one
time in history rather than another, then the accident which
makes up that advantaae v/ould take the place of the primacy
of faith, ana Christianity as inwardness woula again be cor-
rupted. A qualitative metabasis of faith cannot result from
probable evidences. "To make such an assertion about faith
is to slander it,"-'-®
In reading SK at this point one cannot help but vro n-
der if in his enthusiasm for the establishment of subjectiv-
ity he has not become blindea to healthy Biblical emphases.
Throughout the whole Bible I our only source for the meaning
of Christianity) the believers took great apologetic coirifort
from the miracles ana signs v.-hich were performed by Christ
and those sent by Kim. An apologia of Christianity was very
much r espected. Christ debated v;ith the doctors in the temple
even as did the apowtles in the synagogues vi th the Jews and
on common ground with the pagans (e.g. Athens). Thomas had
his faith strengthened by handling Christ. raul was even
willing to abandon Christianity if the resurrection proved
not true (I Corinthians lb). Peter pleads a readiness for
defense ( apologia ) as part of one's witness to the pagans
17. Kierkegaard PP, 85.
18. Ibid.
,
""79.

175
(I feter 3:1b). John apologetically speaks of the norci v/hich
the apostles touched, looked upon, ana conversed with (I John
1:1). It v/oula be extremely aifficult to establish Siv's
thesis that the apostles were too t)usy following to trouble
themselves with apologetics, therefore, ana one cannot re-
frain from wonaering if Kierkegaard is historically inaccur-
ate in such apparent truths, whether he be trusted in the
broader question that Christianity is subjectivity?
But be that as it may, there can be no auestion but
what existentialism can acc(^odate a serious apologetics only
with reservations and embarrassm.ents . The reason for this is
that a break v;ith irninanence entails an anti-intellectual in-
wardness.
Er ist radikaler Antiintellektualist : Gott kann nach
ihm nicht auf gedanklichem Wege erreicht werden, der
christliche Glaube ist widerspruchsvoll und jeder
Versuch, ihn zu rat ionalisieren
,
G-otteslasterung. -^^
In attacking the proofs for God, SK waxes not a little
eloquent. He sums up his objections in a rather Humean
fashion: the v^orld is finite; therefore Goa, who is infinite,
cannot be proved by the vvorld. There is no evidence that the
probability of a finite God's existence ever entered into the
picture. "objective dread," SK»s term for the problem of
evil, receives very little treatment. The reason for this
is that SK is concerned only ¥/ith inwardness, not nature.
SK presupposes that Goa is wholly other than the worla. This
transcendence must be preserved so that the incarnation might
19. Bochenski, EFG, 16U-161.
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be nothing less than the absolute paradox. To insure a re-
tention of this barbed paraaox as a basis for passionate
living, therefore, the apologetic task of proving Gog must
be terminated. "If G-oa does not exist it v/oula of course be
impossible to prove it; ana if he does exist it would be
folly to attempt it."^*^ Faith dictates that a man must live
either for or against Goa, leaving off attempted theoretical
proofs. The only proof for Goa that there is, is the living
individual himself who has taken God seriously enough to
mediate God's love in time.
Oh, these -gr oofs which are advanced for the truth of
Christianity, these devilish learned and profound and
perfectly convincing proofs which have filled folios,
upon v/hich 'Christendom' plumes itself as the btate does
upon the army, what do they all amount to in comparison
V7ith...a living, and the possibility of a career thrown
into the bargain?^-^
If a man wants to prove God, let him quit the folly of the-
oretical demonstration and start loving his neighbor as him-
self. "God is love, therefore we can resemble God only in
loving.
.
.V'/hen you love your neighbor, then you resemble God.
Only as a fool dealing with fools will even stoop
to discuss the theoretical proofs themselves. The ontological
argument, for example, is quite fallacious, for it is simply
another Instance of the folly of reason's attempt to pass
from logic as a framev/ork of possibility to reality "out
there." The argument either presupposes the conclusion that
20. Kierkegaard, i'P, 51.
21. Kierkegaard, KAC , 145.
22. Kierkegaard, WL, 52.
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God does exist, in which it is no argument at all, or it is
agnostic about the existence, in which case it is just plain
stupidity.
When it is argued that God must possess all perfections,
or that the highest being must have ail perfections, ex-
istence is a perfection; ergo , God or the highest be-
ing must exist: this entire movement or thought is de-
ceptive. For if Goa is not really conceived as exist-
ing in the first part of the argument zhe argument can-
not even get started. It vvculd then reaa about as fol-
lows : 'A supreme being who aoes not exist must possess
all perfections including that of existence; ergo , a
supreme being \mo does not exist does exist. ' This
woula be a strange conclusion. Either the supreme be-
ing was non-existent in the premises, and came into ex-
istence in the conclusion, which is quite impossible;
or he was existent in the premises, in which case he
cannot come into existence in the conclusion.'^'-*
If by the simple expedient of rational arguments the existence
of GoQ could be establishea, then the hard work of living as
an existentialist would be obviated, and one could go home
to rest. Should logic 9x10. not the individual be the meaiator
between time and eternity, SK would be handing over the olive
branch of victory to Hegel.
It v.ill not do to turn to Lhe historical Christ as a
basis of proof for God, either, since Christ, being a human
being as well as true God, haa all of his attributes of deity
hidden by flesh. Christ is the incognito. If he were not
veiled as God He would not be the object of historical study,
for GoQ has no parts or passions. "Ana so unrecognizableness
,
the absolute unrecognizableness, is this: being Goa, to be
also an individual man."'^^ When people tooK up stones to put
23. Kierkegaard, GW, 298.
24. Kierkegaard, TG, 127.
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Christ to death, they did so blinded by the humanity. They
did not want to see merely Vvorks of love; they wanted to see
Groa himself. "Direct recognizableness is precisely the char-
acteristic of the pagan goa,"'^^ It was in living a life of
love that Christ revealed the meaning of the hidden nature of
(jod. If Christ had come out openly and declared his unveiled
divinity, then the purpose of the incognito v/ould have been
destroyed and the virtue of the maieutic mxethod corrupted.
Christ v/anted to elicit the act of inward faith from those who
were called by him. They had to believe against their under-
standing, since the attribution of the incommunicable attri-
butes of deity to a finite human being in history entails an
absolute contradiction. Objectively, the incarnation is pure
nonsense, let, it is this offense which keeps faith, faith.
The sin of the apologist is that he shares the giilt
of the preacher by trying to reduce the offense in the incar-
nation ana to make the coming of God in the flesh palatable
to the ng.tural man who will believe only that which is con-
tinuous with his reason. But the effort is in vain. "The
infinite Qualitative difference between G-oa and man"'^^ sullies
any attempt to make their coincidence in one person an easy
arrangement. As Christ "is qualitatively aifferent from every
other man and therefore must refuse direct coirirnunication , He
requires faith, requires that He become the object of faith .
25. Kierkegaard, TC, 135.
26. Ibid
.
, 139.
27. Ibid. , 142.
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He v;ho persists in his belief that one can start with
a human being and work from there up to Goa, only adds more
humor and pathos to the already pathetic situation. By col-
lecting footprints in the sand one may establish the exis-
tence of man or of an animal, but such an induction will not
prove successful in a search for God. If Goa is liKe man,
then He is not God at all.
If Goa and man resemble one another to that degree, if
they have that degree of kinship, and thus essentially
are included in the sairxc. quality, the conclusion, ' ergo
it was Goa,' is nevertheless humbug; for if God is
nothing else but that, then God doesn't exist at all.
But if God exists, and consequently is distinguished by
an infinite difference of quality from all that it means
to be a man, then neither can I nor anybody else, by
beginning with the assumption that He was a man, arrive
in ail eternity at the conclusion, 'therefore it was
God. ' Everyone who has the least dialectical training
can easily perceive that the whole argument about c on-
seauences is incommensurable with the decision of the
Question whether it is God, and that this aecisive Ques-
tion is presented to man in an entirely aifferent form:
whether he will «^ believe th&.t He is v/hat Pie saia He
was; or whether he will not believe .^^
There is no more beautiful side to Kierkegaard than
this. When defining decorum in the presence of Goa, SK is
surely the Emily Post of existentialism. If a tree is worthy
of attention, a aog of affection, ana a man of love, then the
only possible worthy relation that dust can have to the whol-
ly other is that of prostrate worship. The gap between one
man and another is great, yet it can be fillea in by deeds
of kindness. But the gap between God and man is infinite.
Therefore, nothing but worship will bridge it.. " Vt or ship is
28. Kierkegaard, TG, 31.
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the maximum axpresslon for the God-relationship of a human
being, and hence also for his likeness with Crod, because the
qualities are absolutely different." Infinity merits in-
finite response. The closest that one can exis tentially come
to this is to v-'orship.
The Christian order of living is, once again, not un-
like that of the sage of Athens. Socrates would not risk his
venture in virtue until he had first made bui'e of U-oa before
he began.
He always presupposes Bod's existence, and unaer this
presupposition seeks to interpenetrate nature with the
idea of purpose. Haa he been asked why he pursued this
method, he would doubtless have explained that he lacked
the courage to venture out upon so perilous a voyage of
discovery without having made sure of God's existence
behind him.
^
Speculation comes too late to help man, for one neeas the in-
ward assurance of God before he can begin the art of living
at any point. Paith, therefore, must not be tardy. Faith
is the prior act of comjnitment in relation to ich every-
thing else is made significant. Until one integrates himself
through faith, he is not yet fully a man. But, paradoxically,
when he tries to becom.e a man he cannot. Gut of this aespair
faith comes, "When the aialectical contradiction brings his
passion to the point of despair, ana helps him to embrace
God with the 'category of despair ,'" "^-^ then there is meaning
to living. An inward assurance of Goa
-is like nourislriment in
29. Kierkegaard, CUi^ , 369.
30. Kierkegaard, r'F, 34-35,
31. Kierkegaard, GUf , 179 n.
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the arteries: unless it is there, strength to do anything
else is wanting. God exists for a man only when he lets go
of himself tma learns to aepend upon the infinite for strength.
"Freedom ia the true wonaerful lamp; when a man rubs it with
ethical passion, Goa comes into being for him."'^^
Vifhen one supposes that by a theoretic refutation of the
existence of God, he has removed the basis for faith, he has,
in oK's opinion, missed the point. SK outflanks such r efuta-
tions of Goa by insisting that the act of faith carries along
v.'ith it its own proof. The absense of theoretical support
is no more damaging to faith than is the presence of such
a support to create it. bocrates is once again infinitely
more profound than the speculators.
Christianity teaches Lhat eveiything Christian exists
only for faith; for trjis reason precisely it wills to
be a Socratic, a Godfearing ignorance, which by ignor-
ance Qfcfends faith against speculation, keeping watch
to see that the aeep gulf of qualitative aistinction
between God/ and man m.&y be firmly fixed, as it is in
the paraaox ana in faith, lest Goa/ana man, still more
dreaafully than ever it occurred in paganism, might in
a way, philos ophice
,
poetice
,
etc., coalesce into one
...in the ^System.
L). The Established Institution.
At no point in the literature does SK more thoroughly
ignore his decorum as an existentialist lovingly to mediate
time and eternity in his ov;n person, ihen when his invectives
against the established institution are released. If a
Christian may entertain a righteous indignation, SK assumed
32. KierKegaard, CUF , 124.
33. Kierkegaard, SD, 161.
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his share. i^assing completely over th« faithful defenders
of the truth in the Danish church, SK denounced the visible
Institution as a stumbling block to Christianity. The ob-
jective creeds, rituals, ana hierarchical orders stood in
the way of subjectivity. In and of themselves, such means
of Frace may not be harmful, so long as they are kept means.
But SJ:-. felt that the trappings of the established church,
likfc the riches of the wealthy, had become an end in themselves
and therefore oUfiht to be indicted.
Against so many vvho rested comfortably in a Gothic
church building aown the street or in their inclusion mxthin
an apostoiically blessed hierarchy, bK contends once again
that probability in any form is an insufficient basis for
faith.
With respect to an historical fact, I cajn obtain only
an approximation. My father has told me so, the
church record attests it, I have a certificate, and
so forth. Oh, yes, my mind is at rest.*^
The tragedy of reposing in the visible institution is that
faith is stifled. The humor is that one is tryin,^ desperate-
ly to base his eternal happiness upon a relation of bricks,
statues, and altftrs, or upon a host of robed attendants.
Doctrine is very necessary for a speculative system.,
but "Christianity is not a doctrine but an existential comi-
munication expressing an existential contradiction."'^^ The
only test for orthodoxy is whether a m.an is passionately
34. Kierkegaard, CW , 4 3.
35. Ibid. , 339.
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living or not. The speculative consistency of doctrine may
serve the ancillary role of giving historical continuity to
Christianity ana the church, but such a problem of thought
must not be confused with Christianity itself. If Christian-
ity were a doctrine, then it would be but Quantitatively dif-
ferent from the pa^ n religions. One could only argue with
the pagan that Christianity was a little more coherent than
his faith. Against such degrees of truth SK revolts that
Christianity is absolutely different from all religions, as
it alone interprets existence itself paradoxically. Doctrine
is an intellectual re Ja tionship
,
compatible with all of the
corruptions of immanence. "Christianity is therefore not a
doctrine, but the fact that God has existed."*^ Objective
trust in the church or in doctrine is too trifling a matter
for a man of faith to dabble with. "It is just as impossible
to be mirrored in an objective aoctrine as to be mirrored in
a wall."'^'^
The blinding effect of an objective representation of
Christianity is illustratea in SK's interpretation of infant
baptism. Such baptism, vvhile it is "an expression for the
piety of the parents,"^® ana vvhile it may effectively serve
as "an anticipation of the possibility,"'^^ is yet of aetri-
m.ent to the church because it makes the inwara struggle of
becoming a Christian all the more aifficult. Kitual gives a
36. Kierkegaard, CUP, 290-291.
37. Kierkegaard, FSJY, 68.
38. Kierkegaard, CUP, 340.
39. Ibia. , 532.
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man whereof to trust, so ttiat he does not have to become
serious with his inwardness. "The less outwaraness, the
more inwaraness . "'^^ EmbarKed on the course of making Hien
inward, therefore, SK. felt the onus upon him to challenge
all of those forces which were set for the overthrow of
seriousness. "In an age when the progress of culture ana
the like has made it seem so easy to become a Christian, it
is quite in order to seek to make it aifficult . "^-^
The bitter sarcasms in the Attack upon "Christendom "
can be understood and^^ (partially) forgiven only when one
remembers that SK seriously believed that in Denmark the ma-
chinery of Christianity was so efficient thet it could pro-
Quce a do^en Christians with more facility than one could
make a pound of yellow butter.
'And that's very easily aone , it's nothing at all:
let's get hold of the children, then each child is given
a drop of water on the head--then he is a Chr-istian. If
a portion of them don't even g:et their drop, it comes
to the same thing, if they imagine they got it, and
imagine consequently that they are Christians. So in
a very short time we have more Christians than there
are herring in the herring season'. '^'^
Although at times bK longed for the monastery himself,
in his more existential moments he included monastic out-
wardness in the general fallacy of mistaking a temporal for
an absolute telos. The monastic laeal is infinitely superior
to the comfortable life of speculation, indeed, since it is
"the expression for a passionate decis ion. ""^ The monk is
40. Kierkegaard, CUT, 341.
41. Ibid
.
, 542.
42. Kierkegaard, KAG, 147,
43. Kierkegaard, GUF, 360.
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supposed to live absolutely anyway, and that is a more
stringent requirement than goes along v.ith the office of be-
ing a i'rivat docent , But the monastic ideal has capitulated
too easily to externalism. Like the backv.ard pupil Vi'ho rushes
to the teacher a moment after the problem has been announced,
proudly aisplayinf" his answer, only to have it marked wrong
because of a failure to grasp the full implications of the
assignment; so the monastery m.isses the profundity of what
it means to live absolutely. It has created "for itself a
conspicuous expression in a distinct and special outwardness.
As a consequence it became, in spite of all, only relatively
different from every other outwardness."'^'^ Counting beads in
a basket and fasting tv^ice a day are not to be confused with
the task of existentially mediating time and eternity through
passionate living.
This suggestion, that one lives bet.ter for Christ among
men than in the aesert, is the nearest sign of a social p,os-
pel in bK. If exploited, it mif-.ht have turned vv'hat is now a
one-sidedness in the literature into a full-orbed view of
Christianity.
In contending with the mystic, likewise, makes
reference to this unexplored side cf Christianity. The mystic
not only confuses himself with God, and so degrades both him-
self and deity, but he alls o substitutes a vi'ithdrav/al from the
v;orld for the real art of living, supposing that abnegation
44. Kierkegaard, GU]:' , 363
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is Christianity.
The life of the mystic aispleases me because I regard
it as a deceit against the world in which he lives,
against the men to v/hom he is bound by obligations and
with v/hom he might have come into relationship if he
had not been pleased to become a mystic. '^^
When one confuses himself with deity, he is no longer an in-
dividual, for he has ceased from the spiritual life. The
monk ana the mystic, by a common withdrawal from the ta^k
of living, share in the aeceits of believing that absolute
inwardness can be haa through the paltry assignment of an
external ritual, Vvhen all they accomplish is a negative at-
tempt to call attention to themselves.
45. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 205.

PART FOUR
KIERKEGAARD'S APFIRIVIATIVE CRITERIA

CHAPTER WINE
FAITH
A. Transition.
VJhen v/e pass from the negative to the affirmative
criteria in bK, a raison d'etre of our procedure is called
f cr • Is not invvard feeling; the only adequate way affirmative-
ly to learn of Christianity's truth? The analogy of the mys-
tic vision of God may serve us here. Negatively, the mystic
can accurately assure the uninitiated that the richness of
the vision is not this and not that; but £vQm beyond that his
attempt to communicate meaning is illicit because of the na-
ture of the mystic experience itself. Only by one's passing
through the experience can there be assurea to the inquirer
what otherv.'ise must remain ineffable. And so in SK, does it
not follow that the emotional experience of Christianity is
the only affirmative way to learn of the doctrine?
The problem is difficult, but not insurmountable. IT
we may dravj a aistinction here, more scholastico , a helpful
clarification will result. LeL us Qistin^uish between inward
Christian experience, on the one hand, ana the reasons why a
person ought to become a Christian, on the other . The an-
nounced problem of the dissertation is, ie t us recall, to lay
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bare the criteria which bK chose to secure his postulate that
truth is subjectivity, ana not the interior anatomy of those
emotions which make up the subjective experience of Chris-
tianity itself. These aspects overlap, doubtlessly, but there
is a valid aifference between them. The exp erience of Chris-
tianity m.ay be a private affair, but surely it is a public
concern whether or not people ouaht to become Christians in
the first place.
The following points buttress our conviction that bK»s
reader has a right to expect positive reasons v;hy he ought to
put himself into the position of being converted to Christian-
ity:
First , SK is proposing a live solution to the very
pressing problem of how to guarantee indiviauality by becoming
a Christian. ITie Christian solution to the problem is assumed
to be better than one proffered by the t^rivataocent of the
university. But the question which rises in the mina of the
reader immediately is, however, the following: Better, accord-
ing to what ? Some answer to this quev^j must be found. The
act of amassing negative criteria to stand as signposts to
warn the reader why^^einr a Christian is a bad thing, is a
wholesome assignment; but unless it is fortressed by positive
arguments, it is a truncated expenditure of effort. Negative
standards narrow covin a field of possibilities, but they ao
not go on to identify.
To say a piano is not a rhizome is to give us no clues
to the principle of inaiviauation in the piano which
separates it from all other things which are likewise
not rhizomes. For example, we know that a piano is not
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a rhizome, but that does not distinguish it from a
nautilus which is also not a rhizome.-^
There is no other alternative. Unless SK supplies unambiguous
positive criteria why one ought to accept the proposition
that truth is subjectivity, the reader vuill be unable to Dis-
tinguish the Kierkegaardian solution, which happens to be
anti-rational, anti-Hegelian, ana anti-objective, from the
multifarious other candidates for the office of religious
experience which likewise claim such negative characteristics.
The only way to skirt the force of this conclusion is
to propose the following unlikely hypothesis: When SK speaks
of truth , he is really only expressing his own personal taste,
such as, that he likes spinach or that ^unaay walks are
pleasant. If such an hypothesis proves true, then let the
curtain fall. De gustibus non est disputandum . But if SK
is actually proposing an objective structure of truth (this
is the only worthy thesis one can defend), and if SK is in
earnest that his system is better than that of others, the
question miay richtfully still be asKed, Better in relation to
what ?
Second , it is not licit for one to define his system
of thought in such a vmy that questions of affirmative cri-
teria are ruled out a priori . A system-not-in-need-of-
verification must be as much chosen by the reader as the sys-
tem- in-need-of-verification. Ana unless one is to choose by
flipping a coin or drawing straws (solutions which are of-
1. Garnell, IGA, 142
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fensively non-Klerkegaardian, for they destroy individuality
by demanding no Inward passion), then some positive ground
must be advanced as the basis for the choice. Ivieaning;ful
decisions ought always to be made in the light of meaningful
juagments
.
Third, if SK hes no interest to scaffold affirmative
reasons to support the right of one zo decide to become sub-
jective, Lhen let him not complain if his reaaer, when asked
to become a Christian, answers with an abrupt l\^einl i.ithout
sufficient reasons for being a Christ ian, it is no more mean-
ingful to decide for Christianity than against it. But is
not the very purpose of SK's authorship to make men Christians?
Fourth , because it is Ghr istia nity vh.ich SK is defend-
ing, a final justification for our pursuit is safeguarded.
Both Old^ and New Testament'^ wr'iters encourage their reaaers
to seek affirmative proofs. Would it be fair to require more
credulity of a modern than an ancient reader?
Another buttressing consiaeration stems out of the
fact that practically all of the secondary sources extract
from Kierkegaard's existentialism affirmative c rit eria of
one sort or another. Their conclusions are not always of
equal worth, to be sure, but the fact that they do come to
conclusions is significant for our ourposes. The following
2. "Let them bring their witnesses, that they may be justi
fied; or let them hear , and say, it is truth." Isaiah 43:9.
3. "Eeloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the
spirits." I John 4:1 (R.S.V. )
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samples from standard Kierkegaardian commentators illustrate
the sweep of these conclusions.
Bretall announces criteria v-/hich are compatible with
philosophic disciplines. This is partially understanaable
when v;e remember that Bretall himself is a philosopher.
It is true that Adolf Hitler was an existential thinker,
of sorts; so are most of the inmates of insane asylums.
To this charge, so frequently brought against existen-
tialism, there is a oragmatic answer--and another which
applies to Christianity alone. The praginatic answer
consists simply in pointing out that the false 'ulti-
miates ' refute themselves in experience: they lead to the
disintegration of a personality and not to its unifica-
tion. The other is that Christianity by definition ex-
cludes irrationalisn: the 'choice' here cannot possibly
be arbitrary, because it is the choosing of Eternity in
time
There are reasons to question v/hether these criteria,
though somewhat suggestive, are really harmonious with the
spirit of the real Kierkegaard. The following arguments bear
up our conviction.
First
,
pragmatic fruits are gL ose partners with ob-
jectivity. But a careful reading of SK assures us ttm t when
subjectivity is lost, SK himself is lost. The native iSK is
uninterested in objectivity. buch fruits may by by-products
of the Christian struggle for inwardness, but th^ m^ust not
be used as a support for that conflict itself. One is to
quest for inaivi duality , not an integrated relation to an en-
vironment; and each man alone must calculate the cost involved
to nurture his own spiritual life.
Second
,
pragraatice fruits themselves threaten to be-
4. Bretall, KA, xxi.
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come new forms of refuge, which stand in the way of pristine
decision for inwardness. It was against any such potential
havens uf refuge that oK fired his most powerful salvos.
Third, the master of existentialism himself did not
come into the enjoyment of pragm^atic fruits. As his life be-
came the more bitter, a rancor and censoriousness set into
his soul, revealing the fact that, thouph he was aoing his
utmost to be a Christian, he by no means enjoyed integrating
pragmatic fruits.
He v/as not able to find 'the freedom of the Christian
man. ' Salvation lay for him in the future; this life
was hope and suffering, but hardly more. He remained
to the end a Johannes Climxacus, one who wished to be a
Christian but was not yet one. Though in the last
phase he seemed to have broken throuti;h to a decision,
it was death which saved him from discovering how un-
certain was the ground on vi/hich he stooa.^
May the disciple Iook for blessings v*hich the master was
denied? We see an a fortiori argument here.
Fourth, as for the suggestion that Christianity ex
hypothesi excludes an irrational decision, is this consistent
vith SK's postulate that it is b^ the absurd the Christian
decision comes? "For the absura is the object of faith, and
the only object that can be believed."® If Christianity were
not absurd to the intellect, It would be inefficient (in SK's
estimation; to serve as the basis for that existence decision
vjhich shatters hopes of continuity and idleness of complacency
in the exist inp: individual.
5. Allen, KLT, 206.
6. Kierkegaard, G^f , 189.
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Vt/liat now is the absurd? ihe absurd is— that the eter-
nal truth has come into being in time, that Gocl has come
into being, has been born, has grov/n up, ana so forth,
precisely like any other individual human being, quite
indistinguishable from other inaividuals
r'robably more to the point are these conclusions which
lean heavily upon the subjective side of SK. Wolf believes
that SK actually came into an inward peace ana reconciliation
through the forgiveness of sins.^ Thomte mentions suffering
and the consciousness of sin as sure conditions of religiosity.
Grene claims that SK can point to a peaceful inwara security
which (enigmatically) follows when the inaividual feels him-
self infinitely removed from God.-'-^ Faith for Swenson suc-
ceeds "in organizing and unifying the life."-^-^ Horton men-
tions the peace of an "extra dimension of reality, inacces-
sible to the cool intellect but accessible to sane warmer and
more vital faculty. ""^^
These suggestions are very much to the point, since
they avoid zhe danger of attributing criteria to SK which lie
outside of the existing inaividual himself. In this same
mood the dissertation will defend fb ur positive criteria:
faith, suffering, hope, ana love. All of these define in-
dividuality from one point of view or another. All strengthen
Christianity, if Christianity actually be subjectivity.
7. Kierkegaard, GUir', 188.
8. Wolf, ARSK, II, 288ff.
9. Thomte, Ki'R, 92.
10. Grene, DF, 58.
11. Int. to Geismar, LRTK, xl. The pragmatic facet to this
answer, however, is subject to the same objections as those
listed against Bretall.
12. Horton, CGT, 90.
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As conceded earlier in the dissertation, tihere is ae
facto only one possible affirmative criterion in bK, ana that
is inwaraness or existence
. If a person is aef icient in
truth when he lacks spiritual concern, one possesses, or is ,
the truth only when he mediates time ana eternity through
passionate inwardness. But even as we gained precision in
the previous section by aividing "che one over-all negative
criterion into subordinate parts, so also profit will accrue
to our efforts at this point if w^e clarify the one affirmative
standard by exhioiting four concrete ways in which it is man-
ifested. Althou^5;h our four aivisions may not be exhaustive,
they are at least definitive suggestions of the limits which
may be put on the concept of Exist enz in the Kierkegaardian
literature
.
In evaluating this suggested list of criteria, there-
fore, the reader must bear in mina the following two facts:
First , since every negation is a aisgiised affirmation, and
every affirmation a disguised negation, our division between
the negative and positive criteria is justly arbitrary. Every
negative criterion we have already gone over, therefore, could
here easily be converted into an affirmative and thus be de-
lineated once more. But so to proceed would be as uneconomii-
cal as it v ould be indiscrete. Second , the four affirmative
criteria here discussed are, like the negative, selected only
for their representative qualities. Although one might
actually locate minor sub-criteria that are here (.unintention-
ally) passed over, the dissertation contends that in faith.
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suffering, hope, ana love all of the possible major affirm-
ative criteria in SK are quite exhausted. What is true of
them is a fortiori true of any sub-criteria which may be ae-
duced from them.
B. Faith.
If is almost as aifficult for bK to define faith as
it is for the Aristotelian to define God. l\lot only is faith
an existential determinant, but also it is so basic to SK's
thinking that it appears at times to be that category in
terms of which other things are exolained, but which itself
is indefinable.
S.K. , without essential exaggeration, affinns that the
immense literature he produced had only one theme, name-
ly, faith, ana that from the beginning to end his whole
effort had been to define what faith is.^*^
For this reason a certain futility and exasperatl on attends
the assignment of the dissertation at this point.
Now and then in the writings, however, SK offers sug-
gestions to clarify the meaning of faith. The following is
illustrative of his procedure: "Faith is: that the self in
being itself ana in willing to be itself is grounded trans-
parently in God."l^ In this particular definition, happily,
a significant clue to the m.eaning of faith is revealed. It
can easily be detected that faith is simply the opposite of
sin
.
liet us recall bJ\'s definition of sin alluaed to earlier.
13. Lowrie, Kier
.
, 319.
14. Kierkegaard, SD, 132.
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Sin is this: before G-od , or with the conception of God ,
to be in Qespair at not vvillln,i-: to be oneself, or in
despair at \A.-illlng: to be oneself . Thus sin is potenti-
ated weakness or potentiated defiance: sin is the poten-
tiation of despair. -^^
There Is no virtue in reviewing SK's doctrine of sin beyond
saying that if sin is the refusal of an individual to be him-
self before G-od, then faith, v^hich " is the opposite of sin, "-^^
is the inward submission of the individual before G-od. If by
sin a man destroys himself, by faith restoration is accom-
plished.
Although this correlation is very helpful, the live
meaning of faith will be captured only after the story of
Abraham is understood and appreciated. Let us turn to this
narrative next.
By way of preface to the story, let us remember that
SK indicts specu]a tion for making the universal higher and,
hence, more important, than the particular. Since the partic-
ular can be defined only by its inclusion v/ithin the univer-
sal. Speculation posits the priority of the universal. boc-
rates, for instance, is defined a man only by his fortunate
membership in the generic class, man. Since the universal is
antecedent to the particular, it is more real. Kierkegaard
does not object to a realism in logic or semantics, but he re-
fuses to approbate a metaphysical realism v/hich swallov/s up
the individual. Viewed as an existentialist, SK is a radical
nominalist. If the individual is absorbed into the universal.
15. Kierkegaard, SD, 123.
16. Ibid. ,^132.
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or if the individual may be knovm only through the universal,
then '"^K is back on speculative premises. But such a retreat
would decree the death of existentialism.
It is only by faith, le
.
, inv/ardness before God , that
one succeeds in settin^^ up inward tension ana so maximizing
his individuality that he breaks vvith speculation. The re-
sult of this existential maneuver is Lhat the indiviaual
emerges higher than the universal. In the Kierkegaardian
nomenclature this new relation is callea "the paradox of
faith.
"
The paradox of faith is this, that the inaividual is
higher than the universal, thaL the indivi dual . . . det er-
mxnes his relation to the universal by his relation to
the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his
relation to the universal. The paradox can. be express-
ed by saying that there is an absolute duty tomrard G od;
for in this relationship of duty the individual as an
individual stands related absolutely to the absolute.
So when in this connection it is said that it is a duty
to love God... for if this duty is absolute, the ethical
is reduced to a position of relativity.-^'''
By deliberately being a naked self in sensitivity before God,
the inaividual defies all of the rules of speculation. Faith
inverts the order of values, reducing the glory of the uni-
versal by augmenting the glory of the individual. The story
of Abraham is SK's exhibit A of faith, since it combines all
of the ingredients of what it means before God to break com-
pletely v.ith immanence. The stage of existence which borders
closest on the religious is the ethical. In the ethical
sphere the individual devotes himself to the laws of duty,
17. Kierkegaard, FT, 105.
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I.e. , ethical standards, and by so acting hopes to anchor
his salvation. By perfectly fulfilling all ethical obliga-
tions peace in spirit may be founa. After a great crusade
in duty, however, an antecedent impossibility of fulfilling
duty blocks his enthusiasm. No man, for example, has ever
perfectly done unto others what he Vi/oula that they ao unto
him. When this awareness overtakes the ethic ist, he can
either leap out of his despair by having faith in Goa, or he
can move further aown into despair ana pessimism. Iz is only
the man who turns to G-od and aecides for faith who suddenly
feels a peace of heart which he never knew in the ethical
sphere. Only when selfhood is lodged in God is the inaivia-
ual freed from the law as a means of realizing the self.-^^
The life of Abraham is SK's best example of how selfhood in
God is brought about in this way.
In the story of Abraham all the elements of perfect
faith converge excellently. When Abraham Uvea comm aeo
,
the ethical demands of the law were replaced by a sensitive
inward response to Cfod alone. To achieve this communion of
spiritual excellence before God, however, Abraham was obliged
first Lo declare himself bankrupt. So, by leaving Ur of the
Ghaldees for the land of pi'omise, he passea this negative
18. "j:''rom this, however, it aoes not fo±low that the ethi-
cal is to be aoolished, but it acquires an entirely aifferent
expression, the paraaoxical expression— that, for example,
love to Goa may cause the knight of faith to give his love
to his neighbor the opposite expression to that which, ethi-
cally speaking, is required by duty." Kierkegaard, FT, 105.
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test. Ke left his hopes, his plans, in short, he left him-
self for God. So intense was this decision that a cruci-
fixion of the unaerstanaing had to take place. VieviJed from
the point of view of immanence, his venture v;ith G-od was pure
foolishness. He "left his earthly understanding behind and
took faith with him— otherwise he woula not have wanaered
forth but would have thought this unreasonable."-^^ But the
less Abraham became concerned with himself and the world,
that he might find himself anew in G-od, the more his intui-
tion for aivine things became sensitized. As a result of
such disciplines of faith he became a mighty steed vi^hich in-
stinctively knew its trainer, leaping swiftly to attention
at the meanest nod from the Lord.
The climax to Abraham's perilous journey of faith
came when the voice of God v/ithin him revealed that he must
take his son, his own son, the son whom he loved, ana immo-
late him in the land of Moriah. Abraham might have staggered
at such a horrible assignment if he naa not broken with
ethics, for duty challenged the right of a father to slay his
son. But Abraham faithfully triumphed becsiuse he loved Goa
enough to put His will above the voice of auty. "Abraham
believed and aid not aoubt, he believed the preposterous."*^^
Not fully knowing, not accurately seeing, but always
pressing on in faith, Abraham did not stagger. uread, the
dizziness of freedom, aia not overtake him. In triumph,
19. Kierkegaard, FT, 20.
20. Ibid. , 26.
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Abraham, havinp- believed God, confidently went to sacrifice
his son. Ana in so acting he proved that he Uvea by faith.
Duty aictated that it was murder to slay the son; but God
saia that the son must aie, .These were the alternatives.
Abraham successfully mediated time ana eternity by resigning
his conscience to the will of God. "In the infinite resig-
nation there is peace and rest,"'^-^ By faith Abraham became
a true individual.
Resignation, hov/ever, is not the final chapter in the
story of faith, for faith presupposes activity
,
hesigiation
but prepares for faith. In submission one confesses I "see
myself rith respect to my eternal validity, ana only then
can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of
faith. But faith v^ithout works is dead. Here again the
Book of James becomes an "Epistle of Gold,"
This action in faith, a condition wherein an individ-
ual maximally accents his inaiviuuality before Goa, can
profitaDly be comparea to the courage of a soldier who, aur-
ing severe combat, performs a valorous act over and above
the call of auty. For instance, though it may be the auty
of the soldier to conquer the enemy, nov. and then an oppor-
tunity to display personal valor arises, as when one who
could preserve himself saves his buddies instead by throv/ing
himself on a live granade. Ethically, the solaier woula not
be court martialed if he dia not sacrifice himself for saving
21. Kierkegaard, FT, 64,
22, Ibid. , 66,
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his friends, since duty aoes not require it. Yet, by ac-
centing his ovm inwardness, Le
.
,
by giving his life for his
companions, the soldier is handsomely rewarded. His heroism
grows out of a v/illingness to exploit potentialities which
lead beyond the requirements of duty. Religiously speaking,
the solaier acted on faith. His inwardness was excitea to
move beyond the ethical.
And so in the case of Abraham. Valor replaced duty.
Abraham' is great by reason of a personal virtue . In
Abraham's life there is no higher expression for the
ethical than this, that the father shall love his son...
iiVhy then did Abraham (seek to kill his son)?... For Groa's
sake, and (in complete identity v/ith this) for his own
sake. He did it for God's sake because (joa reauired
this proof of his faith; for his own sake he aid it in
order that he might furnish the proof.
The soldier's act is only suggestive of Abraham's faith, how-
ever, since the patriarch haa to act in defiance of duty. The
man under military arras earns his reward by acts which are
continuous v,ith ethical auty. International law suill pro-
tects the code of warfare.
At this point in the story a new richness is added to
faith's account. Faith is ttTat pure expression of Exis tenz
,
which is gendered in the terror of temptation. Temptation is
ordinarily a seduction to evil. This is not the t^pe of
25. Kierkegaard, FT, 88-89. (italics ours) "It is in what
Kierkegaard calls the ' teleological suspens ion ',.. that the
soul's unity is seen as polar or split... As personal, the
soul has gazed into the mist of the infinity of its being--
or perhaps into the image of the infinity of the Greator--
and knows once for all that it belongs to this infiniteness
ana yet cannot by itself attain unto it. It reacts by re-
sponses of charity ana heroism 'above and beyona the call of
duty . ' " Harp e r , ETK , 58
.
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temptation which gives birth to faith, however. heligious
temptation is testing or Anfechtung * Anfechtung results when
an absolute t elos contests with an ethical deniand in time.
So long as the ethical life is not displaced by an inward
sensitivity to religious ideals, that long Anfechtung remains
absent. "Anfechtung is in the sphere of the God-relationship
what temptation is in the ethical sphere. "^'^ Vi/hereas Lhe
unrighteous man is tempted when he is called away f rom doing
his duty, as one seduced to steal or rape, the righteous,
who lives coram deo , is tempted when he becomes so concerned
with his Quty rhat he allovfs that devotion to usurp the pri-
ority of God's inward revelation to him.
A t erapt ation--but what aoes that mean? What ordinarily
tempts a man is that wnich woula keep him from aoing
his duty, but in this case (Abraham) the temptation is
itself the ethical. , .which would keep him from doing
God's will."^^
The glory of Abraham is that he triumphed in Anfechtung .
Anfechtung is associated with the weakness of allowing auty
to crowd out respect for personal valor. The ethical may be
the occasion of temptation v/henever providence juxtaposes an
ethical responsibility and potentiality of personal valor,
ana then requires the inaividual to choose, i he temptation
of the religious individual is so to make a premium of ethics
that his s ensitivity to the inwara voice of Gog is blunted.
Vi/henever the ethical is triumphant in such a conflict, the
individual has not yet come to faith. When a man is ethically
24. Kierkegaard, GUF , 410.
25. Kierkegaard, PT, 89.
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strong, he is threatened by Anfechtung ; whereas when he is
ethically weak, he is tempted by sin. I'hese two temptations
must be kept in balance.
In temptation, it is the lower that tempts, in Anfech -
tung , it is the higher; in temptation, it is the lower
that allures the individual, in Anfechtung it is the
higher that, as if jealous of the inaiviaual, tries to
frighten him back. Anfechtung therefore originates
first in the essentially religious sphere, and occurs
there only in the first stage, increasing quite proper-
ly in proportion to the intensity of the religiosity,
because the individual has aiscovered the limit, and
Anfechtung expresses the reaction of the limit against
the finite indivi dual
.
It is within the context of Anf ech-cung that Abraham's
heroism as the father of the faithful is to be appreciated.
V/hen Abraham cleaned the aagger ana startea off to tne ap-
pointed place of sacrifice, the ethical screamed out against
him in juagment, crying that slaying the son is a scandalous
breach of duty. The inclination to heed this cry of ethics
is Anfechtung
.
Sparing the son is (for 3Kj aoubtless Abra-
ham's ethical duty, for to destroy the boy is plain muraer.
And yet once Abraham was assured that it was G-od v/ho tola
him to slay his son, faith coula be retained only when he al-
lowed himself to be transformed by letting that revelation
take precedence over the demand of ethics. By preferring
the voice of God ro the law of ethics, Abraham so pre-
eminently mediated time and eternity that he set a ..attern
for the faithful in all ages. Abrahamic contemporaneity with
(iod, being the most pristine form of faith, is equivalent to
26. Kierkegaard, GUP, 410.
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pure fixistenz . In the coram aeo devotion, every decision,
whether it be simply to ro to the left or to the right,
elicits a maximum o£ inv/ardness ana concern. To t rifle with
Crod in the least is to offend aPsoiutely ,
J^'aith, then, is a private Christian category. It can-
not be understooa in paganism because paganism cannot break
with immanence. Faith is that total inv/ard response in the
religious Individual v/hich emerges mhen time ana eternity
are mediated through an active response to the commanaing will
of God . By actively setting out to sacrifice his only son,
Abraham has everlastingly earned for himself the title,
"father of the faithful."
The story of Abraham contains therefore a teleological
suspension of the ethical. As the inaivldual he became
higher than the universal. This is the paradox which
does not permit of mediation.'^'''
It is increasingly clear nov; that "faith is a pas-
sion, a passion beyond v/hich it is impossible to go. In
faith the individual breaKs
.
totally with immanence, ethics,
and the self. And yet, paradoxically, it is by this very
act of losing the self that the individual saves himself,
for faith perfects the inwardness of spirit. The more spir-
itual a m.an is, the more individual he is. In faith, there-
fore, the individual, shattered in immanence, is restored
tenfold. In faith the individual is alone before his God;
he is no longer but a subdivision in a universal or an ad-
27. Kierkegaard, FT, 100.
28. Ibia.
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jective of the absolute. In faith the individual, resigned
from law and self, lives wholly unto G-od. He permits per-
sonal valor to overtake devotion to auty. Swenson sums up
the total passion of faith concisely.
The chief categorical determinants assigned to faith...
are: (1} the particularity of its relationship to Goa,
dispensing vvith every form of universal intermeaiary
:
cormnunity, state, humanity, tradition, so that the be-
liever sustains qua inaividual an absolute relation to
the Absolute; ( 2 ) the infinite resi>^,nat ion vvith respect
to finite t^oods v-hich it psychologically presupposes,
thus dissociating itself toto coelo jsicj from those
dreams of wish-fulf illraeni: with which the inexperienced
confuse it; (3) the double movement of the spirit, by
which after the infinite resignation it again lives in
the finite, but only in virtue of a God-relationship
which has no dependence upon the calculations of the un-
derstanding; (4} the fearful teleological suspension of
the ethical as exemplified in Abraham, whom the poetic
imagination of the author makes to live vivialy in the
present . ^9
With the general mood of faith clarified, however, it
has yet to be explained exactly why faith ma;/ be called a
positive criterion for Christianity. The answer seems to
turn on the fact that in the mind of SK only the incarnate
Christ , the absolute paradox, coulu elicit faith. Vvithout
faith the individual is lost, ana v;ithout the absolute para-
dox there can be no faith; therefore, the absolute paradox is
the source of truth. Syllogist ically , SK's argument might be
formulated as follows:
Only that which can elicit faith is truth;
Christianity alone can elicit faith;
Therefore, Christianity alone is the truth. "-^^
29. Swenscn, SAK, 182-185.
30. "Christ ianity ... accentuates life paradoxically ... the mo-
ment in time becomes decisive with respect to the winning or
losinb^ of an eternal happiness." Swenson, SAK, 29-30.
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Although the dissertation has already alluded to the
meaning of the incarnation, it is necessary to open up the
matter once again in this nev; connection. First we shall re-
view what constitutes Lhe nature of absolute paradox; second,
we shall seek to learn how it is^that this paradox can alone
elicit faith.
The concept of paradox is central to SK's system.
Whenever time and eternity are coincident, there paradox a-
rlses. The ethical attempt upon the part of the inaividual
to mediate duty perfectly involves a paraaox, for Instance.
The last stage in paradoxicalness is Keiigiousness B. ne-
ligiousness B, by understanding existence itself paradoxically,
teaches the indiviaual to save himself by losing himself.
Religiousness B, however, rests upon the founaation of Christ,
the absolute paradox. The absolute paradox, which is an in-
tellectual formulation of the incarnation, expresses the his-
torical occasion when God actually became an individual human
being. The incarnation is paradox because time ana eternity
linivocally m.eet; and it is absolute because it is the full
God that became a full man. For ^K, nothing could be intel-
lectually offensive in a greater degree than the incarnation.
It is not an angel or a demiurge which enters time; it is the
absolute God. Ana it is not God entering generic humanity;
it is God entering an individual man. The paraaox, there-
fore, is absolute.
The God-Man is not the unity of God ana mankina. ouch
terminolo&y exhibits the profunaity of optical illusion.
The God-lVian is the unity of God and an individual man.
That the hum.an race is or should be akin to God is an-
cient paganism; Dut that an inaiviaual man is God is
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Christianity, and this individual man is the God-Man.
There is neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor^in the
depth, nor in the aberrations of the most fantastic
thinking, the possioiiity of a (humanly speaking) more
insane combination* "^-^
The incarnation (in bK' s estimation) unites together
all the elements of offense which are needed to elicit per-
fect faith, "Faith is precisely the contradiction between
the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness ana the
obj ective. uncertainty The more intellectually offensive
the objective is, the more passionate is the inward man.
For the objective situation is repellent; and the ex-
pression for the objective repulsion constitutes the
tension ana the measure of the corresponaing inwardness
I'he paradoxical character of the truth is its objective
uncertainty; this uncertainty is an expression for the
passionate inwardness, anu this passion is precisely
the truth. '^•^
Because "truth is an equivalent expression for faith"
faith, the inward expression of passion in the presence of
an objective uncertainty turns out to be but another Kierke-
gaardian way to express Exis t enz . Truth is " an objective un
certainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most
passionate inwardness ." It is evident, then, that the more
one risks, the more he has both faith and truth. This fol-
lov/s because the absence of risk guarantees the presence of
immanence. Immanence, by rejecting the paradoxicalness of
man's nature as a synthesis of time and eternity, is a state
31. Kierkegaard, TC, 84. We shall inaicate in the conclu-
sion to the dissertation certain reasons why v^e believe this
conclusion is non sequitur .
32. Kierkegaard, GUr , 182.
33. Ibid
. , 183.
34. Ibid. , 182.
35. Ibia.
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of spiritle ssness in which individuality is destroyed.
The absolute paradox, being objectively pure maaness,
accents man's inwardness to that point beyona v/aich SK be-
lieves is not possible to go. When using the understanding
to learn what is that final paradox which is to be believed
against the understanding, the incarnation is the end result.
For how should the Reason be able to understand what
is absolutely different from itself. If this is not ira-
mediately evident, it will become clearer in the light
of the consequences; for if God is absolutely unlike
man, then man is absolutely unlike God; but how could
the Reason be expected to understand this?^^
Time to think the incarnation over will not help one avoid
its rational barbs either, inasmuch as no quantity of contem-
plation could possibly reduce the intellectual offense of an
intrinsic paradox. "If this fact came into the world as Lhe
Absolute i:'aradox, nothing that happens subsequently can avail
to change Lhis. The consequences will in ail eternity re-
man . "
But this resultant intellectual futility is all to
the good, however, for once Christianity is no longer para-
doxical, i.e. , once it no longer is an intrinsic offense to
the intellect, then it ceases to have worth for faith. "The
less outwardness, the more inwardness ." '-'^
The "understanding must come to a standstill" before
the absolute paradox. Those who trifle v. ith the incarnation.
36. Kierkegaard, , 37.
37. Ibid
.
, 79.
38. Kierkegaard, GUF , 341.
39. Kierkegaard, TG, 85.
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believes SK, reducing it to a simple historical doctrine,
are devoid of an explicit conception of what it means to say
that the absolute has become limited. Kiebuhr is particular
ly forceful on this question.
All definitions of Christ which affirm both his divin-
ity anu humanity in the sense that they ascribe both
finite and historically conditioned and eternal ana un-
conditioned qualiti es to his nature must verge on logi-
cal nonsense. It is possible for a character, event
or fact of history to point symbolically beyond history
and to become a source of disclosure of an eternal mean
ing, purpose and power v/hich bears history. But it is
not possible for any person to be historical ana uncon-
ditioned at the saiTie tirae.^^
SK*s need of paradox is clear, but v;hat now requires
clarification is the reason why Christianity alone fulfills
that need. SK answers the question in the follov/ing way:
I contemiplate the order of nature in the hope of find-
ing God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also
see m.uch else that disturbs my mina and excites anxiety
The sum of all this is an objective urc. ertainty . But
it is for this very reason that the inv.araness becomes
as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective un-
certainty v;ith the entire passion of the infinite.^
The individual needs G-oa, since his own sinfulness is respon
sible for his radical break with eternity. But unless God
reveals himself to the individual, the inaiviuual is left
in despair. Here is where the immeaiate relevance of the
incarnation enters. The incarnation stanas as a beacon of
hope to the aespairing soul, for it is just what one needs
40. Niebuhr, IMDM, II, 61. Wiebuhr breaks v-ith SK on the
question of the metaphysics of Christ as the literal God-Kan
preferring to turn the incarnation into a "religious truth."
There seems to be more consistency in this position, al-
though it is not v;ithout its ov/n aifficulties
.
41 r Kierkegaard, GU? , 182.
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to be saved: i econcillation, by Goa's love. Ihe cieStjairing
soul "considers viithin himself whether Christ is everything
to hi'v. , and then he says, on this I stake everything. "^2
There is no objective coiiipulsion for choosing Christ, for if
there were we would be bacK on premises of immanence. A leap
wtnch comes of inward passion is entailed. "To believe means
precisely that dialectical hovering which, although in fear
and trembling, never despairs; faith is an infinite self-
m^ade care."'^'-' Interest in Christ must grow out of the aes-
pairing soul. It cannot be the result of objective compul-
sion. The infinite assurance of the truth of Ghi-ist is pro-
jected from the passionate interest of the heart. Just as
Socrates secured the truth of immortality by staking his whole
life upon it and living as though it were the most certain of
all things, so also the Christian makes Christ absolutely
sure by existentially living as if Christ were God.
The first step in acquiring faith, then, is to inquire
"whether one can base eternal happiness upon soiiiething his-
torical."'^'^ Doubtless "here is so:re thing historical, the
story of Jesus Christ. "'^^ The inuividual at this point does
not concern himself with amassing historical evidences to as-
sist him in making his leap of faith, for "even though it
were the m.ost certain of all historical facts it v^ould be of
no help," since "there cannot be any direct transition from
42. Kierkegaard, JSK, §763.
45. Ibia.
44. Ibid
. , §1044.
45. Ibid.
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an historical fact to the foundation upon it of an eternal
happiness. That is something qualitatively new. "^^ The way
out is simply this: the individual believes that his eternal
happiness is contingent upon the fact of Jesus Christ. There
is risk in so believing, to be sure, for eviaences cannot
directly elicit faith. But this risk is the very venture of
faith. It is that without which faith would not be faith.
And so I say to myself: I choose; that historical fact
means so much to me that I decide to stake my v/hole life
upon that if. Then he lives; lives entirely full of the
idea, risking his life for it: and his life is the
proof that he believes. He aid not have a fevi/ proofs,
and so believed and then began to live. l\o, the very
reverse .'^'^
Faith, when understood in terms of his own presupposi-
tion, therefore, is one of bii's most powerful affirmative
criteria of verification. Only in faith is the inaividual
accentea maximally. But according to SK only the God-Man can
elicit faith. Therefore Christianity, vh ich is based on the
God-Man doctrine, is true.'^
46. Kierkegaard, JbK, §1044.
47. Ibid .
48. All ciitical comments will be reserved for the conclu-
sion of the dissertation.

CHAPTER TEN
SUFFERING
There is no more unequivocal, positive criterion of
verification in SK. than suffering . It is as integral to the
health of the religious life of the individual as is sun-
light to the green leaf. If a man suffers in the proper
manner, he may be quite assured that he has the truth.
"Aesthetic existence is esentiaily ^sic
J
enjoyment; ethi-
cal existence is essentially struggle and victory; religious
existence is essentially suffering."-^
A. The inevitability of Suffering.
The last stage in the religious life is that sphere
of self-annihilation in which the task of the individual and
the impossibility of fulfilling it war paradoxically one ovo'
against the other. Iv:an's auty is to mediate eternity j agape
love) through the medium, of passionate existence in time.
But at once the assignment shades off into paradox. The auty,
on the one hand, ana the inaividual assigned to ao the auty,
on the other, are so incompatibly related that complacency in
the fulfillment of the religious task is ruled out. Man can
1. Thomte, Ki'R, 84.
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not bring himself to mediate time ana eternity in the de-
cision ana tension of the moment. Knowledge of this incom-
patibility, together with an awareness that sin and guilt
rest upon individual responsibility, is the reason for the
inevitability of religious suffering. To deny one's auty
is to betray the Christian definition of what it means to be
an individual; yet, to admit that duty is to invite suffer-
ing as part of the normal relip:lous experience.
Because it is inevitable, suffering is a token-proof
to the self and to Goa that the self is aware both of its
guilt and of its continued earnestness to overcome that guilt.
Suffering becomes a lotion of inward purification. In mercy
G-od accepts suffering as the religious substitute for the
fulfillment of auty itself.
Suffering has religious significances, hov/ever, only
when man's mediatorial task is unaerstood as a concrete as-
signment. But let us be clear first what this assignment is.
"The task was posited as consisting in the simultaneous main-
tenance of an absolute relationship to the absolute telos
,
and a relative relationship to relative ends.'''^ So long as
this problem is kept on paper and is made an abstract etiii-
cal assignment, that long there is no aifficulty whatever in
carrying it out. Vdithout further aao the task is done, and
a new venture may be undertaken. That much is clear. But
when the matter is appreciated from the point of view of an
existential task, then all simplicity immediately vanishes.
2. Kierkegaard, Chf , 386.
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One existent ially unites time and eternity only v.hen an ab-
solute devotion to God and a relative aevotion to everything
else are simultaneously maintained, Vvhen the task is cast
in these dimensions, suffering is inevitable. The suffering
is tnat inward grief with which one struggles when he becomes
sensitive to his constant failure to ao his duty, suffering,
then, is an inward , not a physical aiscomfiture. It trans-
pires within the inner recesses of the heart.
Suffering in the inward man is a token of two things.
First, it is a proof that the person knows enough of the
height of absolute bliss in God to realize that he is exis-
tentially separated from such a happiness. rTesent aiscom-
fitures teach him that existentially
,
happiness is not his
possession. Second, it is an indication that the individual
is intent ionally related to that happiness before him, as he
constantly seeks to keep the absent happiness his hope. To
claim a possession of happiness is sinful imjneaiacy; while
to be inaifferent to happiness as a promise is paganism. The
honest man realizes his present deficiencies, and the coura-
geous man presses on to possession. The saint is both honest
and courageous.
Because suffering is an inevitable relif^ious conaition,
it follows that immediacy may never secure a lasting advan-
tage over religiosity. The aesthete, for example, lives for
the moment's offerings. Knowing nothing of the sacrifices of
the inward man, he is jolly over the tidbits of empirical sat-
isfaction that are meted out to hi-r. along the way in fortune.
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" Immediacy is fortune ."'^ But note: only as long as these
satisfactions move along accoraing to expectancy, is the
security of the aesthetic way of life safeguarded. Serial
fortune is its only verification. Whenever misfortune arises,
therefore, a contradiction sets in.
The inipotency of immediacy is exposed in the fact that
this contradiction cannot be explained vvithin the expectancies
of fortune itself. The aesthetic Indiviaual is so aeficient
in an unaerstanaing both of himself ana of his task that the
prongs of the contradiction remain a painful intrusion into
his aesthetic tranquility.
The immediate inaiviaual never comes to any understand-
ing with misfortune, for he never becomes aialectical
in himself; ana if he aoes not manage to get ria of it,
he finally reveals himself as lacking the poise to bear
it. That is, he despairs, because he cannot grasp mis-
fortune. Misfortune is like a narrovi/ pass on the way;
now the immediate inaiviaual is in it, but his view of
life must essentially alv^ays tell him that the difficulty
will soon cease to hinder, because it is a foreign ele-
ment.^
In his oY.Ti strength the aesthete can never learn the meaning
of his predicament. In the face of contraaiction he can only
despair. The despair, if pursued, to be sure, may lead him
into a aialectic awareness of his predicament, but antecedent
to this leap, pessimism remains constant.
Over against immediacy the ethico-religious way of life
"reouires suffering In the same sense that the immediate in-
dividual reouires fortune.' While suffering intruaes into
5. Kierkegaard, GUir^, 388.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. , 389.

the aesthetic way as an incompatibility, "the religious man
believes that it is precisely in suffering that life is to
be found. V.henever the religious inciiviciual looks to e x-
ternal fortune as a means of encouragement on the way of
life eternal, that moment he has lapsed back into the fallacy
of the aesthetic way. The vomative of the aesthete becoi^-,es,
thus , the nourishment of the religious man. "Immediacy ex-
pires in suffering; in suffering, religiosity begins to
breathe.""^
iiince inwardness is a Goaward relationship, suffering
is inevitable by the very factors involved in that relation-
ship. IV' an never inwardly does the full v;ill of Goa. If suf-
fering is, absent, the relationship of devotion is missing.
He who tries to avoid suffering, adds but more sin to his
account. Suffering is the litmus test to determine whether
or not an individual persists in religiosity.
Because suffering, for the sake of righteousness is its
true mark of uniqueness, religiosity stands over against all
substitute ways of life in sharpest contrast. In opposition
to the poet "it is necessary ... to comprehend the suffering
and to remain in it, so that reflection is airected upon the
suffering and not av;ay from it." The poet frequently passes
through suffering, but he never approbates such ills as part
of the real essence of living. Instead, he seeks to flee
6. Kierkegaard, GUF , 390.
7. Ibid .
8. Ibid. , 397.
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pains by creating in his imagination a Utopian worla in vh ich
a happier, more perfect oraer of things may be expected.
hegardless how superficially the external suffering of the
poet may seem to overlap religiosity, therefore, the poet
can never existentially understand himself in his essential
cont raaiction. The reason for this is that the terms in his
dialectic of existence are fortune and misfortune rather than
tim.e and eternity.
The poet can explain (transform) the v«hole of existence,
but he cannot explain himself, because he will not be-
come religious ana so understand the secret of suffering
as the form of the highest life, hipher than all fortune
and different from all misfortune. For herein lies the
severity of the religious consciousness, that it begins
by making everything more strict, and that it is not re-
lated to poesy as merely a new v.ishful invention, and
entirely novel way of escape that poesy has not areaiTied
of, but as a difficulty v/hich creates men in the same
sense that war creates heroes.^
Because suffering is r eligiously inevitable, ana be-
cause those in the world with whom the Christian has to qo
business live for fortune, it follows bhat the world will al-
ways stigmatize the message of Christianity as foolishness.
This follows because those in the world can juage only accord-
ing to immediacy, never according to essentiality. it is sin-
ful, therefore, to tell a person who is thinking of becoming
a Christian that he need not have fear of continual opposition
from, the v/orid. Such aavice "places the opposition oi' the
world in an acciaental relation to the Christian v/ay, not in
an essential relation, ""^^ It ignores the fact that Religeous-
9. Kierkegaard, GUP, 398
10, Kierkegaard, V/L, 157.
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ness B interprets existence itself paraaoxically , "j:<'rom
the >-Jhristian standpoint, the opposition ol" the vvorld has
an e ssential relation to Christian inwardness . ''^^ I'he worla
hurls ingratitude, opposition, sna insults against the
Christian way of life because Christianity requires a suf-
fering which imirjediacy cannot fathom. Christian love is
never fully vindicated within the course of history, for
self-sacrificial love has meaning only vjhen r ewards of service
are forgotten,
B. Non- Christian Suffering.
Because it can so easily be caricatured, religious suf-
fering must be sharply defined over am inst the many pseuao
pretenses to religiosity abroad. buffering for the sake of
Christ is an inward contradiction. Lan, a synthesis of time
and eternity, is an individual only when he mediates eter-
nity in time by passionate decision. Suffering is inevitable
only when one appreciates the essential contradiction in
which existence is involved, for paradoxical religiousness
presupposes that existence itself is an essential contraaic-
tion. Religious suffering, hence, is always inward, essential
,
and constant . Any forms of suffering which lack these three
condiitions, therefore, lack Christianity itself.
Aesthetic siol'fering is inl'erior to religious not only
because it arises out of external r elations , tut also because
it breaks the rule of Christian inwaraness. "Suffering stands
11. Kierkegaard, WL, 157.
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in an accidental relation to existence. "-^^ buffering is
neither essential nor consistent for the aesthete, because
his frustration is not aefined within the contradiction of
existence itself. However frequent suffering for the saKe
of art or music may be, such a frequency is only accidentally
related to the aesthetic experience. The inevitability of
suffering can arise only after the shattered inaiviaual passes
from the ethical to the religious stage, ana from heligiousness
A to heligiousness B. Only in Christianity, where existence
itself is contradictory and where the only univocal mediation
between time and eternity is guaranteed by G^od ' s revelation
in Christ, is suffering inv/ard, essential, and perpetual.
When the Scriptures say that God awells in a contrite
heart, this does not represent a transitory or momen-
tary relationship (in that case the use of the word
'dwell' v'ould be extremely unfortunate), but expresses
on the contrary the essential significance of suffering
for the Goa-relationship.-^*^
The aesthete hops blithely from; one airect experience to an-
other without ever lighting oh the only hope that is hope:
eternity .
belf-flagellation, as illustrated when the priests of
Baal cut themselves in the contest with Elijah over the Goa
v/ho woulp answer by fire,-*"* appears superficially to merit
the crown of religious suffering. By such a show of external
seriousness, hov/ever, one never cultivates true inwardness.
The one who tortures himself to please God is a tool. In- •
12. Kierkegaard, GUir" , 598.
15. Ibid. , 599.
14. I Kings 18.
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stead of confessing himself to be rtothing bef cr e God , he es-
teems his movements tov/ard self-torture as being something.
In this he sadly errs. Self-torture is a quantitative deter-
minant while inward suffering is a qualitative determinant.
These are incompatibilities. He who suffers as a Chrictian
understands that his own existence is involved in an essen-
tial contradiction. But he who tortures himself blindly be-
lieves that the contradiction of existence can be broken by
acts of self-infliction. He aoes not grieve over the es-
sential contradiction of existence, fie believes himself so
congenially related to eternity chat self-flagellation can
be termed a legitimate form of mediation. It is clear that
this form of good works, like all others, succeeds only af-
ter refusing to submit to the real terms of the problem it-
self.
The religious individual sustains a relationship to an
eternal happiness, and the sign cf this relationship is
suffering, ana suffering is its essential expression--
for an existing individual. -^^
The martyr may be nominated by many as the most likely
canaiaate for the office of externally expressing an inter-
nal suffering. Does he not pay the supreme price for his
faith? Even in rnartyraom, however, other things being equal,
the external is significant only if the antecedent condition
of inwardness happens to be present. If martyrdom is simply
used as an occasion to increase the inaividual's priae, for
example, it profits nothing. Vrtienever death is made a for-
Ib. Kierkegaard, GUr, 407.
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tune, then one falls back into the aesthetic fallacy that
suffering is acciaentally related to life. i^hysical suffer-
ing is infinitely inferior to that suffering which concomi-
tantly attends reli^;ious inwardness.
No, when the individual is secure in his God -relation-
ship and suffers only outwardly, then this is not re-
ligious suffering. Such suffering is subject to an
aesthetic dialectic, like misfortune to the immediate
consciousness; it may be present ana it may be absent. -^^
If the external and the accidental could serve as criteria
of religiosity, then the one upon whom the accident of martyr-
dom haa never fallen would automatically be less religious
than the one whose historical fortune permitted him to die
for his faith. Religiously it would be unjust. G-oa, there-
fore, judges the heart of the individual, not his external
countenance. He who suffers nothing externally "is not on
that account without suffering, if in fact he is religious;
for suffering is precisely the expression for the God-rela-
tionship. "-^"^
SK reminds his reader of the Pauline injunction that
even if one enaures martyrdom,, but coes it not out of love,
the gesture is quite without religious profit. "If I de-
liver my boay to be burned, but have not love, I gain noth-
ing." (I Corinthians 13:5, H.S.V.)
The suffering of fatalism is one of religios ity '
s
closest substitutes. Fatalism "always has something se-
16. Kierkegaard, CUF , 405.
17. Ibia.
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ductive about it."-^^ The reason for this xs tnat it can
claim the criteria of necessity ana o erpetuiuy . Under the
pressure of fatalism the inaividuai is involuntarily sub-
jected to the mercy of the v, orld-process . Out of this cru-
cifixion of freedom, comes the suffering of resignation.
Such a sorrow, however, aoes not proceed from genuine inward
repentance. Hence, its necessity is not inward. The fatal-
ist is in a contradiction, to be sure, but, again, only
outwardly not inwardly . Since the fatalist believes that
under ideal conditions he coula be relieved of the pressure
of his suffering, he aoes not actually believe that his con-
tradiction is ess ential . In another universe, affairs might
be different— especially if he had charge of things. G-rief
over fatalism, therefore, is simply a chronic species of
aesthetic sorrow ana must not be confusec with ^^uilt. That
resignation which is bred out of necessity, as illustrated
by the m.an who, loving spirits, suffers because there are
none at hana to drink, is not a suffering which results in
the transf orm.at ion of the inaiviaual. "He has not seen him-
self in his freedom, has not chosen himself with freedom. "-^^
All externalismsare a hindrance to that true inv^araness v.nich
ends in "godly sorrow."
Fatalism is one form of a "sorrow of the world," that
attituae "which sweeps man into the turbulent waters of ais-
illusionment
,
lethargy , aes ire for death, and suicide. "^^
18. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 198
19. Ibid
.
, 195.
20. Vasady, Art., 159.
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"Godly sorrov/" involves a "repentance unto salvation" v/hich
"branches out into a new hope ana a new obedience."'^-'- Until
the fatalist chooses himself , he cannot pass from aeath unto
life, from external to internal suffering. Choosing "oneself
is identical v ith repenting oneself. "^^
Only vvhen in his choice a man has assumed himself, is
clad in himself, has so totally penetrated himself that
every moment is attended by the consciousness of a re-
sponsibility for himself, only then has he chosen him-
self ethically, only then has he repented himself, only
then is he concrete, only then is he in his total iso-
lation in absolute continuity with the reality to vv^hich
he be longs.
Inasmuch as there is a comical element in religiosity,
the pain of religious suffering ana the laughter of the hu-
morist overlap in some manner. Humor serves as the transi-
tion stage between the ethical ana the religious spheres be-
cause of its relation to contradiction. It is humorous that
the religious m.an, while absolutely devoted to uoa, outwardly
appears the same as all other men. Although his intentions
are open and apparent to U-oa, his true inward iaentity is
quite concealed from the inouisitive eyes of men.
Because the humorist can understand the seriousness of
contradiction, therefore, he is not far from, tne kingdom.
He has also an essential conception of the suffering
in which life is involved, in that he does not appre-
hend existence as one thing, and fortune or misfortune
as something happening to the existing inaividual, but
exists^^so that suffering is for him relevant to exis-
tence.'"'*
21. Vasady, Art., 159.
22. Kierkegaard, EO, II, 208.
23. Ibid .
24. Kierkegaard, GDt , 400.
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The humorist has come as close to the truth in his under-
standing of suffering as one can without passing over into
religiosity, for he candidly realizes that suffering must
attend an individual as long as he exists , UnliKe the
aesthete, the humorist is not so superficial in his juagment
as to make suffering an accidental misfortune that time can
heal. In this emphasis religious ana hum.oristic minds over-
lap, for both have learned thst "the more thoroughly and sub-
stantially a human being exists, the more he will discover
the comical, "'^^
But suddenly the similarity vanishes. I'hfc humorist
fades into insignificance v.hen he is called upon to explain
the basis of the human contraaic tion. In unaertaking this
assignmem: more than laughter is needed. iet , all the humor-
ist can do is to introauce more humor. Vih.ile he sees suf-
fering in its relation to existence, he has quite missed the
point of what constitutes the nature ana cause of that suffer-
ing.
He comprehends the significance of suffering as relevant
to existence, but he does not comprehend the significance
of the suffering itself; he understands that it belongs
to existence, but doe s not understana its significance
except through the principle that suffering belongs. The
first thought is the pain in the humorist ic conscious-
ness, the second is the jest, and hence it comes about
that one is tempted both to weep ana to laugh when the
humorist speaks. He touches upon the secret of exis-
tence in the pain, but then he goes home again, 26
Because all the humorist can ao is to laugh at life.
25. Kierkegaard, GUir', 415.
26. Ibid. , '400.
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believing that the predicament of irjan is not capable of an
explanation, no humorist can be a savior. If a troubled in-
dividual goes to him for serious advice, he is simply given
a philosophical jest to tranquilize his ailing spirit. The
humorist significantly rejects fortune as a solution. He is
a hiimorist because he profounaly unaerstanas the inevitability
of pathos in life. Therefore, the humorist "finds every form
of documentation superfluous, and expresses this by mention-
ing the first thing tliat comes to mind,"^'''
The predicament of religios ity ' s aisciple is actually
even more comical than that of the humorist. The law of the
comical is easy to define: "It exists v;henever there is a
contradiction."^^ The greater the contradiction, the more
the comic. but there can be nothing more contradictory
than the elements involved in the auty of exist entially meai-
ating time and eternity. Time ana eternity are separated by
an absolute. Qualitative gap. Yet, it is the unqualified
duty of the Christian to mediate these incompat ibles . This
is the oredicament, and out of it essential humor stems. The
follower of religiosity, in infinitely choosing himself, is
conscious of the contradiction involved in his responsibility
to m.ediate the timeless love of God, on the one hand, v;hile
27. Kierkegaard, CUF , 402.
28. Ibid
.
, 466.
29. "The tragic ana the comic are the same, in so far as
both are based on contradiction; but the trap:ic is the suf-
fering contraaiction , the comical, the painless contraai ct ion .
"
Ibid. , 359.
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yet remaining a selfi^ mortal in time, on the other. Unlike
the aesthete, he cannot look to the future for fortune; ana
unlike the fatalist he cannot blame his predicament upon ex-
ternal progress. The reason for this is that he is a man who
has repented. The one vvho seeks for an excuse outside of his
own guilt has already broken the tension of religiosity.
"Everyone who has not suffered for the doctrine has^in one way
or another been gi ilty of using his slirewdness to spare him-
self. "^0
C. The Reward of Suffering.
On the surface it might appear that the retention of
suffering as an integral part of Christianity's program aoes
more harm to the cause than good. The lack of suffering
seems more enticing than its presence.
SK has a ready response to this type of objection. A
religion without suffering might indeed appeal to the v/orld-
ly nan, but the Christian is concerned more with discovering
truth rather than in learning what satisfies aesthetes v*io
have not yet come to themselves. Refusing to make life any
easier than it is, SK argues that the nature of man is such
that raan is not an individual until he exist ent ially mediates
time and eternity. Clever pates may elect to have the task
of life maae easier, but SK refusesto compromise.*-'-^
30. Kierkegaard, PSJY, 25.
51. "The absolute t elos exists for the inaiviaual only vvhen
he yields it an absolute aevotion. Ana... an eternal happi-
ness ... cannot be conceived as realizinp.; a union in existence
in terms of rest." Kierkegaard, GUf , 355.
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What the follower of religiosity aiscovers vvhen he
submits to the inevitability of suffering in his own inwara
life is that he is vonderfully relieved of the threat of
earthly despair. The Christian lives for what may be his
hope , not for Vv'hat is his po ssession * In deciding for or
against Christianity, therefore, the calculus of values em-
ployed must keep possession and expectation in a proper re-
lation.
In the finite sense there is nothing whatever to gain,
and everything to lose. In the life of time Lhe ex-
pectat ion of an eternal happiness is the highest reward,
because an eternal happiness is the highest t elos ; ana
it is precisely a sign of the relationship to Lhe ab-
solute that there is not only no reward to expect, but
suffering to bear.*-*^
Just because i^he Christian must suffer, that is no
reason to reject Christianity. The truth of the matter is
that every man is going to suffer for the doctrine. Take,
for example, the aesthetes who turn to immediacy and relapse
into a worldly wisdom. They optimistically cling to the for-
tunes of the present life. r'eeking "around for excuses,
hoping to find some v/ay of escape from thus having to walk
on their toes, sonie way of evaaing--the relationship to the
absolute '^'^ while all the while overlooking the truth that
only eternity can satisfactcr iiy draw out a man's spirit.
Disillusionment is inevitable for the aesthete, because these
fortunes of immediacy to which he aspires actually never come
in that pleasant unending series which alone can stay off
32. Kierkegaard, CUF , 360.
33. Ibid. , 360- 561.
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baredom. If minor misfortunes in life do not overtake the
aesthete, death itself will. Lteath invaaes as an intrusion,
thus proving the aesthete's awareness of his potentialities
for eternity. Aesthetic despair, therefore, is inevitable
on the ground that man is a synthesis. He is so related to
both time and eternity that whenever spirit tries to locate
satisfaction solely within the finite, earthly despair
threatens; for the spirit thrives only when eternity is in
viev/.
The presence of idolatry among men is a partial sup-
port of the truth of the Augustinian dictum (which iJi fol-
lows), that man was maae unto Ciod ana he will not rest until
he rests in Joa. If man aoes not find the true Goa, he maKes
himself comical by constructing a goa for himself. The pro-
phet Isaiah ridicules idolatry with almost Kierkegaardian
irony.
He heweth him down cedars, ana t aketh the cypress and
the oak. ..for he vdll take
,
thereof , ana warm himself;
yea, he kindleth it, ana baketh bread, yea, he maketh
a god, and worshippeth it; he maketh it a graven image,
and falleth down thereto ... the residue thereof he maketh
a god, even his graven image: he falleth down unto it,
and worshippeth it, and prayeth unto it, and saith.
Deliver me; for thou art my god.*-^
Earthly despair is temporal frustration. Iz is found
whenever one seeks to make some manifestation of immediacy
serve as a substitute for the absoluteness which spirit re-
quires. Despair may indeed leaa to religiosity. But this
does not happen until the self becomes bankrupt, forfeiting
54. Isaiah 44:14-17.
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all claim to a repose outside of the absolute. Until eter-
nity replaces time, earthly despair threatens. "That which
really makes a man despair is not misfortune, but it is the
fact that he really lacks the eternal. "^^
The suffering of the religious man is uniquely dif-
ferent from all other tyoes in that it can be understood and
explained from the perspective of the sufferer himself . He
who suffers for Christ sees life in the dimension of the ab-
solute telos . Realistic about himself, he understands the
commitments involved in duty, on the one hand, and his chronic
failure to comply v;ith that duty, on the other. He senses
full well the contradiction involved in his own existence,
and hov; that, while remaining a man of passions, he is ob-
liged simultaneously to maintain an absolute relation to the
absolute telos ana a rel&tive relation to the finite.
But in this strenuous exertion there is nevertheless a
tranquillity ana a peace; for absolutely, or with all
one's strength, and with the renunciation of everything
else, to maintain a relation to the absolute telos is
no contradiction, but is the absolute corresponaence
of like to like.^
Unlike the slave of v/orldly passion who bl inaly gropes
in his misguided attempt to substitute an absolute devotion
to a relative telos for the unalterable requirements of the
absolute telos , the man who suffers religiously knov.'s why he
suffers. The suffering of the v/orldling ismad. It is "pre-
A
cisely the most general expression for madness that the in-
35. Kierkegaard, vVij, c>4:.
36. Kierkegaard, CUf , 377.
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dividual has an absolute relationship to what is relative."^'''
If, for example, a man gives both of his eyes to save a
worthless blade of grass frora being eaten by an animal, he
is surely mad. But a fortiori how maa is he who gives his
whole life devotedly to gaining everything but his own soul?
Comedy at this point borders on tragedy.
For the perishable is nothing when it is past, ana it
is of its essence to pass away, quickly as the moment
of sensuous enjoyment, the farthest possible remove
from the eternal: a momient in time filled with empti-
nes s
.
Religiosity teaches the soldiers who fight what the
issues at stake in the battle are. When the tiae of conflict
seems superficially to have turned in the enem.ies' favor,
therefore, such warriers can yet victoriously struggle to
the end, knowing that the real victory is "Cheir ovm inward
allegiance to the truth, not outward, temporal triumphs.
Owning an inward victory may be man's most, aifficult posses-
sion, but it is the most lasting.
The religious man has his satisfaction in himself,
and being introspective he is not busied with sense-
less complaints that others acquire easily what he with
difficulty ana with the utmost effort aspires after. ^'S
Because his eye, like that of the martyr's, pierces beyond
the grave, the religious man cannot be frustrated by exter-
nal contingencies. As long as he is consistent V;ith what
he believes, he is never put out by what the course of history
K'ay bring. He lives for eternity. Nor he Is^rauch disturbed
37. Kierkegaard, GUP, 378.
38. Ibid .
39. Ibid. , bl5-516.
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by v\/hat others may think of him, since he lives before G-od
alone. "The stage is eternity, and the listener, if he is
the true listener ... stanas before God during the talk."'^^
In conclusion, let us point out that the theoretic
validity of the criterion of suffering as a test for truth,
i.e. , its power to bring inwara peace, must not be confusea
with its practical application
.
Although it is true that SK
the day he aied^-^ was able to confess that he had peace be-
fore God, the most consistent witness of his life is that
the threat of inward melancholy never aeparted from him. ITie
impossible demands of giving absolute aevotion bo the abso-
lute and finite devotion to the finite "hung like a cloud
of melancholy between him ana his Saviour ana put, one might
say, a curse on his work, forcing him to live in the far ais-
tant realm of genius. "^"^ The problem of knowing whether a
man's inv;ara life is really at peace or not is too aelicate
a matter to settle, since some, enigmatically, find peace in
not having peace. Possibly falls into this category. In
any case, the theoretic system itself requires that suffer-
ing, when properly united to a sincere and pure heart, is the
basis of a profound peace which can never be understood by
one unacquainted with eternal verities.
40. Kierkegaard, i^m/, 163.
41. When Boeson asked the dying SK if he coula pray to God
in peace, the latter ansv/ered, "'Yes, that I can; ana so I
pray first for the forgiveness of sins, that they all may be
forgiven; then I pray that I may be free from despair in
death... and that 1 may knov/ a little before when death is
comingJ" Lov/rie, Kier . , 586.
42. Haecker, SK, 65.
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One need not be an existentialist to appreciate the
fact that without time- and space-transcending norrris to
serve as guides Tor our judgments of value, our aevotions
would hardly be distinguishable from those of the higher
i'rimates. The really great souls in history have succeeded
in creating invi/ard cathedrals only by a constant devotion to
eternal norms ana values, even though they antecedently knew
that their ideals would never be accepted by the masses of
men. Therefore, they sufferea inwardly for what they be-
lieved was risht. It is not unlikely, then, that as long as
we ourselves live in an imperfect worla, our aevotions to
the right v/ill likewise entail an inward suffering not un-
like that of which SK has spoken.^
43. This paragraph is not to be construed as an unoualified
approbation of suffering as a positive criterion of truth.
The reasons for this will appear in the conclusion to the
dissertation.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
HOPE AND LOVE
The final affirmative criteria vjhich we shall examine
are hope and love . Although it is quite impossible to araw
an absolute line betv;een the norms of faith ana suffering,
on tne one hana, ana hope ana love, on rhe other, a suf-
ficiently valid distinction can be maae to warrant their
separation. The following paragraph suggests a basis for
this Qivision,
Faith is existential response , even as sin is lack of
response. Love is the content of this existential response,
since a man who has faith exercises his faith in his loving.
Suffering and hope, being inward relations, are fruit
s
of the
existential response. Suffering is a consolation gained
from the perspective of the inward man striving after right-
eousness. A pious man is intentionally related to truth.
Hope is a consolation gained from the perspective of eternity
and the mercies of God. Thus, while suffering is oriented
inwaraly, hope is oriented toward eternity. Vvith this clar-
ification completed, we may proceed to a study of hope and
love as final, positive examples of Existenz .
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A. Hope.
In the magnificent book, V^^orks of Love , isK penned his
most concise philosophy of hope. The details are outlined
in a section of the volume entitled, '"Love hopeth all things,"
this being a commentary upon I Corinthians 13:7. In this
passage, hope is likened to a gust of a fresh mountain breeze
that floods a room filled with foul air. The im.pure air in
this case is the contaminating worldliness of imimanence, and
the refreshing breeze is hope. Y.'hen life is downcast, hope
rushes in. It revives man by seizing eternity as a possibil -
ity . "Christianity's hope is eternity.""^
Kope can be understooa and appreciated only v/hen it
is evaluated from the point of viev/ of ijii* s anthropology. At
the risk of being repetitious, a review of such background
miaterial is necessary at this point. ivlan, a synthesis of
timie and eternity, is a being whose individuality is fully
accented only when passionate m.ediation of eternity, through
existential living in time, is nurtured. jc'aradox, however,
always crops up in such an attempt. But paradox, when made
good use of, encourages repentance, self-denial, ana suffer-
ing. Such religious exercises are confessions that eternity
is not perfectly mediated. Yet, eternity actually is never
absolutely out of reach. Hope, by extending its arras, lays
hoj-Q on eternity for the believer, though not as an existen-
tial possession
-
(for paradox forbids the possessionj but as
1. Kierkegaard, vi/j-., 200

236
a passionate possibility
.
Hope achieves on the level of
earnest what on the level of Existenz v,ould require complete
sanctif icat ion.
For hoping means the synthesis of the eternal and the
temporal; the consequence is that the expression for
the task of hope in the form of eternity is to hope all
things; for the task of hope in the form of eternity is
to hope all things.
^
The reasons why the eternal cannot be more than an
earnest to a person in time are the following: First, the
eternal cannot become the present , for the present is Dut a
vanishing moment, a fine razor edge v.'hich separates the eter-
nity of the past from the eternity of the future. before the
present can even be mentioned, it is already part of the past.
Before one can finish saying "now," for example, the ''now"
slips into the eternalness of the past.
becond, the eternal cannot become part of the past
,
since the oast is only the accumulation of possibilities whidi
have become actual. The eternal is the necessary, anq the
necessary can never change from the present into the past.
The eternal is the I AM.
Finally, the eternal cannot be the future . The future
is the possibility of things which may be, not the necessary
of that which cannot be, but vi/hich always is. Therefore, SK
sees no other way in which the eternal can make its entrance
into time, than through the creative power of hope. By hope
the spirit of man seizes eternity as a possibility.
2. Kierkegaard, Wi., 201.
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By "possibility" is not meant that which may become
concrete through becoming, hut rather possibility as a rule
of duty. The eternal can become man's possession only
through a firm ana confident expectancy. "To la;y hola ex-
pectantly on the possibility of the gooa is to hope ."*^
bince hope may easily be corrupted, one must carefully
distinguish it from those frivolous yearnings which attend
the youth who hopes for more canay, more toys, more joys.
It is a misuse of that noble word 'hope' to juxtapose
it with anything like that; i or the fact of hoping lays
hold essentially ana eternally on the good— so one can
never be disgraced by hoping.
The truth in youthful wishing is the fact that it is attended
by a zeal and zest to possess what is just out of reach. The
fallacy of childish hope is that it does not grow out of an
awareness of the essential preaicament of man.
Religious hope cannot be the unique possession of any
age, if hope is actually the way eternity is intentionally
united with tim.e.
The eternal certainly extenas over the whole life, so
there is and consequently must be hope until the last,
so there is consequently no exclusive age which is
hope's, but the whole ofone's life must be the time of
hope.^ ^
The blessing of hope is safeguarded to ail by the further
reason that the nature of man does not change. Spirit can
adequately be satisfied only in the possession of eternity;
but the nearest v/ay that eternity can become actualized is
3. Kierkegaard, wL, 220.
4. Ibia. , 211.
b. Ibid. , 205.
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through the reach of hope. 'Ihe man v;ho refuses to hope,
therefore, is a man who, be 1 or e Go
d
, is unwilling to be a
self, since only within that tension is the inwara man de-
veloped. The hopeless man is a spiritless man. In jbiblical
terms, the lack of vision means the destruction of the people.
Hope mediates between the anxious inaividual, who be-
lieves he will die if he cannot embrace eternity as an ex-
istential possession, on the one hand, and the naked aemands
of existential duty itself, on the other. Hope does not lower
the demands of duty by transforming eternity into an actual
possession. Rather, it takes hold on eternity as the possi -
bility of duty
.
Hope actualizes eternity as a limiting con-
cept, if man haa to be perfect before he coula enjoy eter-
nity, he wou-ld soon faint. The existential task is an ira-
possioility. Otherwise the dialectic v.oula be broken.
It is only because eternity may be aivided into eter-
nity as actual (which is never a possession; and eternity as
possible (v'hich may become a possession through hope), there-
fore, that man may be savea.
If eternity were sometime and in its ovm language to
set man the task without regard for his apprehension and
his limited ability: the man would be in despair. But
then it is truly wonderful that this, the greatest power,
eternity, can make itself so small, that it is so divis-
ible, that that which is everlastingly one, by putting
on the form of the future, of the possible, by the help
of hope, educates the chiia of the temiporal existence
(the man), teaches him to hope . . . Hight ly unaerstood, the
eternal assigns only a little portion at a time in the
possibility. Eternity is through the possible always
near at hand, and yet far enough away to keep a man
moving forward, progressing, toward the eternal. Thus
eternity draws and lures man by the possibility from
the cradle to the grave, if he will but choose to
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hope.^
The only enemy of hope is fear . Fear is a recoiling
of the spirit (csught within the dizziness of freedom) from
pressing on to the full heights of possibility. Pear cringes
from taking hold of eternity as possibility, preferring in-
stead the withdrawal of despair. Vv hiie both faith ana faith-
lessness may know the good, therefore, faith alone presses on
to hope. Faithlessness falls by the waysiae in fear. Know-
ing the good, the faithless one "ventures impudently to as-
n
sume the impossibility of the good."' The glory of hope is
that it preserves the follower of religiosity from sinking
into the slough of despair after his perpetual failure ex-
is tent ially to give concretion to v/hat conscience commands
must be realized.
The Vifor Idling notices that the christian professes
absolute duty to love, but then scorns him as a hypocrite for
not actually fulfilling his intentions. The Christian can
only reply that the measure of success in religiosity is not
that outv/ardness which is visible for men to inspect, for
such mediation would be quantitative. The measure of Chris-
tian success is, rather, inward, the qualitative inwardness
of hope. God looks at the heart.
Acting cleverly is, namely, incompleteness, whereby one
undeniably gets farthest in the world, gftins worldly
goods and advantages, ana the world's honor, because
the world and worldly advantages are, everlastingly
unaerstood, incompleteness. But neither eternity nor
6. Kierkegaard, WL, 204.
7. Ibid
.
,
'205.
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the Holy Scriptures have ever taught any man to strive
to come far or farthest in the Vvoria; on the contrary
they warn him not to come too far in the v^orld, in
order, if possible, to keep himself pure from the
vvorld's pollution.
°
The worldling cannot know what the blessing of hope means be-
cause he has no sense of time-transcending values.
Contemporaneity with Christ, a conditio sine qua non
for aiscipleship , is also made possible by the power of hope.
Through contemporaneity a believer is put on exactly the same
footing as the original eye-witnesses who perceived Glirist
after the flesh. Since Christ is the eternal one, ana since
eternity is tangential to history at every point, it follows
that Christ reveals himself equally to all generations. The
historical occasion of discipleship may aiffer from age to
age, but the Christ is the same. Becoming a Christian, there-
fore, is no monopolistic prerogative of the first generation.
Rather, it is the privilege of all men in all ages, since
eternity's seriousness belongs to all eoually. "For in re-
lation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present.
For him who is not contem.porary with the absolute--f or him
it has no existence."^ Contemporaneity is a synonym for
seriousness. Centuries might separate Christ after the flesh
from believers in later generations, but they ao not separate
the eternal Christ from such believers. Only the power of
8. Kierkegaard, V«l., 211.
9. Kierkegaara, TC, 67. It is never maae auite clear by
just what is the exact relation between the historical and
eternal Christ. This serious weakness in Christology has,
significantly, been carried over into those contemporary the-
ologies which SK influenced, such as crisis theology in Europe
{Barthj and realism in -"-merica (iMiebuhr).
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hope can account for this miracle. Hope holas on to eter-
nity as a possibility, provlaing the indivioual vi th an op-
portunity to declare himself seriously related to eternity
by making Christ the rule of his life.
Hope is listea among the positive criteria because
it is that fruit which one would expect to find in him who had
succeeded in breaking with skepticism. A hopeful man believes
that there is more to reality than the routine of historical
contingency. In hope man probes into eternity behind his-
tory. Hopelessness is a mood v»hich generally attends that
skepticism which denies that there is a stratum of eternal
values behind the flux of the time-space universe. The
aesthete is the skeptic. The history of cireek philosophy
is a compendious account of the plight of those thinkers,
who, like the Milesians ana the Sophists, were unable to get
beyond the flux of panta rei to tap a guiding stratum of
values above the historical. From Thales to i^iato a rather
convincing dialectical movement can be traced. The Greeks
discovered that the more one talks of such eternal values as
the true, the e:ood, and the beautiful, the less is a material-
istic hypothesis able to bear up that full coherence needed
to explain reality. It is somewhat intriguing to begin a
^Weltanschauung with material substance, but woe to the one
who stops at that point. Even Heraclitus haa to postulate
a Logos concept behina the flux in order that chan,{.';e itself
might enjoy regularity. The more serious the skepticism be-
came, therefore, the more men like bocrates , who refused to
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believe that material flux was the whole order of reality,
turned to transteraporal values. It v/as only when the vvorld
of Ideas v?as stormed by riato that values were uncovered, for
the conservation of which men could live ana die.
In the sane manner hope gave SK soraethinf: to strive
for. It kept an alternative devotion before him when the
futile temptation to unite himself v/ith negina possessed him
again ana again. Through the power of hope bK was able to
break with poetry ana get a hold on himself religiously.
B. The Grand Existential Criterion: Love.
When the rich passages on love in SK are studied, one
instinctively feels that something very great is being devel-
oped. Love is carefully analyzed by SK because it is the
nearest that one can come to completing the existential task
of mediating time ana eternity. Love is the universal in
SK's system. All can love whether or not they are mature
enough to suffer or hope.
What is it vjhich connects the temporal ana the eternal,
what except love, which just for this reason is before
everything, and which abides when everything else is
past?!^
Because of its very inexhaustivenes.s , love is a final chal-
lenge to the spirit of man. Spirit is freedom. But when
freedom is turned toward love's offerings, an everlasting
assignment develops. Although time, space, ana knowledge
have existential enas , there is no possible end to love.
10, Kierkegaard, WL, 6.
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V\/hen love has been infinitely developed, there is still an
Infinity of love yet to be expended. Forever ana forever
love challenges the free possibilities of man.
Love cannot be bottled up, like butterfly specimens,
or accumulated, line knowledge ana prophecy, as if one could
measure his achievements in love by quantitative standards.
Love is such a relation that only in loving does love exist.
Until one conscientiously loves, love is not. Therefore, in
all eternity the spirit of man will fina in love an assign-
mient v;hich can never be exhausted. The existential task of
mediating time ana eternity is thus a priori endless.
Truth as subjectivity is but a way of expressing the
mediatorial act of a man in love. Gonseouently , he who will
not love aefrauds himself of his own inaiviauality . Man is
not perfectly a man until he loves.
To defraud oneself of love is the most terrible decep-
tion of all. It is an eternal loss for vhich there is
no compensation either here or in eternity ... Much has
also been said about being deceived by life or in life;
but one who self-deceiveo defrauded himself of living,
has suffered an irreparable loss... (for) the self-
deceived has prevented himself from gaining the eternal.
Oh, what has one whose love maae him a victim of human
deception really lost if in eternity it appears that
love abides while the deception has ceased J -^-^
Christian lev e is unique in that it rests on self-
love. In one stroke Christianity erects the greatest pos-
sible challenge to the development of man. Christian love
commands that one love his neighbor, not in a wonaerful or
marvelous way, but, like himself .
11. Kierkegaard, WL, 5.
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If the coinmandnient about loving one's neighbor were
expressed in some other way than by the use of this
little phrase, 'as thyself,' which is at once so easy
to use and yet has the tension of eternity, Lhen the
cctnmandment woula not be able thus to master the self-
love. ^
Self-love defines the infinite condition in the conimandrnent
.
"ii^hen one asks what is the limit to which a man can love him-
self, the answer is that spirit knows no limit. Toaay's self-
love, being compounded v/ith freedom, is more inclusive than
yesterday's. So, when limitless self-love is juxtaposed
v^ith a duty to one's neighbor, a possibility /impossibility
dialectic, the heart of Christianity, emerges, "Certainly
no wrestler can get so tight a clinch upon his opponent as
that with which this commandment embraces the selfishness
which cannot stir from its place. "-'•^ .buch aajectives as
"great," "wonderful," or "high" do not begin to contain what
is entailed in the determinate, self-love .
but this horizontal reverence to one's neighbor does
not exhaust the Christian's duty to love, for there is yet
the equally impossible vertical demand: absolute love for
God. The only love which is conceivably greater than self-
love is that which ascends vertically to God. Such love is
warship.
There is only One whom a man may v;ith the truth of the
eternal love better than himself, that is God. There-
fore it aoes not say, 'Thou shalt love God as Lhyself ,
'
but it says, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all
thy heart ana v.ith all thy soul ana with all thy mind, »
A man mus t love God in unconditional obedience ana love
12. Kierkegaard, WL, lb.
13. Ibid.
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Him in ado rat ion . It would be ungodliness if any man
dared to love another man in this way, or aared to per-
mit another man to love him in this way.-'-'^
The horizontal ana the vertical references in love so exhaust
man's existential duty that no conceivable limit can be placed
on freedom's possibilities. In the act of loving, man is
m.ost essentially a man, ror he is exist ent ially carrying out
in time what Goa exis tentially is in se , "Goa is love, there-
fore we can resemble God only in loving. "'•^
It is this possibility/impossibility dialectic which
stimulates both religious suffering and hope. oince man
must ao what he cannot ao, the ideal is at once possible and
impossible. Out of possibility comes hope, ana out of impos-
sibility, suffering. Love overtakes man, not as a suggestion
which may or may not be followed, but as an ought, a command,
in short, as duty. The voice of conscience in man is eter-
nity speaking. "Only when it is a duty to love, only then
is love everlastingly secure against every change. "-^^
Anything less than eternity cannot serve as duty, for
duty stands over the vicissitudes of fortune ana change in
judgment. Duty must not be deterred by the sands of time or
the winds of fortune. i)uty must dismiss the contingencies
of time and space as irrelevancies . "For the eternal is the
only thing which can be and becom.e ana continue contemporan-
eously with every age."-^'''
14. Kierkegaard, WL, 17.
15. Ibid
. , 52.
16. Ibid
. , 25.
17 . Ibid. , 34.
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The very impossibility of exist entially mediating
love is what makes love the perfect catalyst for spirit. If
love's demanas were inferior to duty, spirit would be frus-
trated. Spirit la moved only on z'ne level of eternity.
That which really makes a man despair is not misfortune,
but it is the fact that he lacks the eternal; despair
is to lack the eternal; despair consists in not having
undergone the change of eternity by duty's 'shalt.'-*-®
Consistent Christian sufferlnp-, hence, never aescends to des-
peration, since hope clings tenaciously to eternity's wealth
as a promise or possibility. Contemporaneity cancels out
that frivolous fear of fortune which lurks in the shadov/ of
those aesthetes, who, living for the moment, have not been
enraptured by the inmiutabilit ies of auty. The Christian may
not be exempt from personal unhappiness, but he is surely ex-
empt from despair.
Since duty has eternal coverage part iality is con-
demned by Christian love as sin. Duty is owea to one's neigh-
bor, anu the person near at hand is, v\?ithout exception, that
neighbor, Partiality, as illustrated in the love of the
blithe poet who, passing bj this begger ana that hag, turns
to the fair maiden in yonder castle, lavishing love upon her
alone, is a self-gaining love and stands in sharp contradiction
to the self-denying love of Christianity. The Christian
understands love as auty, ana duty permits no exceptions.
Love is the one thing which must be lavished upon all men,
regardless of their antecedent worthiness. Nothing can press
18. Kierkegaard, WL, 34.
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the spirit of nan to a greater measure of inwardness than
Christian love. "To exhaust these passions is bev;ildering. "^^
The sin of select iveness or partiality is thet justice is not
done to the full possibilities of spirit. Duty ana partial-
ity, therefore, are antipathetically relatea. "The extreme
passionate limits of partiality lie in exclusiveness , in lov-
ing only the one; the extreme limits of self-denial lie in
self-sacrifice, in not excluding a single one."^^ When the
heathen love only the lovely, they encourage a partiality
which Christ came to destroy. The heathen have not learned
the full significance of love as duty.
Inordinate partiality is Idolatry. Whatever a man
elevates to the worth of eternity is his god. When mammon
receives the sobriety and sacrifice \n ich are aue to God
alone, existent ially (not metaphysically j finitude is raised
to the order of aivinity.
Because a "neighbor is your equal," Christian auty
rejects all essential differences between men.
Equality precisely consists in not making distinctions,
and eternal equality is unconait ionally not to maKe the
least distinction, unqualifiedly not to maKe the least
distinction; partiality, on the other hand, consists in
making a distinction, a passionate distinction, in mak-
ing an unlimited distinction.
It may be easier to love hiri who reciprocates in love, but
eternity dismisses reciprocation as an irrelevance. All men
19. Kierkegaard, WL, 4 3.
20. Ibid .
21. Ibid
.
, 50.
22. Ibid. , 48.
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are equally of worth because God created them. Mo essential
distinction can be made between men, therefore. God decrees
the equality of all men, ana duty subm.its with docility.
The neighbor is every man; for he is not your neighbor
through the difference, or through the equality with
you as in your difference from other men. He is your
neighbor through equality with you before God, but
every man unconditionally has this eauality, ana has
it unconditionally.'^'^
At this point a misunderstanding must be cleared up.
Absolute love to God and man does not require that one cease
from loving his beloved. On the contrary, a love to all men
includes love of the lovely. If the beloved is a neighbor,
love is in order. The only danger attending such a love is
that it may tem.pt one to refrain from loving all men. It is
only vvhen love is viewed as auty that those accidental ais-
tinctions which separate men vanish and neighborly equality
reigns supremie. The fact that a person is a social enemy,
for example, is but an historical accident. The fact that
he is a neighbor is an abiaing essence. Vvhile the sinner is
careful v/hom he loves, lest h'l^ lavish love upon the unlovely,
the Chri.stian looks away from differences between men to
understand their comiirion essentiality as neighbors.
Two types of olinaness stem out of the love aialecLic.
The sensual man is d1 ina to auty and the religious man is
blind to earthly aifferences. "Love for one's neighbor miakes
a man blind in the deepest ana noblest and most blessed sense,
so that he blindly loves every man as the lover loves the be-
25. Kierkegaard, VjL , 50.
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loved. "'^^ It is because of this blindness that the Christian
oua:ht seems so meaningless to the pagan. The scale of values
follovv'ed by the worldling forbids the giving of oneself sacri-
ficially to one who has nothing to offer by way of recipro-
cation. Since the natural man can judge only v.ithin history,
he cannot appreciate the leveling power of eternity.
The worldling says that the first step in making love
universal is to improve social conditions. When all men
share ecually, then they may be loved equally, b ut the Chris-
tian, who looks to eternity to equalize men, considers this
V(/e 11- intended scheme of Lhe pagan just another form of sin.
It is a refusal to submit to auty in Christ. It is not neces-
sary to level men off socially to make them of equal v^fcr th
from the perspective of love. "Christianity always allows
the difference of the earthly life to persist, but Lhis
equality in rising above earthly differences is implicit in
the commandment to love."^^ Temporal differentiations among
men are flimsy exterior garments. The aifferences are "to
hang loosly about the inaiviaual, loosly, like the cape the
king casts off to reveal himself. "'^^ As -che cape is not to
be confused with the king, so accidental differences are not
to be confused with the men having them.
bince perseverance in the assignment of loving is
one's only criterion to aetermine the levels of inaiviauality
24. Kierkegaard, Vi/L, 57.
25. Ibid. , 60.
26. Ibia. , 72.
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in men, it follows that one may rightly look lor inaivid-
uating differences among men accoraing to the consistency
of their love for G-od ana man.
The pagan is only a potential individual because he
lacks an understanding of his existential assignirjent . The
Christian is partly an individual. He knows his task ana
is intentionally related to it, but he never fully matches
act and duty. In the case of Jesus Christ, however, perfec-
tion both in duty and in act is accomplished. For this rea-
son there is only one full inaividual in history, and that
is Christ. Viev/ed from the perspective of eternity, all men
may be persons; but viev/ed from the actuality of history,
only Christ is an inaividual. Here the significance of the
absolute paradox is related to the Christian story of love.
He was love, and His love was the fullness of the lav/.
'Mo one coula convict Him of any sin,' not even the law
which knows every conscience; 'there was no deceit in
His mouth,' but everything in Him was truth; there was
in His love not the hairsbreath of a moment, of an emo-
tion, of an interval between His purpose ana the demand
of the law for its fulfillment . . . His meat was to ao His
Father's will; thus He was one with the Father, one with
every demand of the law, so its perfecting was a neces-
sity to Him, His sole need in life. The love in Kim
was perpetually active; there was no mom.ent , not one
single instant in His whole life when His love was merely
a oassive feeling which seeks expression v.'hile it lets
time pass; or a mood which produces a self-satisfaction
and awells on itself while the task is neglected. IMo
,
His love was expresse*d in perpetual activity; even when
He wept, was this not redeeming the DimeV^'''
Christ is not partly God; He is wholly God. Exie tent ially ,
there was never a moment in which he aid not ao the full will
27. Kierkegaard, WL, 81-82
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of the P'ather; there was never a gesture made or an intention
entertained v;hich was not done fully within the plenitude of
agape . "His only purpose throughout His whole life from
birth to death, was to sacrifice Himself as an innocent vic-
tim. "29
The inexhaustive potentialities of love as duty can be
appreciated uhen it is remembered that the whole maze of
civil lav/ can be obviated by a lovinji heart. Just as faith
goes beyond reason to find a security in eternity, so love
outflanks law by taking in the full gamut of human possibil-
ities in one sweep. Law must continually be added to law to
make wider provisions, while love, by taking in the needs of
everybody eaually, renders all such law unnecessary. Laws
limit the spheres of selfishness among men, but love does
away with the selfishness itself.
Yet, love can succeed only when Goa is made the mid-
dle term. If men are iua&ed only within history, then there
is a certain raison d'etre for worldly love, ken actually
are not all of equal worth, speaking in earthly terms, but
love is duty when men are unaerstood through the miaale term.
28, Reinhold Isiebuhr finds too many "sub- agape " elements
in Christ (such as His doctrine of hell and the invectives
which He heaped on the Pharisees) to assign him a consistent
existential role of G-od in history. "Faith. . .has not tried
with too much consistency to fit every action of the his-
torical Jesus into the symbol of this perfection. .. It is not
possible for this reason to assert the sinlessness of every
individual act of any actually historical character." Nie-
buhr, NDM, II, 75.
29. Kierkegaard, WL, 6'^.
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God.
Yvorldly wisdom believes that love is a relationship
between man ana man; Christianity teaches that love is
a relationship between man— Goa—man, that is, that God
is the middle term.
Christ alone interpreted ir.en according to eouality ana not
according to the fortune of immediacj''. Therefore, He is God.
He was, divinely understood, love. He loved by virtue
of the divine understanaing of what love is; He lovea
the entire race; He aared not--on account of His love,
give up this. His understanding, for that v.oula precise-
ly be to deceive the race. Therefore His whole life was
a terrible collision with the purely human unaerstanding
of what love is. It was "che ungoaly v.orla vvhich c ruci-
fied Him; but even His aiscipxes aia not unaerstand Him,
ana constantly ^ sought to win Him to tneir coijception of
what love was.*^-^
That pagan violence against righteousness, which cul-
minated in the death cf Christ upon Lhe cross, is explicable
only on the grounds that those who perpetrated such acts of
unrighteousness judged according to earthly rather than eter-
nal standards. Partial love hates the lover who preaches
against partiality. And so, when Christ not only preached
love for all men, but lived it , the violence of men was un-
bounded. "'•J-'he love v-h ich does not lead to (xoa... stops at
the purely human judgment as to what lo^ e ana love's sacri-
fice ana submission are . " "-"^ Collision with Christ invited
unique violence because the pagan, v«'hose conscience was pricked
by his being remindea of his auty, aia not want to have his
partiality aisrupted.
30. Kierkegaard, WL, 87.
21. Ibid
.
, 90.
52. Ibid. , 92-93.
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Those v;ho prefer partiality vindicate their choice
by ai;^gregating together, ana then out of the v/armth of that
collusion, advance a friendly mutuality. "Viihat the ^Aorld
honors ana loves under the name of love, is a union of self-
ishness."'-''^ The way of the v;orld is as follows; One uoes
something for another ana then that one in turn returns the
favor; so, in partiality there is partial wisdom. Qood fel-
lowship ana magnanimity bring results. bach wisaom is able
to stand up, however, only so long as the cycle of fortune
is kept unbroken. Sooner or later the futilities of fortune
will harrass the pagan. 1 he arm of flesh will always fail.
This brings despair.
The Christian does not stumble at rebuff. If the whole
world were to rise up against him, and if he vi/ere to be lea
to a cross, even then the peace of knowing that he follows
eternal values is his. He knows of the contradiction of ex-
istence, while the pagan aoes not. In knovving himself, he
knows God.
Die Selbsterkenntnis fiihrt zur Gott eserkenntnis , Oder
geradezu--weil kein anderer Vieg zur Gott eserkenntnis
fiihrt una dieser, konseauent gegangen, notwendig dazu
fuhrt--Selbsterkenntnis ist Go tteserkenntnis
.
Even to think of casting duty asiae is to toy with an
abandonment of ino ivi duality. "The love is God"*^^ ana he who
gives up God forfeits the only postulate of faith which can
save him frorr' the despair of the aesthete, on the one hand.
33. Kierkegaard, ^^VL, 97-98
34. Diem, fCK, 176.
35. Kierkegaard, VvL, 99,
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and the unresolved paradox of the ethicist, on the other.
Since Christianity "has made every human relation-
ship between men a matter of consc lence , " there is a pul-
sating zeal in living the Christian life. The Christian,
like a courier of the kin^, speeds on to execute his auty
,
carrying the message of eternity to those waiting for it in
far aistant lands. Every gesture in the crusaae, being ap-
preciated from the point of view of eternity, has religious
significance injected into it. The blood of auty nourishes
every capillary. "Christianity transforms every relation
between men into a conscience-relationship, ano thus also
into a love-relationship."'^'''
To love all m.en eqiially, therefore, is as binaing on
the Christian as the most serious of civil vov/s are among
m.en. Because God is the middle
a trifle. But this seriousness
has broken with himself and has
term in love, the vow is not
is unknown unless man first
submitted to eternity.
The matter is quite simple. Man must begin by loving
the unseen, God, for thereby he will himself learn what
it means to love; but the fact that he really loves the
unseen will be recognized precisely by the fact that
he loves the brother he sees; the more he loves the un-
seen, the m.ore he will love the men he sees. Not con-
versely, that the more he rejects those he sees, the
more he loves the unseen. If that were true then God
would be transform,ed intg an unreal something, a fig-
ment of the imagination.
By coming to one's neighbor by way of Goa, auty is
mxiraculously transformed into debt . In this gesture the
36. Kierkegaard, WL, 110.
37. Ibid. ,111.
Se. Ibid. , 130.
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seriousness of love is stepped up even more. The result is
a duty/debt dialectic. The Christian is to owe no man any-
thing, save the debt of love. This debt, unlike all others,
increases as it is paid. The reason for this is that the ob-
ligation to love is infinite. The more one loves, the more
a sensitivity to indebteaness increases. iraradoxically
,
too,
one is to seek to remain in debt, refusing, to believe that
he has ever fully requited his obligation to love his neigh-
bor as himself. On the contrary, an eternal vigilance must
be kept in the sduI, so that early ana late one will live in
terms of eternity, ana never partiality, V.hen one looks to
the finite for consolation, he has already given up love as
duty; for any standard short of eternity is finitude. "If
you vvish to preserve love, then you must preserve it in the
39infinite debt," Finite comparisons corrupt, suck, ener-
vate, and destroy. Through com.parison, one's equilibrium is
disturbed and eternity's voice stifled. "Gomoarison is a
loathsome skin-eruption '."^'hich strikes inwara and consumes
the marrow, be vigilant, therefore, in your love against
the comparison, "'^^
When the auty/debt dialectic is reacned, Christianity's
claim on inwardness can be appreciated. The auty to love is
secured because man, a synthesis of time ana eternity. Knows
in conscience that his possibilities will not be exploited
until he loves others as himself. One is not truly an in-
59, Kierkegaard, WL, 151.
40. Ibia.
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dividual until he mediates time and eternity in love. But
duty entails as part of its assignment the demand that the
inaividual keep himself sensitively conscious of his infi-
nite debt to others. Duty is performed only v/hen the impos-
sible assignment of loving all men infinitely is executed.
This is the dialectic of duty/debt. To leave the dialectic
is to destroy individuality, v.hile to enter into its tension,
is to make the inwardness of siaffering inevitable. Inward-
ness is absolute here, since man is kept fully responsible
for doing what coula never in time be aone.
In the Christian sense no human being has ever accom-
plished the highest in love; and even if it were possible,
this impossibility, there would at that very m^oment
,
from the Christian standpoint, be a new task. But if
there is immediately a new task, then it is . impossible
to have time to know whether one has achieved the high-
est or not; for at the m.oment when one would get to
know it, he is engaged in accomplishing the new task,
and hence is prevented from knowing anything about the
preceding moment, for which he has no time; he is occu-
pied with the haste of .get ion , whereas even in the mo-
ment of the greatest enthusiasm there is a certain
lingering.
There is no force in this duty/debt dialectic for the
worldling, since the one who knows not G-od is blinded to what
constitutes the existential meaning of love. But v\/hen exis-
tence itself is appreciated as paradoxical, i.e
.
, when one sees
himself suspended between an inescapable duty and the equal
impossibility of fulfilling it, then the dialectic is tremend-
ously serious. The possibility/impossibility dialectic ac-
cents existence maximally. bince the task is infinite, one
41. Kierkegaard, WL, 152-153.

can have encouragement only in hope. There is no coisolation
in the fact that the infinite has "somewhat" been executed.
Less than infinite is finite, and all finite stanas unaer
judgment. "Only the God-relationship is earnest; the earnest-
ness consists in forcing the task to its highest achievement
because there is One vvho compels by the pov^er of the eter-
nal."42
If one goes beyond the dialectic of love, he goes be-
yond Kierkegaard, The final predicament of the Christian is
to tack passionately between infinite auty ana the despair
of failure. The course he taKes is repentance. hepentance
is the acknowledgment of the failure, coupled with a determi-
nation to strive for the right. It is a state of faith,
carried on in humility by suffering ana borne on through
hope. This is Christianity.
42. Kierkegaard, WL, 154

FART FIVE
CONCLUSION

GHAi'TER TIVELVE
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Before listing the conclusions which we have reached
as a result of this study in Kierkegaard, it is academically
decorous to submit a brief evaluation of the seven major cri-
teria of verification which v\/ere chosen to illustrate the
standards one should follow when testing for the presence or
absence of inwardness.
This task of evaluation is difficult. Not only are
the writins-s of SK numerous, covering an unbelievable field
of interest, but also many of them are deliberately cast in
the indirect form of communication. Desiring more to draw
a concern for Christ from men than to instruct themi in a
philosophy of religion, SK so wrote that a poetic haze is
left hovering over his conclusions. Riany of the fine contours
in the argument are shaded out, therefore. For these re?Lsons
one cannot be completely sure that in grasping the surface of
the literature, he has plumbed the depths of SK's richest
meanings.
No attempt will be here made to evaluate SK beyond
the one question of verification. Although there rises a
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temptation at this point to go beyond this limited problem
and take in the over-all issue of internal coherence, such
a choice will not be maae. Instead, we shall in very brief
fashion set aown the exact reasons vi/hy we either agree with,
or take exception to, the specific criteria of verification
detailed earlier. To pursue any other course, regardless
hov/ challenging it may be, v;ould entail a departure from the
announced problem of the dissertation.
It seemn to the present writer that precision and
clarity will be increasea if we set aown two separate stand-
ards by which to judge They are the following: r'irst,
ao the criteria safeguard the generic conaition of inwardness?
Second, ao the criteria safeguard the specific uniqueness of
Christian inwardness? In the very asking of these two ques-
tions we presuppose, of course, that there is a aifference
between the two types of inwardness. The reason why we feel
constrained to divide our analysis in this way is because we
want to avoid the danger of living either too little or too
much credit to SK's criteria. It is the conviction of the
writer, that while adequately serving as standards for the
generic state of inwardness, the criteria somewhat fail to
preserve the uniqueness of Chris tian inwardness.
Inasmuch as the most crucial argument turns on SK's
negative relation to coherence, our oraer in the treatment
of the criteria in this section will be inverse to that fol-
lowed in the main boay of the dissertation. The positive
criteria will be examined first, after which a study of the
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negative v/ill follow.
A. The Affirmative Criteria and Generic Inv/ardness
.
There can be no question but what the four criteria,
faith, suffering, hope, and love, ouite exhaust the basic
affirmative tests for general inward concern. Is not the
inward man totally excited whenever there is passionate
trust in God, earnest suffering for the right, courageous
hope in eternity, or constant love for God and man? What
more noble tests of inwardness could be devised? 3t. is
surely right that a man who never believes, never suffers,
never hopes, and never loves, is hardly a living man at all.
Our answer to the Question whether the positive cri-
teria can safeguard generic inwardness, therefore, is an
unequivocal yes.
B, The Affirmative Criteria and Christian Inwardness.
Let us now examine the same criteria and see Vvhether,
separately or collectively, they can preserve Christian in-
wardness as a unique religious experience. Settling this
is very important because it is Christ ianity, not general
religious experience, which SK is given to restore. It is
faith in Christ
,
hope in the Goq of the Bible , and the love
thereby Christ loved us , that SK seeks to preserve.
Many existential virtues attend Kierkegaard's doctrine
of faith . But because faith is perfect before God only when
one stands ready to break with ethics, the writer seriously
doubts whether faith can safeguard the Christian experience
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of inwardness. Abraham's faith was richest and most exem-
plary v/hen he was willing to heed the voice of God by op-
posing the established norms of ethics. Furthermore, nothing
is specifically stated by SK in uhe literature to exclude
the inference that the Abrahamic incident can be repeated.
One may only vvonder, therefore, v/hat can prevent some persons
from so receiving private revelations that they slay not
only their own, but also the sons of their neighbors. Li-
cense in breaking with ethics woula result in social anarchy.
In this, Christianity is corrupted.
The writer admits that he has an uneaay conscience
whenever he charges SK with so obvious a weakness, since there
may lie hidden in the literature a good reason why Abraham's
experience cannot be repeated. But having been unable to lo-
cate such a reason, the criticism must remain.
The criterion of suffering , while it may always ac-
company Christian inwardness, cannot of itself prove that a
given inward discomfiture proceeds out of Christian tensions.
Inward suffering for an ideal is a rather ubiquitous phenome-
non. It m.ay attend both the Christian Vv^ho suffers over the
contradiction of existence and the pagan who suffers because
he cannot see his wicked ideals realized. One can only im-
agine v/hat degree of inward suffering Hitler reached as his
dreams of power crumbled before his eyes, for example. Prom
the fact that there is inv/ard suffering, therefore, no more
than the following may be inferred: (A) The datum that there
is a person who has certain values set before him; (Bj That
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this one who grieves does so because such values are not yet
realized. Whether or not such a one suffers for the truth,
hov/ever, is a separate, and vastly more important, question.
The criterion of hope is inadequate for the same
reason. Hope is a consolation which may accompany devotion
to the devious as well as to the constructive. The fool
hopes in his riches, vihile the Christ ian hopes in Goa.
When the criterion of love is examined, however, one
instinctively feels like removing his shoes, for the ground
he v;alks on is holy. At no point in the literature aoes SK
wax more eloquent than when he teases out the inner parts
of Christian love. The joy which the student experiences at
this point is well expressed by Geismar:
I confess that I aid not know v;hat it means to believe
that God is love, until I read this passage in Kierke-
gaard. It means to believe that the only real -value of
life is love, and that love is the content of eternal
life. It means to be v/illing to risk being deceived
again and again, rather than lose love by being, dis-
trustful. It means to permit oneself to be governed
by the dictates of love against the fear of finite con-
sequences, because love is the sole content of man's
iirimortality .-^
There can be little doubt but what love is the perfect
test for normative Christian inwardness. Vi/hereas faith, suf-
fering, and hope may sometimes miss the point to Christ's
saving grace, love cannot. Paul is eloquent on this point
in First Corinthians, chapter thirteen, calling the powers
of the poet to express the m^agnif icence of the Christian goc-
1. Geismar, LRTK, 69-70.
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trine, that when everything else fails, love remains.
The reason v/hy love is the most certain of all the
criteria of inwardness is that it forms a bond between per-
sonalities. Love is that condition of selflessness vhich is
present in the heart of him who believes that the worth and
value of others is such that he is willing to give himself
for them. The central message of the Bible is the love cf
God toward us; therefore, not to say that love is a Christian
criterion of inwardness is but to evince the fact that one
has not yet grasped the meaning of the Christian way of life.
While a man may fail in suffering, hope, and faith, ana still
not be far from the kingdom, therefore, he who refuses to
love has no inv/ardness at all. The man vi?ho will not love
others simply declares his own person to be of supreme value.
But it was for the redemption of others that Christ taught
the meaning of love. If man is not worthy of respect and
devotion, what, then, is?
G. The Negative Criteria and Generic Inwardness.
These criteria, like the positive, are assuredly valid.
Hegelianism (when interpreted sub specie aeterni ) des-
troys the significance of inv\/ara concern. If the real is the
rational and the rational the real, then the individual's
inner vitalities of spirit, v-;hich do not happen to be rational,
need not be accented. In any consistent sub specie aeterni
world view, the indiviaual cannot be accounted for. Observe
the inadeouacy of Spinoza's treatment of the finite modes.

264
for example.
Idle spe culat ion
,
by rendering the contribution of
personal concern worthless. Is also a valid test for the
lack of earnest passion to develop inwardness and character.
The sai'iB is true of objectivity
.
By definition,s peculation
and objectivity are disconcered with the transforming pov/ers
of inv;ardness.
Our answer to the question whether the negative cri-
teria can safeguard a test for the absence of generic in-
wardness, therefore, is an unequivocal yes. The more one is
concerned with that which excludes the r elevance of the self,
the less he is concerned with the self. That is evident.
D. The Negative Criteria and Christian Inwardness.
The regretful side of SK is that in his enthusiasm to
break with immanence (that inwardness might become more in-
tense), he failed to see that he was severing connections
v/ith the only rule by wriich he actually could keep inward-
ness intact. How zhis is so will appear as v/e now turn to
learn v/hether the negative criteria succeed in safeguarding
Christian inwardness.
In order that we might get right to the point, let us
waive the criteria of Hegelianism ana oojectivity. They con-
tribute to the issue only in a suborainate way. \Wiat con-
cerns us directly is SK's decision to break with coherence .
Let us recall that the complete irrationality of the absolute
paradox is appealed to as the basis for Christian inwardness.
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The superior glory of Christianity is presumed to be the
fact that it rests upon that v/hlch, when viewed by reason,
is discovered to be completely offensive and totally dis-
continuous with the categories of coherence. In the opinion
of the writer, this turn in the literature is fatal, for it
introauces such chaos into the epistemological situation
that even the criterion of love, secured at so dear a price,
is jeopardized. The following three points summarize the
reasons v/hy we have a feeling of deepest regret over bK's
choice to relate Christianity and coherence ant ipathetically
:
First
,
by breaking with the canons of coherence as
that test by which we determine what v;e miay mie aningfully be-
lieve, SK destroyed the Christian's only hope of maicing his
aecision for Christ significant. If "to accept the idea of
a 'God-man' is m^uch the same as accepting the idea of a
'round square, '"^ then it is no more m^eaningful to ask a man
to accept Christ than to accept a four-angled triangle . It
is amazing that SK either never saw this, or, seeing it,
apparently was not troubled by it.
Second, SK actually was incorrect in his supposition
that the God-Man doctrine is the most offensive fact with
which reason can collide. It is much more offensive, for
example, to believe that God came into history , but aia not
come into history . It is also more offensive to believe that
God came into history as a hal
f
of individual or as an angle
2. Mackintosh, TMT , 247.
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worm . Org v/ould easily run out of pen and ink attempting to
exhaust the possible combinations of paradox which are far
more offensive to reason than the iaea of the whole God tak-
ing to Himself human nature. If collision with reason is a
basis for inwardness, surely Christianity is lost. i^Hirther-
more , even if one were to grant the argument that offense is
greatest only in the case of the God-Man, what is to prevent
the GoQ-Man miyths in pagan religions from serving faith just
as well? Again, Christianity is lost.
Third, SK erred tragically in his basic assumption
that the more the intellect is offended, the more an invi^ard-
ness is aroused. This is not true psychologically. The
actual state of affairs is that for thinking men--ana these
are the only kind who will turn inwardly anyway--passionate
inwardness and coherence are proport ionately , not dispropor-
tionately, related. If one is informed that his house is
burning, for example, his passion increases in proportion to
his assurance of the coherence and objectivity of the evi-
dence involved. If he has no house, ana if there is no such
thing as fire, then a yawn, not inwardness, is in order.
Kierkegaard might have immensely strengthened his
case, therefore, by demonstrating the fact that the incarna-
tion and coherence are continuously related . He could then
have m.oved from that point to the inference thst all men
ought to become concerned with themselves on the ground that
there is something in the incarnat ion which demands that either
one put his house in order or suffer judgment. If this course
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had been pursued, there is little doubt but what the good
points in SK, which now can so easily be overlooked because
of the counteracting irrat ionalism, coula have been not only
preserved, but also increased in value. If one is to leap to
Christ just because in Him paradox is found, and not because
of the spirit's continuity with the coherent truth of the
incarnation, then surely a leap to a square circle will bo
as v;ell, providing inwardness is aroused*
E. Conclusions to the Dissertation,
The dissertation has come to the following threa con-
clusions ;
First
,
Kierkegaard's ideal to restore individuality
is impeccable, No demonstration of this will be made beyond
asking the salient Question once more. If man is not worthy
of respect, what, then, isV The rarity of SK's vision can
be appreciated when we remember how few philosophers actually
have had the interests of indiviaual m.en at heart when they
penned their systems. Against all forms of phiiosoohic in-
sight which leave man out, SK stands courageously bayonetted.
Furthermore, the means which he used were "Che highest. He
did not call for pov/er, like Nietzsche, He turned to the
vitalities of spirit, to the maieutic method of giving in-
ward birth.
Second , the seven criteria which were chosen as major
tests for either the presence or absence of inwardness, are
indubitably valid for securing generic inwaraness. But be-
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cause of a decision to break with coherence, SK reduced the
adequacy of these criteria as tests for Chris tian invmrdness.
A man surely may continue to love his brother if he follows
the Kierkegaardian system, and in so doing fulfill the true
test for Christianity; but he does so in spite of , not because
of, the irrational interpretation of the incarnation. SK,
by encouraging his reader to act in defiance of reason, cor-
rupted the uniqueness of decision for Christ. For this rea-
son the dissertation accepts the following conclusions of both
Grene and Blanshard:
If a thinker vi-ithout the absurd is an inconsiderable
fellow, the thinker who loves the absurd for its own
sake is, in his ov/n way, a questionable character, for
he may easily turn out as much falsity as truth or as
much nonsense as sens©,^
Start with the assumption that v.hat Goa says must at
least make human sense, and we knov. what to think when
some dervish from the desert or from berchtesgaden
raises his voice to claim guidance from above. Start
from the assumption of Kierkegaard. . .that revelation
must needs be an offence to our understanaing, and
what
of the
— — — — — ^ ^ — — — — — — —
is to prevent us also from becoming blind followers
le blind?^
A decision for irrat ionalism at one point leaves the whole
system open to serious attack. The very coherehce which SK
used to establish love as a criterion is rashly cast aside
when the incarnation is discussed. The implications of this
are legion.
One can only wish that SK had submiitted his manuscripts
to friends for criticism. Iwuch grief coula have oeen saved
3. Grene, DP, 37.
4. Blanshard, Art., 6 3.
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had he been brought to see that v.'ithout a coherent meta-
physics and. epistemology to buttress the Christian exper-
ience, the act of inv/ardness is submerged in subjectivity.
Ivdght not a consistent cOiiimunist, Tor example, hail with
gusto the irrational siae of SK? Might he not be v/ise enough
to perceive that if oiie man can reject the ubiquity of co-
herence to establish love , another can do so to enthrone
hatred and malice ? Because of a serious irrationalism at
this one point in the negative criteria, therefore, the
Kierkegaardian system can with very little effort be con-
verted into the Heidegger brand of national socialism or the
Jean-raul Sartre mood of existential atheism.
Third , the most horest ansver we can give to the
ouestion whether or not SK's criteria are valid is that the
criteria are a fountain from Vvhich both sv^/eet and oitter
waters flow. In the Kierkegaardian system Lhe seasoned
existentialist finds peace, on the one hana, vvhile the
trained logician cries out in protest, on the other. Vve
shall make no effort to harmonize these conflicting emphases
in the literature. It is enough to say that here, indeed,
is the final paradox within a system of paradox: After fight-
ing for Christianity with undaunted heroism, SK then sur-
rendered his gains by taking the sv/ord of reason out of
Christianity's scabbard and handing it over to the very
forces which already were using it falsely to destroy the
individual.
The aissertat^on may well close with the sagacious
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words of Allen:
Suffice it to say that few men have offered to G-od such
a sacrifice as he did, yet surely what he gave was that
one sacrifice v/hich Ood does not ask of his children,
for it v;as a quenching of the Inner Light,
5. Allen, KTL, 22.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The problem of the dissertation is to discover and
evaluate the criteria of verification to which Soren Kierke-
gaard appealed in his effort to make secure the postulate
that truth is subjectivity.
KIERKEGAARD'S rROBLEMS
The man as a problem to himself * In a very signifi-
cant way Kierkegaard reflected in his philosophy of religion
the unique characteristics of his own person. The fact of a
neurotic and melancholy soul, together with recurrent dis-
turbances induced by a chronically weak body, do nol^explaln
the man, to be sure; but without an appreciation of such
traits, an adequate sympathy for his thoughts cannol^e en-
joyed. Kierkegaard's melancholy, foij^xample
,
mercilessly
lashed him on to profound inward analyses. By experiencing
the dread of a revulsion/attraction dialectic in the home, a
tension wherein Christianity simultaneously became a fear and
a love, Kierkegaard learned the existential meaning of wit-
nessing to sin, suffering, and repentance. His frustrated
amorous relations with Regina Olsen became the catalytic agent
in a lifetime effort to tack between the hope inreconciliation
and fear in separation. The nervous strain, aroused by this
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anxiety, was released in a fertile literature.
Kierkegaard's vocation . He wrote for the purpose of en-
couraging men to become individuals and Christians. But to
make the task as difficult as possible, Kierkegaard translated
the act of becoming a Christian into an existential transaction^
an inwardness of passion the power of which can be known only
by a total inward transformation of the existing individual.
A man is a Christian only when he is the existential mediator
of time and eternity. Kierkegaard claimed metaphysical contin-
uity with Socrates on the ground that the sage of Athens, like
himself, required that actual virtue be reduplicated in the
life of the one who professes a knowledge of virtue. Like this
mian, Socrates, Kierkegaard sought to encourage this reduplica-
tion by means of the maieutic method. In Lessing Kierkegaard
found steady support for his belief that by the strength of
quantitative evidences one can never come to a qualitative
decision of faith.
Kierkegaard's anthropology . Man is a synthesis of body
and soul cp.rried on by spirit. He is likewise a synthesis of
time and eternity mediated inthe moment by a passionate decision
of spirit. The essence of man, therefore, is spirit. Man is
fully man only v/hen spirit is active, i.e ., only when time ajid
eternity are mediated through^ecisive inwardness.
The dialectic of inwardness
.
Spiritual inwardness is
what is meant by the proposition, subjectivity is truth.
Inwardness is measured by three stages or spheres. The
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aesthetic stage calls for the least passion, since in it the
individual lives by the thrill of a decisionless round of im-
mediacy. The only redemptive hope for th(^esthete is that in
colliding with boredom he is forced to turn inward. The
ethical stage accentuates inwardness seriously, for the task
of the individual is understood as a response to duty. At
once, however, paradox, which is somewhat submerged by the in-
cognito of irony, emerges. The task of mediating time and
eternity through absolute devotion to duty is observed to be
an impossibility in concreto . No one has ever been so devoted
to the good that he actuaJ-ly fulfilled the whole rule of duty.
One passes from the ethical to the religious stage only when
the humor of hi^ontradiction is tempered by the terrifying
feeling of inward guilt. A man is religious v\fhen, seeing his
task, he repents for not fulfilling it. Heligiousness A , il-
lustrated by Socrates, does not make guilt absolute, for it
assumes that under ideal conditions mediation is possible.
Reminiscence is the way back to eternity, hegiousness B
,
by
breaking with reminiscence, concludes that existence itself
is contradictory and that the distance between God and man is
infinite. Religiousness B, therefore, interprets life para-
doxically. When ar^ndividual awakens from, his innocence in
ignorance and comes to himself through freedom, that moment he
becomes a sinner who, through^he very fact of existing, has
broken exist entially with his task of mediating time and^ter-
nity. The contradiction of existence is essential, never ac-
cidental.
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KIERKEGAARD'S NEGATIVE CRITERIA
Speculation . As a formal discipline, speculation may
be a good and wholesome mental exercise; but as a m.eans by
which to mediate existence itself, it is a caricature. IT
the real is the rational and the rational is the real, then
the ethical individual is not real. Speculation may sketch
the possibility of becoming, but itcan never move on to ef-
feet its actuality. By requiring no inwardness of spirit,
speculation corrupts ethical decision and, consequently, the
deciding individual. While Christianity makes men higher than
the universal, speculation submerges the individual under the
universal
•
Hegelianism
.
Kierkegaard interpreted Hegel as defending
a sub specie aeterni philoEophy of world history. He, there-
fore, appreciated no empirical possibilities in Heg^ Because
Hegel identified the real with the rational, SK charged him
with a destruction of history and change in general, and of the
existing Individual, Johannes Climacus, in particular. Hegel's
aialectic, with its thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, starts
from a pure immediacy which eliminates the need for that rad-
ical break with eternity which makes God's revelation essential.
Kierkegaard contended that only the existing individual, not
an abstract logic, can mediate timeand eternity.
Objectivity . Passionless objectivity is a sign of the
absence of truth because it requires no inwara decisions from.
the individual. Quantitative, apologetic evidences for Christ-

ianity ca^ never effect a qualitative leap of faith. Evidences
never bring one to decision, for they remain too congenial to
the moods of the unshattered ego. Because faith is a leap in
defiance of what reason finds to be objectively paradoxical,
all apologetic attempts to placate the problem of one's accep-
ting Christianity are as detrimental as they are futile. The
decision for Christianity must be kept painful if the individual
is to be accented fully.
KIERKEGAARD'S AFPlKFiATlVE CRITERIA
ji'aith
.
Faith requires the realm of rixistenz . It is re-
leased whenever the individual lives passionately coram deo .
Just as sin is the refusal of the individual to live before
God, so faith is the delight of the existing individual to
find himself transparently in God. Faith is that pure, exis-
tential response to the voice of God in which the spirit is so
sensitively developed, that the individual, by discovering
in the absolute his real meaning, becomes greater than the uni-
versal. Faith is finest when a man acts out of valor rather
than out of duty. By faith the ethical man rises above the
conventional demands of duty, A man of faith is willing, at
the least mandate of God, to offer up sacrifices which go be-
yond the collective demands of ethics. Faith is unalloyed
Bxistenz
. It is that position of inward earnestness in which
the individual, shattered through his committal to Christ, is
made sensitive in his whole inward self to follow God alone.
Suffering
.
Suffering is that experience through which
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one inevitably passes whenever he becomes sensitive to the
conflict which rages between his absolute task to love all
men, on the one hand, and the concrete impossibility of mak-
ing good that assignment, on the other. Suffering is an
existential det erm.inant , an inwardness which emerges from the
paradoxicalness oi^existence itself. The nearest caricature
of Christian suffering is the smile of the humorist. But the
humorist, while quite appreciating the contradiction of life,
cannot, in explaining the contradiction, include himself as an
existing individual. Peace of heart is the reward of religious
suffering,
Hope , Hope is that power of spirit whereby eternity,
which cannot become an existential possession, is held^ast as
a spiritual possibility. Eternity as a possibility is the
basis of contemporaneity with Christ, the conditio sine qua
non for discipleship. The only enemy of hope is fear. Fear
is the recoiling of man, caught in dread, as he staggers before
the implications of his ideal task as a free soul, Hope is
a proof that the existing individual has successfully put
himself in contact with transtemporal values.
Love , Love is the grand criterion of inwardness, since
it is the way that Christ perfectly mediated time and eternity,
Christ is the absolute existential mediator in that he is pure
love in His own person, Man becomes a true individual, there-
fore, only when he loves. Love is the inexhaustive treasure
of the spirit, for as long as one continues to love, so long
there lies ahead of him an infinity of love yet to be real-
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ized. Heathenish love is characterized by mutuality, while
Christianity isexpressed by a limitless selfless-love. The
K
horizontal reference in love is, therefore, concern for one's
neighbor, while the vertical is love to God with^ll the heart
and mind and soul. With these two duties defined, the full
outer limit of m.an ' s creative possibilities has been reached.
CONCLUSIONS
The dissertation has come to the following three con-
clusions:
First, Kierkegaard's ideal of restoring individuality is
impeccable. One can only ask th^question. If man is not worthy
of respect, what, then, is? Kierkegaard made the interests of
man central to his philosophic inquiry, a program of concern
very rarely equalled in the history of philosophic labor.
Furthermore, the m.eans which Kierkegaard followed in restoring
individuality were the highest. He refused violence, prefer-
ring the gentle wooings of the spirit. Like Socrates, he
followed the maieutic method.
Second , the seven criteria examined in the dissertation
are indubitably valid standards for generic inwardness, for
they fairly well exhaust the m.eaning of Existenz as Kierkegaard
used the term. They fail, however, in securing a test for
Christian invvardness. The reason for this is that Kierkegaard,
by breaking with the ubiquity of coherence, left the criteria
epist emologically and metaphysically unfortified. By encourag-
ing men to become Christians in defiance of reason Kierkegaard
corrupted the uniqueness of commitment to Christ. There are
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no compelling arguments in the literature to gainsay the con-
clusion that a God-Man myth in a pagan religion can elicit the
same inwardness as can Christ.
Third , the literature contains an over-all paradox within
a system of paradox. After struggling for Christianity with
undaunted heroism, Kierkegaard then surrendered all of hisgains
by taking the sword of reason out of Christianity's scabbard
and handing it over to the very forces which were using it
falsely to destroy the individual. ?i/hy Kierkegaard did this
remains a puzzle.

AUTOBIOGRAPHy
Edward John Garnell was born in Antigo, Vvisconsin,
June 28, 1919. His father, Herbert Glaua, an ordained Bap-
tist minister in Lansing, Michigan, ana his mother, Fannie
E., are both living. He received his A.B. degree from
V\/'heaton College, Vheaton, Illinois, in 1941, majoring in
philosophy. In 1944 he received the Th.B. and Th. M, degrees
from vVestm-inster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, majoring in apologetics. In 194 3 he v/on the Wil-
liam. Brenton (Ireen, Jr. prize in apologetics. In 1946 he
received the S.'i'.M. degree from Harvara Divinity bchool, ma-
joring in the philosophy of relif-/:ion. In 1948 he received
the Th.D. degree from the same institution, majoring in sys-
tematic theology and the history ana philosophy of religion.
In 1948 he won the first prize in a literary competi-
tion offeree by the Eerdmans Publishing Company for a book.
An Introduction to Christian Apologetics . The prize was
§b,000.
In the summer of 1945 he received an appointment of
instructor in Dhilosophy at Gordon College, Boston, Massachu-
setts, remaining at Gordon for three years. In 1948 he joined
the faculty of the Fuller Theolo; ical Seminary, Pasadena,

292
California, as assoicate professor of systematic theology.
He is married to Shirley Howe Garnell and has one
child, Jean Elaine, aged 2.






Date Due
Demco 293-5


